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ABSTRACT  
 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF 
“NECKLACING” IN COLESBERG 
       
 
 
By 
Sipho Mbuqe  
August 2010 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Leswin Laubscher 
This dissertation examines certain psychological dimensions and implications of 
political violence in general by means of a specific violent incident that took place in 
Colesberg, South Africa in 1985.  Ms. Nokwakha Dilato was murdered by a group of 
people who poured gasoline over her body, placed a car tire, filled with gasoline, around 
her neck and shoulders, and set her alight – a practice known as “necklacing”, and which 
became widespread during that time as a way of killing suspected or confirmed 
collaborators with the Apartheid regime.  Three sources of data about this event were 
analyzed for this dissertation.  First, I conducted a series of interviews with three of the 
perpetrators; second, I analyzed the court transcripts of the trial and sentencing of the 
perpetrators, and thirdly, I examined a report of the incident, presented to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and related by the author and poet, Antjie Krog, in a book 
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about the Commission’s proceedings.  These texts were subjected to a qualitative 
hermeneutic semiology, as articulated by Hugh Silverman (1994).  In brief, the texts were 
interrogated as to how it made meaning of the event.  From this analysis, it transpired that 
– on the one hand – the psychological theories of violence, focusing as it does on the 
individual, misses the crucial mediating and situated importance of context, while 
contextual theories (such as those of sociology and anthropology), neglect the agency and 
subjectivity of the individual.  Moreover, analysis reveals a particular ethical and moral 
component to political violence, and violence in general, which is explicated on the basis 
of the African philosophical notion of Ubuntu, and the Levinasian sense of the face.  
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Introduction 
South African, and Nobel Peace prize laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
remarks that “We are bound up in a delicate network of interdependence because, as we 
say in our African idiom, a person is a person through other persons [Ubuntu].  To 
dehumanize another inexorably means that one is dehumanized as well” (Tutu, 1999, 
p35).  Does harming another person indeed mean that you are harming yourself?  And, 
what if you are yourself already “harmed,” such that harming another conceivably has 
less salience in terms of harming or hurting oneself?  Might harming another human 
being imply that the delicate network of interdependence was struck before the other 
was?  What does it mean for one to violate – as in violence – a fellow human being?  And 
how does this view of Archbishop Tutu’s correlate with a psychological view of violence 
that imputes motivation and volition to a singular and individual actor?  All these 
questions are ones this dissertation will grapple with as, indeed, the South African 
populace have, and continues to, as it re-members its past.    
Gobodo-Madikizela (2003, p.6) described the South African past as one in which 
“every black South African, have lived a life shaped by violence and the memories of 
Apartheid.”  One wonders, given the notion of a period post-Apartheid, whether the 
Apartheid past is gone, or is it embedded in our psychic being?  Can we really draw a line 
to mark where the Apartheid past ends and the post-Apartheid begins?  What marks the 
start of the present or the popularly named and oft-referenced post-Apartheid?  
Alternatively, is the present and the past an embodied synergy?   
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Nelson Mandela, referring to South African history marred by racial, gender and 
class oppression and violence, comments that “the purpose of studying history is not to 
deride human action, nor to weep over it or to hate it, but to understand it and then learn 
from it as we contemplate the future” (1998, p.51).  However, a popular and admittedly 
formulaic understanding about history repeating itself cautions against a cursory 
examination of the past, and too eager a desire to “put it behind us,” as it were.  In this 
dissertation I will largely use the term “past” instead of “history” for I want to remain 
within the domain of human experience and when I use the term history, it feels distant, 
suggesting reference to events that happened centuries ago, with little or no resonance to 
my life or the lives of those I know.  Furthermore, the goal is to take what we “put behind 
us” and precisely put it be-fore us – how else can we “learn” from history, as it were, than 
to let it come back to us from the future, inasmuch as we imagine that future on history’s 
anvil.  Hence, whereas history often suggests that the event is gone, past brings the event 
and experience somewhat closer; that is, it also carries an affective weight, rather than 
something that could be grasped (only) through thought.   
In responding to the questions posed before, and by doing so in a way that also 
takes a historical event, or rather an event from the recent past, as its focal point, this 
dissertation grapples more specifically with political violence and a particular incident of 
violence, occurring in the Colesberg region of South Africa in October, 1985.   
The Violent Incident 
In brief, and as a preliminary introduction (much more information is provided in 
later chapters), the violent incident that constitutes this dissertation’s focus, took place at 
the height of anti-Apartheid protests, and during a period of considerable unrest within 
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the country as a whole.  In fact, the government of the day had declared a state of 
emergency, giving the police and military sweeping powers, including detentions without 
trial, presidential rule by decree, and impositions of curfews, for example.  Anti-
Apartheid protests seemed almost to respond in escalating kind, ratcheting up public 
displays of defiance, violent protests and acts of sabotage and violence aimed at 
government institutions, personnel, and “collaborators.”  One such manner of violence, 
aimed at “government collaborators,” “traitors,” or people otherwise considered in 
cahoots with the Apartheid government, or at least not aligned with anti-Apartheid aims 
and ideals, was a public (almost always) form of execution, called necklacing.  In 
necklacing, a rubber tire is placed over the alleged collaborator’s (or impimpi’s) chest and 
arms, gasoline is poured all over the body (and/or poured into the inside of the rubber tire 
as well) and set alight.  The victim suffers severe burns, and almost always succumbs to 
this gruesome death.  Unheard of in South Africa before 1985, the necklacing incident in 
Colesberg was one of the earliest incidents of this form of lethal lynching, whereafter it 
become more and more common in the Black southern African townships as a means of 
meting out punishment to suspected impimpi, and as a supposed warning or deterrent to 
others not to cross the rule and expectation of the particular anti-Apartheid organization 
or their representatives that held sway in the specific township.  In the incident in 
question, a young woman, Mrs. Dilato, was alleged to have ignored a consumer boycott, 
aimed at white businesses in Colesberg.  Ostensibly, this was the main reason for her 
execution.  As we will see, however, there is considerably more to the event.  For now, 
suffice it to note that political violence in general, necklacing as a specific form thereof, 
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and a particular incident of necklacing, occurring in Colesberg in 1980, serves as the 
analytic and interpretative data node and departure point for this dissertation.        
Discourse, History, and Context 
Having staked out the area of interest, and the specific incident of interest, it is 
also necessary to introduce the fact of a particular theoretical and epistemological 
positioning as another border or limit of sorts.  Again, whereas a comprehensive 
explication of some of the assumptions and implications of a discursive approach is 
provided later, its introduction here serves to paint a broad background against which the 
unfolding dissertation will come into more specific relief.  To this end, suffice it to note 
that a discursive approach assumes, fundamentally, that language is constitutive of 
meaning and experience.  Discourse is treated as playing a primary role in structuring 
human experience, meaningfulness or lack thereof.  However, as will become clearer 
later, discourse as used in discourse analysis does not necessarily refer to language only, 
but in fact to an institutionalized way of thinking, manifested as it is through, and in, 
language.  
Discourse  
It is difficult to define discourse because the definition seems to be contingent on 
its use.  Discourse analysis is a central component of this dissertation. Attempts to define 
discourse brings a realization that a definition, which is to say a universally agreed upon, 
or unitary usage, is hard to come by – perhaps even impossible.  However, this does not 
absolve this project from staking out a definition, rather, it becomes even more pressing. 
To that end, definitions of discourse appear to be shaped by how and what the person 
wants to use a narrative for, or understands its usage as (Foucault, 1972; Polkinghorne, 
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1988).  So, for example, one could think of the narrative as composed of tropes (White 
1978), as a channel of domination (van Dijk, 2008), including ideological domination, or 
as a means of social constructionism (Burr, 2003).  Hence, and to complicate matters 
further, the very definition of discourse is its usage; that is, while discourse is defined by 
its usage it also defines the usage.  This dissertation will draw heavily from Burr’s (2003) 
description and application of discourse as it finds expression - but not confining 
expression - in the field of psychology.   
Staking out a position even more precisely, Polkinghorne (1988) approaches a 
segment of discourse as narrative. In its elementary form, discourse “is not a mere 
collection of words and sentences” (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.31), yet a word is where its 
starts.  According to Polkinghorne (1988) discourse is 
a unit of utterances:  it is something written or spoken that is larger than a 
sentence. A discourse is an integration of sentences that produces a global 
meaning that is more than that contained in the sentences viewed independently.  
There are various kinds of discourses, each kind links the sentence that compose it 
according to distinct patterns (p.31).  
 Discourse is an expression of something that is achieved by integration of sentences.  
The meaning is expressed both in the integration of sentences and in the meaning of the 
product.  Further, each sentence is only meaningful in relations to others – never 
independently.  Each sentence points to another and creates a context for understanding.   
If there are various kinds of discourse, then it is not only something written or 
spoken, it is also action, gestures, and rituals - to name a few.  These are the ways people 
pronounce their existence or relate to one another, which is at the “center-stage [of] the 
everyday interactions” (Burr, 2003, p.8).  Therefore, discourse rests on attempting to 
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provide meaning to daily events; it mediates subjectivity and intersubjectivity. According 
to Burr (2003), 
Discourse refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, 
statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of 
events. It refers to a particular picture that is painted of an event, person or class 
of persons, particular way of representing it in a certain light. [That means] a 
multitude of alternative versions are potentially available through language, this 
means that, surrounding any one object, event, person, etc. there may be a variety 
of discourses, each with a different story to tell about the object in question, a 
different way of representing it to the world(p.64).”   
 
Here now we see an extension of discourse beyond sentences to include tropes.  Again, 
language figures importantly in discourse, and the very dynamic manner of language (for 
example by the quote above) assumes that one event can be represented in various ways, 
and by extension, the way language is used to represent an event to render it meaningful. 
So, by introductory example, this dissertation looks at the event of Ms. Dilato’s 
necklacing from three different sources, and also in three different ways.  Even though 
one event took place on October 2, 1985, it generated at least three vastly different 
representations thereof.  Therefore, it is understood in a variety of ways.  But, it is not 
just that different discursive ways of organization render the event meaningful in a 
particular way in representation, but in fact precisely as well that particular discursive 
constellations gave birth to the event.  
 Yet, lest one imagines discourse in too abstract and systemic a manner, Burr 
(2003) also notes that discourse is not only an expression of an object and event, but also 
a person, which introduces subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Describing the permeability 
between identity and discourse, Burr (2003) states that  
  7
identity is constructed out of the discourses culturally available to us and which 
we draw upon in our communications with other people. A person’s identity is 
achieved by a subtle interweaving of many different threads. There is a thread of 
age, …class; ...ethnicity; gender; sexual orientation. All these, and many more, 
are woven together to produce the fabric of a person’s identity (p. 7). 
Discourse is not only central in the expression of the person’s identity but also 
constructs identity. Therefore, identity and discourse are intertwined. The “ways of 
understanding the world do not come from objective reality but from other people, both 
past and present. We are born into a world where the conceptual frameworks and 
categories used by people in our culture already exist” (Burr, 2003, p.7).  In South Africa, 
for example, people were born into racial categories that existed before they were born. 
In most cases these categories are “innocently” referred to as demographics.  Race as a 
demographic category, however, unimaginably frames the experience that a person would 
have in South Africa.  There is therefore a sensitivity to the importance of historical and 
cultural background to the context of an object, event and a person.  Context not only 
carries historical and cultural traces, and refers to the environment, but also situates the 
circumstance that contributes to our understanding of an object, event, and a person.  As 
such, Burr (2003) states that  
Ways of understanding are historically and culturally relative. Not only are they 
specific to particular cultures and periods of history, they are seen as products of 
that culture and history, and are dependent upon the particular social and 
economic arrangements prevailing in that culture at that time (p. 4).”   
Discourse analysis pays special attention not only to how the event is represented, but 
also how the cultural, the historical, the economic and political forces are all interwoven 
in the representation, and how these forces converge and diverge.  
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Context and History 
Crucial to a discursive analysis, consequently, is an examination of context.  
Necklacing has to be seen against a broader contextual background.  This entails an 
examination of aspects of the South African past; its history.  Inasmuch as a context is 
thus presented, one also represents the social which is discursive in that it is constructed 
through articulations, which are the alignment of roles, identities, actions and meaning 
with the intent to re-store contemporaneousness to them.  Clearly, in this view things do 
not have an inherent static meaning; they participate in an open field of meaning making 
and remaking.  In complex form articulatory practices demonstrate the relationship 
between experience, discourse and the possible relational horizons.    
Even though I expressed reservations about the word history earlier, there is a 
sense in which this particular incident of necklacing was as historic an event in 
Colesberg, as it became a historic phenomenon in South Africa, broadly – and perhaps 
even a signature of the 1980s’ resistance against Apartheid.  Yet, it is also true that there 
are various ways in which history can be told or described and events regarded as 
consequential or noteworthy to history (or not).  Hayden White, in Tropics of Discourse: 
Essays in Cultural Criticism, is similarly sensitive to the various ways in which history 
can be told, and by his recommendation, history as a discipline and endeavor “… can 
serve to humanize experience only if it remains sensitive to the more general world of 
thought and action from which it proceeds and to which it returns” (White, 1978, p.50).  
Hence, an approach to necklacing and history of Apartheid must not be an abstraction of, 
or from, human experience, and a narrative thereof should strive to disclose as wide a 
range of possibilities of such experiences as possible.  
  9
Clearly, the stereotypical and intuitive approach to the historical narrative is to 
present it in a linear way, as a sequential chronology of events and facts.  White (1978) 
proposes that we should no longer naively expect that statements about a given epoch or 
complex of events in the past “correspond to some preexisting body of raw facts” (p.47).  
In fact, another way of presenting history is through a discursive writing/reading of 
history, where the gesture is an interpretative one, and where the historical text can be 
regarded as a literary artifact.  
Inasmuch as the discursive stance with regards to the historic text is an 
interpretative one, it is a clear legatee to hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions, 
among others.  In this case history is experienced as a meaningful moment in human 
relations.  An event is historic because it carries a particular meaningfulness or 
meaninglessness.  White (1978) notes:    
Surely the historian[/researcher] does not bring with him a notion of the “story” 
that lies embedded within the “facts” given by the record.  For in fact there are an 
infinite number of such stories contained therein, all different in their details, each 
unlike the other. What the historian [researcher] must bring to his consideration of 
the record are general notions of the kinds of stories that might be found there, 
just as he must bring to consideration of the problem of narrative representation 
some notion of the pre-generic plot structure. (p.60)  
The above quotation is particularly salient to this project, and well at a number of 
levels.  First, by proposing a discursive widening of the seemingly isolated act of 
violence, and by inserting necklacing into sociopolitical and historical articulation and 
practices, the quote sensitizes one to the abundance of stories and destinations the 
interpretation can journey to; secondly, the above quote is relevant to methodology, 
which – as I will explicate later - is a particular combination of hermeneutic semiology as 
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advocated by Silverman (1994).  Thirdly, the quotation challenges the notion of an 
ultimate, fundamental, essential, or timeless truth to the historical event to be unearthed 
or discovered by the diligent and talented researcher.  Instead, and already by the data 
points used in this dissertation – three accounts of the same event – it becomes clear that 
there are multiple truths to be found in the seemingly same, and singular event.   
The three different recordings of the event I use in this dissertation are not just 
“raw facts”, but also stories, that is, narrative representations. Moreover, as stories these 
records—data sources—are not just plain accounts of necklacing, but they carry 
processes and conventions for the very telling of the story.  White (1978) says  
Historical narratives are not only models of the past events and processes, but also 
metaphorical statements which suggests a relations of similitude between such 
events and processes and the story types that we conventionally use to endow the 
events of our lives with culturally sanctioned meanings… historical narrative is 
not only a reproduction of the events reported in it, but also a complex of symbols 
which gives direction for finding an icon of the structure of those events (p.88).   
Hence, one can now ask: if necklacing, Colesberg and violence are symbols and 
signify, what and how do they symbolize and signify?  If the discursive complex is 
precisely that – a complex and interrelated system of signification and symbolization – 
how is one to read such signification?  The challenge is for an approach that is able to 
respect such a rich, complex, and symbolic meaning - both methodologically and 
theoretically.   
Within psychology, White’s (1978) representation of the past as history and –
story, is echoed some by Harré’s discursive psychology.  Harré (1995) suggests that 
psychology approaches the social as a discursive act as “experience… is created by 
semiotics, ritual and discursive acts which are effective only in relation to specific 
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cultural-symbolic and socio-structural contexts’ (p.5).  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, consequently, the psychological literature on violence in general, and 
political violence in particular, will be examined for the manner in which it illumes this 
cultural-symbolic and socio-structural relationship to psyche, which is perhaps also to 
say, psychology.   
Violence and Political Violence in the Apartheid State 
It is entirely possible that someone may take issue with the title of this section, 
arguing that violence in the Apartheid state, by definition, is political violence, or that the 
distinction, even if it existed, is impossible to make.  Of course one could also argue that 
inasmuch as Apartheid, by its very nature, was intrinsically violent, on the one hand, and 
that every single aspect of life was regulated by Apartheid, on the other, every action – 
from domestic violence to a mugging for example – is informed by a political regulation, 
and hence every act of violence is also political violence.  These difficulties of definition 
and description notwithstanding, it may also be that necklacing poses a particular 
difference – is beating one’s spouse in any way similar to publicly putting a petrol-filled 
tire on someone’s shoulder, and setting it alight?   
I am deferring the questions of what constitutes political violence, and the 
ambiguities and difficulties attendant on that description, for later, but wish to proceed in 
this introductory staking out of the issues, to draw on an almost intuitive and 
commonsense understanding of violence under oppression.  In situating the dissertation, 
and developing its central questions, methods, and theoretical placement, I start by 
arguing that political violence in South Africa of the 1980s (the period this study will 
focus on) had evolved progressively, and had its precursive prelude in the preceding 
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decades during the height of formalized and entrenched Apartheid policy.  Indeed, 
political violence was evident from the moment of Apartheid’s inception, in 1948, albeit 
manifested differently, and with varied force. 
I enter political violence through political discourse, which is fundamentally 
around which identities were constituted and articulated.  An examination of political 
violence through discourse appreciates the complexities of human action and experiences 
– a point made articulately by Rumi (1997) for the comprehensive relationship between 
discourse and human being:   
Human beings are discourse. That flowing moves through you whether you say 
anything or not. Everything that happens is filled with pleasure and warmth 
because of the delight of the discourse that’s always going on. (Rumi, 1997, p.76). 
Human being and discourse are inseparable, just as meaning and actions are. Human 
beings and discourse are the social, which is also the place for the constitution of 
violence.  The study of political violence is primarily the study of human conduct; a 
violation of (a) person/s by (an) other/s.  It is an examination of the relations between self 
and others; a relation of difference and alterity.  In a startling manner, then, violence is 
quite human, and from the outset, the notion of violence as a mechanical cost-benefit 
equation, or some or other similar mechanical conception that dehumanizes it, is not one 
this dissertation subscribes to.  Of course this is not to condone or endorse it, but rather to 
say and admit that as action in context, as action in discourse, there may well be a rather 
human meaningfulness to it. 
This is, admittedly, not altogether how violence is talked about in general, and in 
the psychological literature in particular.  To be sure there are several ways violence is 
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talked about, theorized, and studied, with some ways carrying greater legitimizing 
authority than others.  Moreover, these ways define and shape our views and 
commonsense understanding on the subject, as it does the academic. I will argue that 
dominant theories of violence have de-humanized violence and by doing so, separated it 
from the sphere of everyday and general human activity and possibility.  In my view (as I 
will argue in greater detail later), violence is always and already in the realm of humanity 
and therefore a human affair. Violence, whether in the extremes of war, or in the 
everyday banality of political barbs and insults, is an interpersonal phenomenon.  And, 
when regarded as such, opens up an ethical dimension.  Of course it is always so that 
violence invokes questions of right or wrong, of the violation of rights or not, but I will 
argue that such an approach involves ethics and not the ethical.  That is, inasmuch as 
violence is dehumanized and considered an abject aberration, occurring among “sick” or 
“disturbed” individuals, and in “rare” cases, a perversion of humanity, rather than part 
and parcel of it, violence becomes a matter of law, to be regulated and managed as a 
transgression of what is “right” or “wrong” vis a vis ethics rules.  On the other hand, 
however, if violence is considered part and parcel of what it is to be human, arising as it 
does from the interpersonal, or the possibility of its manifestation being located in the 
interpersonal, then its occurrence is a matter of the ethical, before law, that is, of what it 
is to be with others by the very fact of being with others – a metaphysical first concern, as 
it were.  Asking the question of what it means then to be human, is perhaps not altogether 
a strange and distancing move within the African context: reconsider the quote that 
started this chapter – Archbishop Tutu’s “delicate network of interdependence” that is 
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also a fundamental organizing cultural trope for what it is to be an African, that is 
Ubuntu.  
  15
CHAPTER ONE 
The Historical Context 
This chapter places political violence and necklacing in Colesberg, South Africa, 
during the 1980s within a discursive historical context.  First, I examine apartheid 
discourse, and how it worked to create “us” and “them” social divisions.  Additionally, I 
argue that even as this discourse resulted in enforced segregation and domination, the 
very seeds of its demise were already present, from the beginning.  Put differently, 
alongside a discourse that serves to entrench and legitimize Apartheid, a process and 
dynamic ran parallel, the aim of which was to overthrow and destroy Apartheid.  
Norval’s work, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (1996), provides a helpful 
description of the emergence and development of Apartheid discourse.  Drawing on the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2001), Norval (1996) notes that the key descriptive 
trope for South Africa in the 1980s (both in the everyday and the academic), was “crisis” 
(Norval, 1996).  The hegemony of the Apartheid state was in crisis, and its regulatory 
practices started to fail visibly.  It could no longer contain and manage daily social 
relations, and the social in general.  Again, and Norval makes this point powerfully as 
well, amongst everything Apartheid was or aimed to be, at heart it strove to organize the 
social and social relations. The social is “not an entity separable from actual people and 
the activities in which we find it [rather it is] the ongoing concerting and coordinating of 
individuals’ activities” (Smith, 1998, p.6).  That is to say, the social is the activities, 
interactions and relations between people which include both the everyday mundane (yet 
meaningful) activities, as well as the uncommon activities of everydayness.  The social 
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incorporates both social organization and social relations (Smith, 1998).  Despite its 
painfulness, or perhaps because of its painfulness, Apartheid is inconceivable outside 
human relations; in fact it is its painfulness that brings up the social in it.  The social is 
the complex web of relations from the institutional and organizational to the personal and 
individual.  
Many scholars of the social, including Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Norval (1996) 
and Smith (1998), agree that the social is a discursively constituted phenomenon– “the 
real force which contributes to the molding and constitution of social relations” (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001, p.110).  As “the multifarious practices and rituals, verbal and non-
verbal, through which a certain sense of reality and understanding of the nature of the 
society were constituted and maintained” (Norval, 1996, p.2), discourse provides a 
meaningful sense of reality and understanding in thought and in everyday/everynight 
activities.  
Apartheid and Discourse 
As a South African one often wonders why Apartheid kept going for so long 
when today there is almost unanimous agreement that it was wrong and an illegitimate 
system of governance?  What kept the National Party in power for so long, and what did 
the party promise the White electorate that returned it to power with every election cycle 
prior to 1994?  In other words, what was the “Apartheid promised land” and to whom 
was the promise pledged?  
Traditionally, Apartheid scholars tended to provide explanations through one of 
three perspectives: liberal, Marxist, and Afrikaner Nationalist (Louw, 2004).  As valuable 
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as the insights derived from those perspectives are, the fact of the matter is still that they 
are all thoroughly rooted in a modernist academic ethic and assumptive frame.  So, for 
example, whether it is the progressive emergence of the individual in liberalism, the 
election of a people by a divine god in Afrikaner nationalism, or the inevitable class 
struggle and conflict of Marxism, each of these propose an inexorable and essential 
component to history, society, and/or individuals – an essence almost outside of and 
independent of the very people it affects and effects.  In contrast, a discursive approach is 
much less amenable to such essential truths and extra-subjective dynamics, and has much 
more of a kinship to the so called postmodern and post structural approaches and 
positions.  Here, truth is contested and plurivocal, meaning that the truth of Apartheid, as 
it were, is contested, multivoiced, and complex.  Indeed, there may not be a single truth 
for all times, but many truths, from many positions. 
 Political discourse, then, is also fluid, even as there are constant attempts and 
jockeying to fix the meaning of things.  Discourse conjugates and serves as the 
conjuncture for what was otherwise loose and particular to create what is 
“commonsense.”  Best and Kellner (1991) note that the poststructuralist take on discourse 
is that “meaning is not simply given, but socially constructed across a number of 
institutional sites and practices” (p.26).  It is through discourse that the different 
tributaries of human experience are channeled and charged to be a current of collective 
experience.  Discourse is an open field which opens the possibilities of articulation, 
movements and struggles - “a site and object of struggle where different groups strive for 
hegemony and the production of meaning and ideology” (Best and Kellner, 1991, p 26).  
Discourse is the central tool in defining and constituting frontiers. Where Apartheid is 
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concerned, similarly, the horizon of what could be thought, practiced, imagined, 
promised was constructed over time, and as a result of this discursive struggle and 
“frontier-fixing.”   
Several historical events are often offered by many of those historians referenced 
earlier as reasons or motivations for Apartheid’s emergence.  Yet, as Laubscher (2005) 
notes with respect to Afrikaner identity making, the same can be said for historical 
Apartheid motivation, namely, that “consensus in identifying historical events 
notwithstanding, no agreement exists about any one, or any particular combination, of 
these experiences functioning as definitive identity crucible” (Laubscher, 2005, p. 309).  
Hence some historians identify the Anglo-Boer war, or the South African war as it is 
known now, as crucial to Apartheid’s emergence.  In this telling, Afrikaners were a 
people who bore the scars of the war, having been defeated on the battle field, and seeing 
their dreams of an independent country being dashed.  Just before the war, the Boers had 
two promising and prosperous independent states; after the war they were a small 
minority under British rule.  Taking into account that the war was particularly brutal – it 
included, for example, the incarceration of Afrikaner women and children in 
concentration camps and a horrific British “scorched earth” policy that decimated 
Afrikaner farms and livelihood - the stage was supposedly set for a lasting resentment 
and wound.  Afrikaner nationalism and Apartheid promised to be the salve, the healing 
for this trauma.  As such, Apartheid was not discontinuous with the battle between 
Afrikaner and English post the Anglo-Boer war, but a confident assertion of a new 
security, and a new assurance in apartness, in Apartheid. 
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Similarly, for example, other authors offer different reasons or motivations for 
Apartheid.  Moodie (1975), for example, argues that a particular brand of Kuyperian 
Calvinism authorized a sense of a people elected by God to fulfill a special shepherding 
mission in Africa, the reward for which was the deliverance of the land as home.  Hence 
Apartheid is a manifestation of God’s word, sanctioning apartness – in fact, commanding 
it.  Yet, perhaps the reason why there are so many varied and carrying reasons, 
motivations, and theories as to “why Apartheid”, is that this search for an essence, a 
singular motivational truth to Apartheid, is a futile exercise.  Instead, all and none of 
these factors can be seen as playing a role for the manner in which they were all 
articulated or interpellated in a discursive horizon and organization.  As such, and by that 
organization, two discursive signifiers and tropes are of particular note, namely the 
“volkseie”, and the fear of “gelykstelling”. 
The Volkseie, and the Fear of Gelykstelling 
Both Norval (1996) and Giliomee (2003) agree that Apartheid was not primarily 
concerned with racial segregation, but rather with the survival of the Afrikaner as group.  
Apartheid as system promised nothing less than the survival of the group, premised on a 
clear delineation of what is particular to the group (the “volkseie”) which, of course, 
implies and marks what (and whom) is not part of the group by the same measure (the 
“volksvreemde,” what is “alien to the people”).  Laubscher (2005, p. 305, italics in 
original) writes that volk is “a thorny term to translate, as it includes notions of nation, 
but self-contained in the sense of a uniquely delimited people”.    
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Giliomee (2003) translates gelykstelling (Afrikaans) as “social leveling.”  Less 
attractively, but more precisely, gelykstelling translates to “setting or making equal”, 
from gelyk meaning equal, even and/or similar, and stelling, which is to set, put, arrange 
in place, or to assert.  The comparative sense of whom one is equal, superior, or inferior 
to, has particular salience, right from the moment of contact between colonists and 
indigenous peoples, and later between warring colonial peoples.  One may even extend 
the argument of difference and measurement of worth between the colonial power 
(Britain, for example), and the now “fallen” Afrikaner who had “gone native”, claiming 
South Africa as theirs, and becoming more and more “uncouth” as they removed 
themselves from allegiance to the civilized European centers; or, on the other hand, from 
the Afrikaner’s point of view, the measurement of worth with themselves as a band of 
God’s chosen elect,, higher than the heathen natives to be sure, but also morally higher 
than the British colonial master, who has lost God, and become corrupt.  Throughout 
South Africa’s history, this sense of whom one is equal to, and by which measure, would 
be a recurrent and framing motif.  From those introductory encounters between the 
Khoikhoi to the period post the South African war, where Afrikaners faced socio-
economic and political circumstances under British rule not altogether dissimilar from 
Blacks, Giliomee (2003) argues strongly for the persistent and dynamic frame that is 
gelykstelling.  In fact, Gilliomee (2003) argues for the dynamic dread of gelykstelling not 
as a chapter, episode, or phase, but as the very spine of Apartheid. As such, it pervaded 
every sphere of life, reaching beyond the confines of church to the political, cultural and 
economical as well.  
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Where race and caste is concerned, Giliomee (2003) writes that   
The burghers [Later Afrikaners] who lived in isolation in the interior beyond the 
first mountain ranges went to great lengths to maintain their link with the 
established Dutch Reformed Church with its Calvinist creed, but were largely 
self-sufficient administratively and politically. In the absence of the standing 
police force or army outside Cape Town, they had to assert their authority as 
masters. They guarded against any form of gelykstelling or social leveling with 
their slaves and servants and restricted their church largely to Europeans 
(Giliomee, 2003, p. xiv).  
Hence, anxiety regarding gelykstelling takes different forms over the years – from 
Cape slavery, through British subjugation and oppressive rule, to the establishment of 
independent Boer republics, through a series of wars with both the British and various 
indigenous peoples, to Apartheid.  Inherent to the comparison and fear around 
gelykstelling is the sense of mastery, “exclusivity and superiority” (Giliomee, 2003, 
p.44).   
This sense of mastery comes to expression in a particularly powerful and common 
word, baas, and the derivative baasskap.  From the Dutch, baas is translated as master or 
boss (in fact, baas is the etymological root for boss), and baasskap is the position of 
being a boss, of being in control.  Giliomee (2003) quotes Hendrik Verwoerd, prime 
minister, and one of the primary architects of Apartheid, referring to South Africa as “a 
white man’s country where he must remain the master.”  It is, then, a desire for mastery 
in separation, in apartness, which demands a delineation of what is one’s own (the 
volkseie), or particular to the group in Afrikaner nationalism, and over which one not 
only consequently has dominion or baasskap, but which one then is authorized to protect 
and care for.  
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The desire for mastery and for a unified “us” need also be placed against the rapid 
transformations of the early twentieth century, wrought by urbanization and 
industrialization, as well as the later economic worldwide depression and Second World 
War (WWII).  It was the challenge posed by urbanization, depression and WWII in the 
1930s and 1940s, especially, that solidified the nascent discourse of mastery in apartness.  
According to Norval (1996), these situations were experienced as dislocations by 
Afrikaners.  
Urbanization, …came to mean much more than a simple population movement to 
the city.  It was characterized as a process which marked both urban and rural 
populations and which could lead to a loss of the volkseie, a loss of one’s own 
religion, spiritual, moral and social values, and even one’s own language 
(Norval, 1996, p.20).   
In the face of such dislocations, questions of identity emerge quite powerfully, 
and the recurring question as to the volkseie emerged with particular force.  It is a 
question of boundaries, and what belongs and does not belong to the volk.  The premise 
of the volkseie was rooted in the notion that there is a group or an entity called the 
Afrikaner volk, which “was given in so far as it could be distinguished from and against a 
series of ‘others’” (Norval, 1996, p.70).  This vision of volkseie would be articulated from 
different religious, cultural, economical and later political frontiers, which also meant to 
mark it.  The notion of the volkseie did not have racism as its primary focus; rather 
segregation became part of the whole that accrued from mastery, and one’s definitional 
“own” in apartness.   
As the discursive borders solidified, I already intimated that several spheres of life 
were interpellated into fixing borders and meaning making.  The church – specifically the 
Dutch Reformed Church, or NGK (Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk) - was one such 
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institutional actor, playing a crucial role in the articulation of the volkseie and providing a 
sacred history of, and for, the Afrikaners (Giliomee, 2003; Kuperus, 1999; Norval, 1996).  
In the years leading to 1948 and the formal institution of Apartheid, “NGK leaders had 
become distinctly aware of the social, material and religious needs of Afrikaners and 
[was] instrumental in promoting those needs collectively to the government and political 
parties” (Kuperus, 1999, p.6).   
The church would focus on channeling all the resources to the Afrikaner’s cause 
in order to address whatever it saw as ailing within the Afrikaner community. According 
to Norval (1996) the NGK embarked on delineating what was “true” in the volk and 
married the need of the volk with the divine.  What would be particular to the Afrikaner 
was articulated as divine and therefore, worth pursuing.  Social stratification would be 
godly and serve the interest of morality. In fact, post the 1948 election the  
Church and state both pursued the interest of economic security and Afrikaners 
ethnic purity. In 1948, soon after the national elections, the NGK’s Kerkboek 
editorial of September 22 declared that apartheid was a church policy, pointing to 
the long NGK tradition of race separation in the church (Kuperus, 1999, p.87).    
During the 1950s, the NGK church welcomed the laws that confirmed the 
maintenance of racial separation laws such as the Mixed Marriage Act, Immorality Act, 
and Group Areas Act (Kuperus, 1999; Norval, 1996).  In fact, the NGK lobbied for these 
laws in the 1930s and 1940s (Kuperus, 1999; Norval, 1996).  
Yet, as was mentioned before – no one institution on its own defines the 
discursive totality for meaning making; for it to be successful and all-encompassing, 
other spheres of life needs to line up and qualify, slightly modify, or otherwise 
supplement the emerging trope such that it assumes hegemonic status and comes to fix 
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meaning across all spheres of life.  The church, powerful as it was, was consequently 
linked by economic and cultural institutions in setting discursive limits.  However, 
inasmuch as the NGK provided a spiritual sense that “the needs of the volk were greater 
than those of the individual or any of the other bonds” (Norval, 1966, p.74), the economic 
needs of the Afrikaners were seen as divine and provided an unparalleled collective 
economic investment and mission.  Similarly, with respect to the cultural, the Afrikaans 
language was appropriated and reified into the sacrosanct vehicle for all of the cultural, 
social, economic, and political.  
Yet, for all of its success in solidifying a sense of group and providing a desired 
promise of survival and identity, the fact of the matter is – and is consciously so – that the 
very definition of the volkseie is premised on its definitional other and social division. 
Again, the very fundamental conceptual departure point for Apartheid, is “apartness” or 
social divisions around an “us” against “them.”  This Manichean articulatory practice 
“constitute(d) and organize(d) social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.25) in the 
sense that articulatory practices shape common sense and truth.  What might otherwise be 
distant and ideological, for example, is made common and applicable in articulatory 
practise, which is a common sense tying of events far into individuals’ narratives near, 
thereby making it personal and personally true.  In this way, the grand philosophical or 
ideological sense is made common, in the very etymological sense of the word, such that 
it not only carries the mission in some passive reflective way, but also dispenses it and 
perpetuates it actively.  Norval (1996) examined how roles like being a daughter, a wife, 
and a husband, for example, were sites of dispensing the common mission of the volkseie.   
Articulatory practices frame and create forms of identification and identities because 
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“identities are not forged merely in positive terms, but are also relational in character, and 
thus gain their specificity in their difference from other identities (Norval, 1996, p.34).” 
In South Africa identities were constituted in black and white. Furthermore, they were 
presented as antagonistic to each other.  
 
    “Apartheid is a recipe for permanent conflict” 
    (P.W. Botha) 
It is appropriate to open this section with the unlikely words from one of the most 
ardent Apartheid protagonists, former Prime Minister and State president P.W. Botha.  
This statement admits that Apartheid was premised on antagonistic interests, and that the 
construction of reality within “apartheid discourse proceeded, from the very start, by 
creating a representation of the nature of the society and thus, of its unity, that had as its 
precondition the exclusion of ‘a series of others’” (Norval, 1996, p70).  Apartheid was 
about configuring human relations in South Africa, and by its reliance on binary 
opposites such as white versus black, inside(r) versus outside(r), friends versus enemies, 
these oppositions came to “function as the very figure for signification and the 
mechanisms of meaning production” (Fuss, 1991, p.1).  Apartheid had “everything to do 
with the structure of alienation, splitting, and identification which together produce a self 
and an other, as a subject and an object, unconscious and a conscious, an interiority and 
exteriority” (Fuss, 1991, p. 1). 
These opposites - as artificial as they might be, perhaps precisely because they are 
so constructed - remained tenuous and required constant vigilance and enforcement 
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against violation.  They constituted and streamlined both the individual and collective 
identities of South Africans of all kinds.  Binary opposites “encapsulate[d] the structure 
of language, repression, and subjectivity, [and] designate[d] the structure of exclusion, 
oppression, and repudiation” (Fuss, 1991, p. 2).  Apartheid was a relational structure 
and/or pattern, which permeated every social fiber; drawing lines of inclusion and 
exclusion, which, according to Norval (1996), were “more complicated until [the 1980s 
when] it, finally, was no longer capable of maintaining and controlling the terms of social 
divisions (p.10).” The maintenance of such lines of opposition was proving to be an 
impossible project.   
Of course one of the seismic fault lines of these binary opposites was race and 
racial categorization.  Although racial segregation existed in South Africa before 1948, 
when the National Party (NP) won the 1948 general election, its formal institution as a 
government policy then saw an unparalleled sophistication and refinement of the organic 
and individual into the sanctioned and frighteningly encompassing systematic.  
According to Thompson (2001), four ideas constituted the pillars of Apartheid;  
Firstly, the population of South Africa comprised four racial groups – Whites, 
Colored, Indians and Africans – each with its own inherent culture.  Secondly, 
Whites, as the civilized race, were entitled to have the absolute control over the 
state.  Thirdly, white interests should prevail over black interests; the state was 
not obliged to provide equal facilities for the subordinate races.  Fourthly, the 
white racial group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans and English speaking 
components, while Africans belonged to several (eventually ten) distinct nations 
or potential nations – a formula that made the white nation the largest nation in 
the country (p. 190).  
These ideas were disseminated and enforced in all corners of the country, and at 
all levels of life, from state department policies, to business and religious sectors.  
Legislative tools such as the Group Areas Act, and Pass laws, which aimed at “influx 
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control,” were designed to maintain apartness and segregate each group from another. 
Keeping the groups apart was maintained through representing them as antagonistic; 
there was constant “threat” from the outside group, the enemy.  As a result of Apartheid 
policies, Blacks (whom I take to include Indians, Colored and Africans) had little 
political power or sway in and over the affairs of the country.   
This policy also mediated the distribution of, and access to, resources.  For 
example, in the late 70’s when there were as many as five times African students in 
school than Whites, the government spent ten times more on white students (Thompson, 
2001).  The disparate spending ratios also continued in higher education.  The uneven 
distribution of resources did not end with education; racial segregation was also rife with 
respect to employment conditions.  Whites were by and large given managerial positions 
while Blacks were largely occupying unskilled labor positions.  In 1956, the Apartheid 
government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act, which allowed industries to reserve 
managerial and skilled labor jobs to be reserved for Whites (TRC report, 1999).  
Furthermore, remuneration levels saw Whites earn substantially higher wages than 
Blacks.  According to Thompson (2001), white manufacturing and construction workers 
earned six times as much as African workers, while the mining industry compensated 
white workers twenty one times as much as African mineworkers (Thompson, 2001).   
Despite the complete and almost total control over daily life by government 
agencies and state organs, Blacks continued to resist and defy such control.  According to 
Thompson (2001), just a year after the National Party came into power, a new generation 
took control of the African National Congress (ANC) – including Nelson Mandela, 
Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo.  Thompson (2001) continues to state that black people 
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were transcending their ethnic, regional and class divisions, mobilizing the masses to 
actively confront the Apartheid regime.   
Of note, here, is that whereas Apartheid discourse had now fixed material reality, 
there were always marginal discourses – always resistance discourses, trying to find a 
structural and meaning-making unity.  Meli (1988) makes a similar point, stating that in 
the late 50’s, the Congress of the People, which marked the beginning of the alliance 
between the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Colored People’s 
Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU), adopted the Freedom Charter.  The unity between these various organizations 
against Apartheid meant that the state was encountering a formidable force from Blacks 
from all parts of the country.  According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001) “Equivalence 
[does] ….not simply establish[es] ‘alliance’ between given interests, but modifies the 
very identity of the forces engaging in that in that alliance” (p. 184).  Hence, by this 
Congress of the People, and the continuing protests and demonstrations over the years, 
the racial categories of the Apartheid state (all twelve or so of them), were now recast 
discursively into a single identificatory label, Black.  At least in terms of a common 
political goal and aim, the resistance discourse was similarly modifying diverse identities 
into a unitary term.  
  The field of “us” and “them” is always open for articulation and re-articulation.  
However, “this takes place, not on a level playing field, but in a terrain that is itself the 
result of prior hegemonic articulations (Thomassen, 2005, p295).”  What is articulated by 
the liberation movements, was a reaction and related to the articulation of Apartheid 
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hegemony.  The ANC projected itself as espousing democratic principles and equality, 
and became the  
national liberation movement of the African, Colored, and 
Indian….[equality and Freedom for all] became the most fundamental and 
essential tenets for building of a revolutionary united front of all 
democratic anti-racist and anti-fascist forces in South Africa. The ANC 
made it clear that nobody is excluded by reason of race or color.  It 
therefore rejected the totally all racist ideas; expressed the consistency of 
the ANC in its non-racial and anti-racist approach and offered an 
alternative to the reactionary philosophy of apartheid. (Meli, 1988, p.125) 
 
Political Violence in the Apartheid State 
A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines 
the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but 
to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor.  At a certain point, one 
can only fight fire with fire. (Mandela, 1994, p.166)  
This above quotation from Mandela demonstrates the attitude of the liberation 
movement in the 1960’s as their peaceful marches and demonstrations were met with 
violence from the Apartheid state.  As noted before, there were always instances of 
resistance to Apartheid, right from its inception; during the 1950’s there were riots, 
marches and demonstration against Apartheid laws.  For example, towards the end of the 
1950s there were several demonstrations and marches against pass laws, led by the ANC 
as single day-strikes (Worden, 2007).  It is in the 1960s, however, that resistance 
expressly moved from a peaceful tenure to a measured adoption of violence as means to 
confront the Apartheid state.  At first glance, there seems to have been an increasing 
escalation of political violence, with each passing decade, reaching an apparent height in 
the 1980s, a period Thompson (2001) described as Apartheid in crisis, and James Barker 
(1985, p. 129) as “a society at war with itself.”  There seems to have been a certain 
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lockstep between the escalation of violence on the part of the Apartheid government and 
the forces of resistance.  Similarly, the concepts and rhetoric of both these parties reflect 
the level and intensity of resistance and oppression.  So, for example, the Apartheid 
governors referred to “a ‘total onslaught’ against the state”, while, for the ANC, “the 
‘total onslaught’ was to be countered by a ‘total strategy’” (Van Kassel, 2000. p. 49).  All 
these descriptions speak to the intensity, breadth and the depth of violence in South 
Africa.  In fact, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report (1999) indicates 
that  
A large number of violations in connection with killings, attempted killings and severe ill 
treatment (resulted) from necklacing and burning – primarily related to incidents during 
1985-87.  In the first two of the review periods (1960-82 and 1990-94), the majority of 
reported fire-related attacks were arson attacks on building.  In the current review period 
(1983-1989), the majority of such violations related to attacks on people. (vol. 3, p. 108)  
Violence progressed from being directed to buildings and state property such as 
cars and infrastructure, to be directed at people.  People were caught in the cross fire, 
both literally and figuratively.  There was a seeming change in the nature, breadth, and 
intensity of violence.   
Frantz Fanon (1963, p.64) highlights firstly that the colonization process (and 
Apartheid) is not only inherently violent, but that violence sustains it; is its lifeline.  But, 
secondly, Fanon also states that “national liberation… is always a violent phenomenon.”  
There are, in a very real sense, “two protagonists” because the colonial world is divided 
into the “native and settlers,”  “us and them” (Manganyi, 1973, p.25).  There is, 
consequently, a constant interplay between “violences”, in a manner of speaking, even as 
the shape, form, and intensity changes. Again the discourse of “us” and “them” 
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permeated and sedimented everyday life and were constitutive of the meaning people 
gave to their lives. 
It became evident to many Blacks in the 1960’s that their interest would not be 
met by the government; on the contrary, the government was becoming increasingly 
brutal (Thompson, 2001).  On March 21, 1960, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 
organized a march to protest pass laws and deliberately gathered in police stations for 
arrest because they were not carrying their passes (Thompson 2001, Worden, 2007).  
However, in what was to become known as the Sharpeville massacre, the police 
responded to a peaceful protest march in Sharpeville by opening fire, killing 67 Africans 
and wounding 186.  Most of the people killed and wounded were shot in the back, which 
suggests that they were dispersing and not confronting the police.  The massacre did not 
deter opposition against Apartheid policies; on the contrary, it stirred countrywide unrest.  
Throughout the country, people mourned and showed solidarity with those who died and 
were wounded.  During the ensuing days, violent unrest, demonstrations, and public 
burning of passes clearly challenged the Apartheid government.  According to Mandela 
(1994), the shooting at Sharpeville created a national turmoil and a crisis for the 
government.  The government responded by instituting more repressive laws, prohibiting 
any act of political organizing within black communities.  Additionally, a state of 
emergency was declared, and the ANC and the PAC were banned (Thompson, 2001).  
The Apartheid state made it seemingly impossible for these organizations to operate and 
further their resistance agenda.  According to Thompson (2001), the banning of the ANC 
and PAC deprived Africans of their last chance to organize lawfully, and peaceably, 
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Black political organizations, especially the ANC, had hitherto adopted 
nonviolent ways of resisting the Apartheid state, even as the government responded with 
violent repression.  Nonviolent methods, it seemed to some within the ANC, had 
achieved nothing except defeats and violence from the state.  Consequently, the ANC and 
PAC decided to form military wings to counter the violence from the state.  This marked 
a pivotal moment in the history of the Apartheid struggle.  In 1961, the ANC formed a 
military wing, called Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), and abbreviated to MK 
(Mandela, 1994; Meli, 1988; Thompson, 2001).  This marked the adoption of the armed 
struggle and in a way, violence appeared to be both the means with which to overthrow 
Apartheid and the means to maintain it.     
After an initial period of seeming quietude at the start of the 1970s, the decade 
came to a crashing and decisive end.  Although the country was experiencing rapid 
economic growth in the late 60s and into the 70s, Black people did not feel a positive 
impact and did not share the fruits of this development.  Although the economy was 
growing at a rapid rate, increasing the number of Black workers, they had no bargaining 
powers because of the exclusion of, and bans on, black labor unions (Thompson, 2001).  
Therefore, there was also discontent from Black workers about their remuneration and 
working conditions.  A growing Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) emerged as a 
formidable force opposing Apartheid.  It comes as little surprise that when the leader and 
spokesperson for this movement, an immensely charismatic, forceful, and popular leader 
named Steve Biko, was killed at the hands of South African security forces, a 
groundswell of resentment and resistance resulted.   
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Black Consciousness (BC) presented an ideology unlike that of the ANC and 
PAC, in that it placed enormous emphasis on the psychological ramifications of 
oppression.  Biko (1978) contended that the ANC and PAC were concentrating on one 
form of liberation, which is physical, to the detriment and neglect of psychological 
oppression.  This is echoed by Van Kassel (2000), who writes that BC was a movement, 
not an organization, and its major focus was on psychological self-liberation as the 
prerequisite for liberation.  Another task that BC saw itself engaging in was to make 
people aware of their social conditions and encourage them to work towards changing 
their social and political conditions.  Defining conscientization, Biko (1978), states that:  
Conscientization is a process whereby individuals or groups living within 
a given social and political setting are made aware of their situation … [it 
is] their ability to assess and improve their own influence over themselves 
and their environment.  Thus in the South African setting, for instance, it 
is not enough to be aware that one is living in a situation of oppression or 
residing in a segregated and probably inferior educational institutions.  
One must if conscious be committed to the idea of getting himself out of 
the morass. (p. 141)  
It is this consciousness that, among many other things, led to the student uprising 
of 1976.  According to Thompson (2001), the ideology of black consciousness penetrated 
the urban schools.  Coinciding with this was the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction in black schools, creating a situation rife with confrontative potential.  In 
1976, the Minister of Bantu Education instructed that half the subjects in schools be 
taught in Afrikaans; a move that, from the moment of its announcement, was met with 
vehement resistance from Black communities (Meli, 1988).  However, the government 
was determined to go ahead with the plan and, on June 16, 1976, about 20 000 Black 
schoolchildren in Soweto converged to march in protest against these teaching policies.  
The police responded by shooting at the students and, among others, killing a thirteen-
  34
year old boy named Hector Peterson whose dead body would become iconic of the 
brutality of the Apartheid regime (Meli, 1988; Pohlandt-McCormick, 2000, Thompson, 
2001).  It was not just the mere fact of introducing Afrikaans as medium of instruction 
that provided the affective saliency to the protest, but also the fact that Afrikaans was 
commonly seen as the “language of the oppressor.”  The shootings sparked a nationwide 
uprising, which continued into 1977.  The government responded with increasingly 
repressive methods, and by early 1977, the death toll stood at 575 and to increase by 
year’s end to 700 people (Meli, 1988; Thompson, 2001). 
The 1976 Soweto uprising marked a turning point in the struggle against 
Apartheid in that the youth took upon themselves the task of liberating the country.  
Violence spread all over the country and  “the vehemence of the students rebellion, 
together with the speed with which it spread across the country was striking and caught 
everybody off guard” (Pohlandt-McCormick, 2000, p. 28).  The intensity of the violence 
and the determination young people showed would influence the subsequent years of 
struggle against Apartheid.  Both liberation movements and the government 
underestimated the power and the role young people played in the liberation of the 
country.  Up until this period the government perceived its enemies – the ANC and PAC 
– as located outside the country’s borders and therefore the focus was to secure the 
borders from them.   
Not unlike the 60s, the governmental response in the 70s was to ban BC, the 
South African Student Organization (SASO), and a number of other organizations that 
were aligned with these movements.  Scores of black leaders were arrested, including 
Steve Biko (Thompson, 2001), who, as noted above, would later die at the hands of the 
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police.  Another consequence of the 1976 uprising was to swell the ranks of the exiled 
resistance organizations as scores of young people left the country to join the liberation 
movement in exile and to receive military training abroad.  Those who were jailed and 
stayed in South Africa seemed to be determined to defy the Apartheid government and 
the defiance reached its crescendo in the 80s (Mandela, 1994; Meli, 1988; Thompson, 
2001).   
As demonstrated in the previous decades, political discourse played a central role 
in the demise of Apartheid.  This is political discourse conceived of broadly: not only the 
words spoken, but the actions understood as discursive signifiers on a large social text.  
Political discourse is a battlefield on its own (Posel, 1989).  This battle intensified in the 
1980s from both the Apartheid government and the anti-Apartheid movements.  
Following Gramsci (1971), we see that for an oppressive political regime to function, the 
ruling hegemony must be able to reform itself to incorporate the aspiration of the ruled 
class.  As he says in his Prison Notebooks (1971), failure to incorporate the aspirations of 
the ruled will lead to hegemonic crisis.  During a hegemonic crisis, those in a ruled class 
recognize that their aspirations are not only thwarted, but also that their aspirations are 
antithetical to those of the ruling class. Each class or bloc vies for the control and 
dominance of the political space,          
The problem of the political is the problem of the institution of the social, 
that is, of the definition and articulation of social relations in a field criss-
crossed with antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.153).         
A successful colonializing power must make the colonized feel that their ability to 
achieve authentic being lies with the maintenance of the status quo.  Their identity rests 
on the success of the system staying in status quo.  Crisis emerges when this is no longer 
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so.  When the social relations are shifted, and when “the Other [which] prevents me from 
being totally myself” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.125) shifts to being those in power, 
this will lead to political crisis.  
The crisis that besieged South Africa in the 1980s is the result of, and the 
continuation of, articulation and re-articulation of the social.  The open field rested on 
constructing antagonistic relations; pointing to the other as the limit.  For example, in the 
1950s, Apartheid was offered as a way the Afrikaners could feel empowered and apart 
from the Anglo power structure, separated from Blacks, while still remaining 
disenfranchised by the Anglo dominance of major industry.  Whiteness aligned the social 
to the political demands of the time.  However, by the 1980s Apartheid could no longer 
reform or rearticulate a discourse to sustain it.  This is because anti-Apartheid discourse 
(understood broadly as both action and rhetoric) began to flood the field with alternative 
possibilities that asserted Apartheid’s impossibilities.  For example, Apartheid was set on 
hierarchical racial division and the state regulating social interaction.  However, anti-
Apartheid discourse espoused a non-racial democratic South Africa.  This would be a 
“South Africa that belongs to all who live in it Black and White.”  As Norval (1996) says, 
it became “ever more complicated” for the Apartheid government to maintain clear and 
consistent “lines of inclusion and exclusion” (p.10).   Meanwhile, anti-Apartheid 
discourse constructed and flooded the field with various signifiers such as “black,” “the 
people,” “the masses,” “democracy,” “freedom,” “non-racialism” against racism and 
Apartheid.  The promise of non-racialism was a continuation of the Freedom Charter 
discourse. All these signifiers were represented as constituting a frontier against 
Apartheid, and coalesced under the “United” “Democratic” “Front.”  It was the success 
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of this discourse in creating a new “unified” entity that held the promises of a group of 
people, now understood as one, which challenged the Apartheid regime and sent it into 
crisis.   
Against this backdrop, Gramsci (1971) argues, that “when the crisis occurs, the 
immediate situation becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for violent 
solutions, for the activities of unknown forces” (p. 210).  These social shifts—shifts in 
symbolization—create new “negative” spaces where violence emerges both within new 
social entities, and between the colonizer and colonized.   
 
Equivalence and Ukuthungelana 
So far, I have explained the conceptualization of a hegemonic crisis as a general 
mass challenge of the dominant bloc.  In order for the crisis to happen, the dominant 
imaginary has to be weakened, and a new imaginary must be formed (Norval, 1996).  In 
other words, the dominant bloc’s grip on the social must slip away.  However, how does 
this happen? Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) notion of equivalence, and the Xhosa concept 
of ukuthungelana provide some clues on how it happened in South Africa.  
In the 1950s we witnessed an alliance between those constituted by Apartheid as 
not white, which at a discourse level is presented as Blacks; a common demarcation from 
Whites.  Furthermore, in the 1960s, “the ANC underwent transformation from an 
organization oriented to the tiny African middle class, and working within the severe 
restrictions of the South African legal order, into a mass organization dedicated to 
militant collective actions” (Price, 1991, p.17).  The transformation of the ANC into a 
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mass-based organization meant a shift in subjectivity.  Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 
describe the process by which multitudes become a united group as: “differences cancel 
one another out… to express something identical underlying them all” (p.127).  They call 
this process of identification, “equivalence.”  They go further to say that “the problem is 
to identify the content of that ‘identical something’” (p. 127) such that masses have a 
common “identical something” to identify with.  The identification of the content of the 
identical something is also a definition of the political frontier.  In fact, the “identical 
something” is the lack, the fulfillment of which is the promised reward. Political frontiers 
are the forebears of political fronts.    
The way into equivalence is through antagonism.  According to Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001), “in the case of antagonism … the presence of the Other prevents me from 
being totally myself. [This] relation arises not from full totalities but from the 
impossibility of their constitution” (p.125).  In other words, antagonistic relations are two 
poles “with clear division between outside and inside” (Thomassen, 2005, p. 297).  In 
fact, it is both the inside and the outside that constitute the totality. In the case of South 
Africa, there would be no Blacks without Whites; each side is constituted by the 
existence of the other.  In a similar fashion, both the colonized and the colonizer 
constitute an antagonistic relation, which form “a broader totality in relation to which the 
poles constitute” (Thomassen, 2005, p.297).  However, this does not preclude difference 
from and within each constellation. The question is then: how are those differences 
subverted to create a “unified” front?  
Norval (1996) explains: “The resistance discourse in the early 1980s already 
succeeded in constructing a set of equivalences between workers, trade unionist, the 
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people, local community-based organizations and so forth” (Norval, 1996, p.251).  On 
the other hand, the Apartheid “government’s [response] tried to disaggregate by 
differential inclusion of ‘moderate’ Africans, workers and township people” (p. 251).  
The battle between the Apartheid government and the anti-Apartheid movement 
attempted to define each side as an opposing force. In doing so, each side prevented and 
tried to disrupt internal equivalences with the opposing side.  Therefore, equivalence did 
not disrupt antagonism; on the contrary, it consolidated around the existing fronts.  
In explicating what happened in South Africa in 1980s, it is helpful to look at a 
Xhosa word which was used frequently during this period to describe the situation and 
the events: ukuthungelana.  This concept is relevant for both theoretical and practical 
reasons. In fact, people used this term to describe what was happening in the 1980s.  
Ukuthungelana is a homonym, different meanings of which accrue from the stem of the 
word, thunga. McLaren (1963), notes that thunga means sew, or fasten with stitches. 
Secondly it means to pour out, to strain out.  The second translation of pouring something 
out is incomplete without context, which differentiates it from galela (pour out).  The 
context of ukuthunga is not only to “pour out” but to do so towards an equal distribution 
of a beverage.  The purpose is to make sure that everybody present, and at times not 
present, gets their share.  Usually, at an event/party where people are gathered together 
there will be a person who is designated to go around the circle1 pouring an equal amount 
of whatever beverage is available for everyone convened there.   
                                                 
1 Historically Africans sit in a circle when gathering in meetings or events  
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Thus far ukuthunga means first to sew, to join together, as well as to go around 
pouring and distributing beverage equitably.  When the suffix ana, is added now, a mode 
of reciprocity and mutual exchange is denoted.  Ukuthungelana means not only that 
something affects the other, but also that it is equally affected by that which it affects.  
That is to say there is an exchange that involves a sewing together - ukuthungelana is 
keeping things together by a thread , but there is yet another meaning to the word; the 
smoke generated by starting a fire (ithungo), and then spreading it (ukuthungelana). In 
sum, ukuthungelana means spreading and sharing something, equitably, and with due 
regard that all the parties are involved and affected.  Indeed, it also means bringing the 
parties together to form something new without completely dissolving what previously 
existed.  
Building on Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of equivalence, ukuthungelana provides 
a way to explain how political discourse worked on the ground, no least of which because 
it was how people themselves made sense of what was happening.  In fact, the sewing 
together of a united democratic front against Apartheid was not only an intuitive, organic 
and spontaneous occurrence or feeling, but was formalized into an organization, 
movement, and institution.  
The formation, in the 1980s, of the United Democratic Front (UDF) became the 
culminating moment of ukuthungelana, just as it promised to be..  The launching of the 
UDF in the 1980s was not discontinuous with the political landscape of the 1960s and 
1970s.  After the banning of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and the 1976 
Soweto uprising liberation movements, the ANC saw an increase in recruits.  In fact, it 
was “black anger during and after the uprising [that] convinced the ANC of the existence 
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inside South Africa of general possibilities… for the construction of an organized popular 
revolutionary political base” (Barrell, 1992, p.74, my emphasis).  The ANC had come to 
believe that military strategy alone was not going to bring Apartheid down.  Therefore, 
“revolution could succeed only through the united strength of the “masses” of the people 
expressing itself in organized political activity [under] a broadest possible national front” 
(Barrell, 1992, p.81).  The purpose of the broad political front was to concentrate and 
mobilize people under an anti-Apartheid coalition.  At this stage the ANC was already 
using the populist discourse of the “masses” and the “people,” which also had moral 
impetus.  
Typical of antagonistic relations, the Apartheid government was also reviewing 
its strategies. Not unlike the liberation movements, the Apartheid government embarked 
on political changes as the result of the later 1970s uprising. In addition to the repressive 
acts, the state sought ways to normalize the relations in South African citizenry.  In the 
early 1980s the Apartheid government embarked on “reforming” Apartheid to encounter 
the threat of revolution.  For example, two (among many) government reforms introduced 
in the early 1980s were the constitutional reforms and the introduction of Black Local 
Authorities (BLA).  Yet, inasmuch as those constitutional reforms and the introduction of 
BLA seemed a survivalist response to threat, they also announced precisely the falling 
apart of Apartheid hegemony and seeming inviolability.  
In 1983 the Apartheid government introduced a new constitution, according to 
which three “parliaments” would be created; for Whites, Coloreds and Indians (Houston, 
1999; Norval, 1996; Price, 1991).  The astute reader will have noticed already that this 
constitutional reform did not include a “parliament” for Blacks.  They were to be 
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“accommodated” by a Black Local Authorities Act (1982), which aimed at shifting the 
governance of urban Africans from the government to the black population itself (Price, 
1991).  These initiatives were meant to deal with the exclusion of these groups from the 
polity while making sure that gelykstelling did not take place.  As reaction to growing 
unity of Africans, Indians and Coloreds in the 1970s, the government saw “a need to 
offset” such resistance by creating a tri-cameral parliament (Houston, 1999, p.60), and in 
so doing engineer an obstacle to a growing united front against Apartheid by refashioning 
the segmenting social in the divide and rule manner of its past.  Furthermore, whereas 
Africans were excluded, they were offered some political expression through the BLA.   
The creation of BLA’s would ostensibly allow Blacks to control their own affairs 
and would “reduce the political costs to the state of exercising … control” (Price, 1991, 
p.133) over black communities.  However, the political costs were not the only thing the 
state reduced, for financial costs were also deferred.  According to Houston (1999), BLAs 
were made to finance themselves and had to increase rent and service charges.  The 
increase of rent would become a lightning rod (as we shall see in case of Colesberg) for 
protest and revolt.  The BLA’s were to present a buffer for the state and provide a sense 
of autonomy for urban Blacks.  Therefore, both “the Constitutional Act and the Black 
Local Authorities Act, were attempts to legitimize the Apartheid system by incorporating 
certain strata from the dominated majority” (Houston, 1999, p. 61).   
The launching of the UDF was both a pursuit and declaration of a “united” front 
against the attempts of the above mentioned reforms to disunite the forces building 
against Apartheid oppressions.  The UDF was a political organization that was launched 
to maintain and enhance the antagonistic relations where lines between enemies and 
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friends were sharply drawn.  This would be achieved through a political discourse that 
created and maintained binary opposites.  It was precisely in reaction to both 
Constitutional Reforms and the introduction of BLAs that the UDF was launched.  
Norval (1996) states that “the UDF, formed to organize resistance to the tri-cameral 
Parliament and to reforms aimed at urban Africans … quickly became a national force 
[however], articulating local township grievances into broader anti-Apartheid discourse” 
(p. 238).  Therefore, the goal of the UDF was ukuthunga (to sew together) different 
grievances and building a common thread—to a common threat. The UDF would 
demonstrate, but also construct ukuthungelana within and among all those who were 
opposing Apartheid.  That is to say, the various “sets of struggles condensed around the 
UDF” (Norval, p.239).  The condensation was also a campaign for a “united” 
“democratic” “front,” which was discursively constructed as a frontier.  The battle lines 
were “clearly” drawn between those who were against Apartheid and those supporting it. 
Norval (1996) notes that  
not only did the UDF work against any division within the urban African 
community, but its opposition was predicated upon the discourse aiming 
to construct a form of unity which cut across all racial divisions, thus 
having the potential to undermine the very logic upon which the social 
division of apartheid was based (p. 239).  
Apartheid hegemony rested on racial and ethnic division, a logic that from its 
inception saw difference as a threat to the wellbeing of all Whites and Afrikaners in 
particular.  Indeed, the constitutional reforms were exposing cracks in the logic.  These 
cracks were articulated by anti-Apartheid movements on different social positions and the 
UDF was “to take the ideological initiatives out of the hand of the state” (Houston, 1999, 
p.65).  By delegitimizing Apartheid in every aspect of the social, the political, economic 
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and moral landscapes, it was creating new beliefs and horizons of democracy and 
possibility, which fueled defiance of the state in collective action.  
So far I have demonstrated a political movement as a work of discourse; 
as operating in a discursive space even as it operates on the discursive space itself, 
and in turn.  With respect to of the signifiers “unity” or a “united front”, it is so 
that, as with any discursive act, unity is not given but produced through political 
frontiers and articulations.  In fact, inasmuch as political frontiers are a pursuit, 
drawing the lines of who is inside and outside, unity as an act (of sewing together) 
involves the translation of the political objective or principle.  For example, one 
of the UDF’s principles was “an adherence to the need for unity in struggle 
through which all democrats, regardless of race, religion or color, shall take part 
together” (Houston, 1999, p. 64).  The UDF principle of unity also became a 
strategic objective “to unite our people across class, color, ethnic and 
organizational lines to oppose the Apartheid reforms” (Houston, 1999, p.65).  The 
name of the UDF was both a discursive destination and destiny, which is to say, a 
goal and a desire.  Furthermore, unity was created as an action against the 
Apartheid government.  In the 1980s everybody was talking about unity, for 
instance, Umanyano Ngamandla (Xhosa for unity is strength) was chanted in anti-
Apartheid circles to the same extent that eendrag maak mag (Afrikaans for unity 
is strength) was litanised by Apartheid defenders and the state.  
Again, as was argued in the discursive acceptance of Apartheid at the level of the 
everyday, so the UDF brought new forms of liberatory and anti-Apartheid identifications 
to personal narrative by “link[ing] politics to day to day experience of [the] people” 
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(Houston, 1999, p.65).  This was done through a populist discourse which “simplified the 
political space, replacing a complex set of differences and determinations by a stark 
dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise” (Laclau, 2005, p.18).  In fact, 
Laclau (2005) argues that the logical simplification and imprecision of the terms is “the 
very condition of political action … [and] political identities” (p.18).  
The “People” and the “Masses” 
It is important to understand how populist terms are used in political action. 
Populist discourse contributed in helping the anti-Apartheid movement achieve its aims.  
Up until the 1980s, the anti-Apartheid movement had been working on bringing masses 
into the fold of the struggle against Apartheid (Burrell, 1992).  By the 1980s “the people” 
and “the masses” were common descriptions of those who were opposing Apartheid 
ideology.  These terms inscribe a collective action, reaction, and will but they also 
constitute and delimit the individual identity.  Populist discourse is aimed at galvanizing 
people for action, providing a moral impetus for such actions, and in effect dispersing the 
individual’s will into a universal and common will.  
Antagonistic relations are set up as two fronts against each other, which mean 
violence is always and already present.  Violence seemed to be inscripted in human 
relations in South Africa.  Drawing from Frantz Fanon, Bulhan’s (1985) comment is 
apropos:  
A situation of oppression is essentially a cauldron of violence.  It is 
brought into existence and is maintained by dint of violence.  This 
violence gradually permeates the social order to affect the everyday living.  
In time, the violence takes on different guises and becomes less blatant 
and more integral to institutional as well as to interpersonal reality.  It 
even invades the deeper recesses of the individual psyche, permeating 
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fantasies, and dreams.  Thus to study oppression is, in the final analysis, to 
delve into the problems of violence in both its subtle and crude 
manifestations. (p.131) 
Moreover, not only was the state experiencing defiance from Blacks, but some 
Afrikaners were beginning to add their voices, tentative as it were, to questioning the 
government’s policies in the economic, moral, and political arenas.  This meant that the 
Apartheid state was being challenged not only by Blacks but also increasingly by the very 
people it sought to protect in the past.  Many Whites, especially English speakers, started 
leaving the country, fearful of an apparently apocalyptic future (Thompson, 2001).  
Furthermore, Blacks were gaining economic power in areas within South Africa and 
outside of the Homelands, creating a problem for the grand homeland policy of 
separation (Thompson, 2001).  Apartheid was not as strong as it seemed in the preceding 
decades, and resistance was gathering momentum like never before.  Unlike the 60s and 
70s, there was a wide spread resistance from labor unions, civic organizations as well as 
the youth.  There were innumerable violent encounters between the state and Blacks.  In 
the 80s, townships across South Africa saw an upsurge in violence directed toward 
governmental institutions, its forces, and those who were perceived as collaborating with 
the government.  The latter group mostly tended to be Blacks and some were the victims 
of a peculiar, and novel form of violence, that of necklacing.  Thus, within the context of 
an increase in violence both from the state and the resisting populace, new forms of 
violence, such as necklacing, entered the resistance repertoire. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Political Violence 
Definition of Violence 
Defining violence is as contentious as violence itself, even as social and human 
scientists have spent enormous amounts of time and energy trying to do just that.  
Degenaar (1990) states that “violence is a complex and contested concept which has to be 
explored at different levels and in variety of contexts” (p. 70).  Furthermore, definitional 
problems arise from the fact that violence also refers to many different actions, processes 
and conditions (Bulhan, 1985).  I argue that like many other social phenomena, the 
meaning of violence and its conceptualization shifts depending on the context and times.  
Perhaps a departure definition provided by The Oxford English Dictionary 
(1990), where violence is defined as “violent conduct or treatment, outrage, injury”, 
could serve as spur to further discussion.  The astute observer may notice, already, that 
violence is defined by the very terms it seeks to define – violence is violent conduct … - 
the assumption perhaps being that we must know, commonsensically, what violence is.  
However, inasmuch as the task of a dictionary is definition, the Oxford Dictionary may 
be excused as there seem to be consensus among social and human scientists, on the other 
hand, that aiming for a clear, precise and all-encompassing definition of violence is 
fruitless.  Nonetheless, social and human scientists have tried to explain and understand 
violence, and have certainly theorized it.  I review some of the psychological theories of 
violence more particularly, given this dissertation’s disciplinary focus and home, but 
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there are philosophical, theological, and sociological theories of violence, for example, 
that – for the most part - fall outside this dissertation’s review. 
Psychological Theories of Political Violence 
Whereas psychology has examined and theorized violence, it has not specifically 
done so for political violence.  As a consequence, it may be difficult to translate a 
psychological understanding of violence to political violence with a fair measure of 
confidence.  However, even though violence has been theorized, it remains largely rooted 
in individual premises, and the sense of an essential, interior, Platonic self and 
personality.  Even in “mob violence”, or when psychology theorizes the power of the 
group on behavior as in conformity and obedience, for example, it is still a question of an 
individual “giving up” an individual moral compass, conscience or otherwise usual, 
fundamental, and essential manner to the group dynamic.  In the introduction to his book, 
Toch (1992) states that he tries to understand violent men as individuals and then sort 
them into groups.  The premise here is that the group is but a reflection and mirror of the 
individual psyche – one is an individual before one is a part of the group, or one’s being 
an individual determines the group one is part of.  Such an approach already portends 
difficulties when there is a palpable sense of violence emanating from a state or 
institution, such as the Apartheid state, and the individual, if one is even able to point to a 
manifest individual, is but a vehicle and conduit for a political violence with origins 
elsewhere.  Therefore, it may be necessary to supplement psychological theories of 
violence to more fully account for both violence in general and political violence in 
particular; perhaps this dissertation will go some way towards developing an approach, or 
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a sensitivity at the very least, that focuses on understanding violence from multiple 
perspectives while demonstrating the intersection of these forms of violence.  
 
Violence and Aggression: Genetic Approaches 
Psychological theories of violence often proceed from the examination of 
violence as a reflection of, or result of, aggression.  Psychologists seemingly prefer to use 
the concept of aggression when referring to violence (Toch, 1992).  There is, however, no 
consensus regarding both the term aggression, and its relation to violence.  For example, 
some psychologists and researchers view aggression as a behavior [for example, Renfrew 
(1997, p. 6), who defines aggression to be “a behavior that is directed by an organism 
towards a target, resulting in damage”], while others understand it to be a personality 
trait, temperament, propensity, or attitude.  Consequently, as well, whereas psychology 
seem particularly drawn to measurement of aggression, such attempts differ widely by 
virtue of it being considered an action or an internal disposition, or both.  Of course, an 
oft-mentioned pitfall is also that aggression is inferred from violent acts, which is then, in 
a circular manner, explained on the basis of aggression: hence he is aggressive because 
he gets into fights all the time and he gets into fights all the time because he is aggressive.  
Sometimes, however, seeming differences about trait or behavior 
notwithstanding, there is occasional agreement as to a genetic or “internal” origin for 
aggression (and violence, as extension or expression thereof). Renfrew’s (1997) 
approach, for example, places an explanatory premium on the genetic, hormonal, and 
neurological basis of aggression.  Extensive neuropsychological research, cognitive 
  50
science- and neurotransmitter mapping, drug intervention research, and several other such 
biological research emphases all speak to the assumptive sense of aggression and 
violence as something internal and essential to the individual, part of his or her make-up, 
as it were.   
In the context of political violence in South Africa - a national phenomenon - 
employing the term aggression in the manner of these referenced theories falls short of an 
adequate understanding of the situation and the people involved. Patently absent are 
contextual factors. I am not arguing against the case that neural make up plays a role in 
violence, however, this approach cannot help us understand collective violence because it 
overlooks the role played by the social environment in such forms of violence, nor does it 
adequately account for thinking through institutional or state violence.  
Violence as a Socially Learned Phenomenon  
 Although social learning theories are somewhat sensitive to an environmental role 
in violence and aggression, it nonetheless still places primary motivating understanding 
for it in the individual.  That is, the approach is to demonstrate how the environment 
teaches people (actively and/or passively) either to be more or less aggressive.  Hence, 
not unlike the genetic approach, the premise is still that aggression is innate, but that the 
environment modifies its expression.  So, for example, Renfrew (1997) offers that 
an aggressive response to the appearance of the police officer might be 
because of  past aggressive interactions with the police.  Although many 
more factors are involved, perhaps classical conditioning contributes to the 
production of aggression in these situations (p.124). 
Although I agree that the environment influences how people handle conflict, 
clearly (and by Renfrew’s own admission in the quote above), social learning theory does 
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not provide a comprehensive explanation for violence in general, let alone political 
violence in particular.  There are too many exceptions to the principles of extinction, 
observation, respondent or classical learning for it to provide a satisfactory account of the 
complex interplay between the violence of the state or institution, and its populace, let 
alone explain the selection, incidence, and forms of collective violence.  Perhaps more 
importantly, these theories do not provide a sufficiently affective explanation for violence 
that is so patently and profoundly suffused by affect and passion.  Put another way, the 
symbolic meaning of events, people, and behaviors are not quite taken into account in 
social learning theories.  That is, taking the example of the police person quoted above, in 
the South African context, what this person represents, the symbolic meaning of their 
presence, has to be taken into account beyond past reinforcement for the reaction to make 
any sense.  The role of the environment is infinitely more complex and pervasive than the 
rather formulaic manner in which it is reduced by these theories to learning laws.  
Complex conditions and factors of oppression as in racism, poor education, poverty, and 
indeed the historical times all militate against a simple reductionism.  
Violence Results from a Poorly Functioning Ego 
Freud, according to Toch (1992), contributed in three ways to an understanding of 
violence.  Firstly, humans struggle against primitive aggression, and a basic tendency to 
be aggressive.  Indeed, Freud saw humans as having an instinct for destruction, often 
directed to the outside world (Whitmer, 1997).  Secondly, traumatic experiences may 
form the vengeful thrust for violence, directed at past aggressors, specifically, or their 
substitutes.  Lastly, inasmuch as the ego is the centerpiece for controlling and mediating 
human drives, including the aggressive drive, violence needs to take the functioning of 
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the ego into serious consideration (Toch, 1992).  The environment, or context, is brought 
to bear by Aichhorn, in Toch’s summary as follows:  
Destructive child-rearing practices … (builds) … reservoirs of aggressiveness and 
… (creates) … unconscious assumptions about a hostile or uncaring world…. 
[S]uch bitterness translates into violence, but … it can be “disconfirmed” through 
love and reassurance in a nonretaliatory institutional environment (Toch, 1992. 
p.3).   
One cannot help but be reminded of the Apartheid state media and experts 
opining that the ‘chaos’ created by the youth in the Black townships was a reflection of 
poor parenting.  Black parents, it was argued, lost control of their children and needed the 
South African Defense Force and police to step in and restore discipline and control.  The 
hypothesis of delinquent egos, and poor mediation of instinctual urges and drives is also 
shared by Muslin and Pieper (1971), for whom violence is the result of a “severely and 
selectively impaired [ego], [so] that instinctual derivatives are discharged without the 
filters or restraints” (p.129).  An impaired ego, or a failing one inasmuch as reality – 
testing and restraint does not occur, is conceivably the application to those who perpetrate 
violence.  Since necklacing and political violence were widespread in South Africa, the 
ego hypothesis would imply a dysfunctional ego of epidemic proportions, at best, or a 
racial predisposition towards dysfunctional egos, at worst.  This hypothesis also assumes 
and places the focus on an individual act, while a group ostensibly executed acts like 
necklacing.   
But even if one is to excuse Freud the specifics of a poorly functioning ego, and 
generously proceed from a broad and generalizing sense of violence and aggression as 
instinctual human nature, problems remain.  In the now famous correspondence of 
Freud’s with Albert Einstein (entitled “Why War?” 1932), Freud is sensitive to the 
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complexities of violence, and notes that it often does not serve a clear or simple 
unidirectional purpose. For example, beyond its intent to settle a conflict of interest, it is 
also instrumental to existence of community, which implies a union of individuals with 
emotional ties.  There is an intersection between community and individual, such that 
community is used to ward off individual violence on the one hand, but at the violent 
price of the individual’s instinctual satisfaction.    
Yet, even in Freud’s general assertion and in the admittedly sophisticated and 
nuanced extension of the instinctual to the societal via defenses and complex psychic 
processes, the fact of the matter remains that psychological theories, inclusive of Freud’s, 
are largely inadequate as explanatory touchstone for political violence because it: 
… has focused above all on ‘the individual,’ but without much appreciation of the 
extent to which this is a cultural and historical entity.  Individuals are not natural, 
they are changing products of culture: artifacts, always already embedded in webs 
of relationships (Packer, 2005, p.3). 
Therefore, it may behoove us to explore – albeit briefly and superficially – some 
of the disciplines such as sociology and political science, where the cultural constitution 
of the individual, and relational webs, sometimes imply a more critical stance towards 
violence, “in which the importance, and the difficulties of attending to power and 
inequality [are] recognized” (Packer, 2005. p.3). 
Contextual Theories  
Having argued that psychology, for the most part, does not pay sufficient attention 
to context, and that context seem pivotal to an understanding of political violence, 
contextual theories of violence from disciplines such as the political sciences, 
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anthropology and sociology may enrich our understanding of political violence.  
Inasmuch as these theories “reveal that larger social actors such as state, international 
organizations, and the global media, as well as transnational finances and people are all 
implicated in the actualization of the violence that transforms everyday life of local 
people” (Das and Kleinman, 2000, p. 2), examining violence at group level, or what the 
literature terms “collective violence,” becomes important.   
However, it is also true that discovering the role played by state institutions is 
often difficult – as is true for the necklacing incident in Colesburg – because it is 
sometimes clandestine, hidden from sight, or otherwise indirect.  Moreover, although one 
should take into account the condition and context in which violence emerges, “they also 
are not simply reducible to them” (Bozarslan, 2004, p. 16) as that will negate the role 
played by individual agency and or will. .   
Therefore at the outset already contextual theories of violence and theories of 
collective violence are as challenged with respect to etiology, definition, and definitive 
explanation.  That said, Tilly (2003) states that although collective violence is a 
complicated, changing, and unpredictable phenomenon, at least three commonalities of 
collective violence can be articulated.  Firstly, collective violence inflicts physical 
damage on a person or objects.  Secondly, it involves at least two perpetrators, and 
thirdly, it results from coordination among persons who perpetrate it (Tilly, 2003).  
Certainly, by these characteristics, necklacing qualifies as collective violence.  Tilly 
(2003) emphasizes “collective violence [as] not simply individual aggression writ large 
[there are] social ties structures, and processes [that] significantly affect its character” (p. 
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4).  One of the contributors is poverty, for example, which goes along with exploitation 
and lack of opportunities.  
Structural Violence 
Many social theories on collective violence have attributed an upsurge of violence 
to the role and effects of social structures.  Hence, one could – from this departure point – 
argue that Apartheid, structurally, is a violent system that gives rise to, or contributes to, 
the creation of a violent culture (Marks & Andersson, 1990).  Bulhan (1985) describes 
structural violence as “inherent in the established modes of social relations, distribution 
of goods and services, and legal practices of fairness and justice” (p. 136).  Similarly, 
Degenaar (1990) explains structural violence as a set of relationships, which can be 
analyzed at political, economic, social, bureaucratic, ethnic and cultural levels.  Structural 
violence is a type of violence that is dispensed throughout the social structures and it 
becomes its modus operandi.  Woven into everyday life, “structural violence enjoys 
sanctions of the ruling authorities” (Bulhan, 1985, p.136), and is interconnected with 
other social structures.  To this end, and taking labor practices as an exemplary point, 
Marks and Andersson (1990) state  
Stresses of the labor market have been multiplied by a network of [Apartheid] 
laws which has perpetuated migrant labor and excluded blacks, especially 
Africans, not only from the central decision-making bodies of the state, but also 
from effective control over their lives…because of the stress and tension it 
generates in the daily lives of millions of people, the destruction of social system 
of the family and the community it causes through mass uprooting and the 
migrant labor system, and the pervasive insecurity, harassment and violence it 
leads to in the psycho-social environment (p.30).   
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In that Apartheid affected every domain of black people’s lives, the 
characterization thereof as violent and unjust is to argue, by extension, that every domain 
of life was violently impacted in the constriction, and restriction of Apartheid laws, if not 
its overtly violent expression thereof.  A plethora of laws –– including the pass laws, the 
group areas acts, separate amenities acts, and a complicated systemic network between 
the labor market, police services and the justice system –– serve as examples of structural 
enforcement, articulation, and coordination of  Apartheid violence. Marks and Andersson 
(1990) note that “racist institutions and practices that make up Apartheid with all their 
adverse effects on the health of the black populations, have been created by design and 
guaranteed by legislation” (p.30).   
“No student of collective violence,” notes Tilly, “can afford to exclude the actions 
of governmental authorities or interactions between governmental agents and non-
governmental agents” (Tilly, 2003, p. 28) because these conditions create the backdrop, 
and some may argue are the fundamental reasons, for the collective violence and  
resistance.  According to Du Toit (1990),  
Collective violence is more likely the more people are discontented; people tend 
to be discontented when there is a discrepancy between what they want and what 
they believe to be entitled to and are capable of achieving; men are quick to aspire 
beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate 
(p. 99).   
The police and defense force, which constitute the state apparatus, met Blacks’ 
discontent with fierce force.  It also led to the disruption of communities, families and 
interpersonal relationships.  As Blacks aimed at rendering the country ungovernable, 
police intervention also disrupted life in Black communities – in a sense they, too, 
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became ungovernable either by the rule of the Apartheid state or the dictate and civility 
of “normal” relations. Chikane (1986) succinctly captures the situation: 
The world of the township child is extremely violent. It is a world made up 
of teargas, bullets, whippings, detention, and death on the streets. It is an 
experience of military operations and night raids, of roadblocks and body 
searches. It is a world where parents and friends get carried in the night to 
be interrogated. It is a world where people simply disappear, where parents 
are assassinated and homes are petrol bombed. Such is the environment of 
the township child today (p. 342-3).  
It was within this context that collective violence was fuelled.  Yet, even as 
contextual theories in sociology and political science highlight the role of a repressive 
context to explain and understand the violence of reaction, Bienart (1992) states that 
“contextual analyses do not seem sufficient in themselves to explain forms of violence 
within [black] communities” (p. 469).  Neither does it explain the particular form 
violence takes, and why this “new” form of necklacing appeared.  And what about 
violence before Apartheid and colonialism – conceivably in societies or communities that 
are not repressed or do not operate under regimes that are structurally unjust or violent.   
The Meaning and the Context of Violence 
In my critique both of psychological theories and a linear historiography, I have 
alluded to a discursive position as constitutive of the meaning of violence.  I have also 
argued that violence is a contested terrain, in the first place because the concept evokes 
divergent and varying theoretical positions.  Furthermore,  it is situated within a 
particular time and moment that may well be pivotal to its understanding.  For example, 
in the Apartheid moment of its occurrence, the same politically violent incident may 
mean something very different than say thirty years later, in the post-Apartheid 
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retrospectively.  Of course, there is a methodological pitfall here as well (which will be 
revisited in the methods section), in that the question arises as to what the researcher 
documents twenty or so years after the fact: the act as it was then, or the act as it is 
remembered, in iteration.   
Again, a possible way out of this tricky situation is a sensitivity to discourse, as 
opposed to the search for an essential truth located in the event itself.  In this vein, for 
example, political slogans could well be read as a discursive text that functions as both 
rhetoric and action.  For example, the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) motto 
Life or Death: Victory is certain, is a pithy and axiomatic encapsulation of Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Tutu description of the 1980s’as:  
 During the days of our struggle our people were magnificently altruistic. 
We had a noble cause and almost everyone involved was inspired by high 
and noble ideals. When you told even young people that they might be 
tear-gassed, hit with quirts, or have vicious dogs set on them, that they 
might be detained and tortured and even killed, there was a spirit of 
bravado as they said, “So what?” “I do not care what happens to me as 
long as it advances our cause.” They spoke of their blood watering the tree 
of our freedom. It was breathtaking stuff – yes they really meant it, that 
the cause was the be all and end all and they were ready to sacrifice 
anything, even pay the supreme sacrifice for this noble cause (Tutu, 2006, 
p.3).  
For Tutu, this anecdote serves not only as an illustration of integrity, altruism, and 
selflessness but also fundamentally what life and death meant.  The anti-Apartheid 
discourse yathunga (sewed together) the meaning of life and death, in the hopes for 
ukuthunga, some new event or possibility to be born and realized.  In fact, what is born is 
Ukuthungelana, wherein connection and interdependence is demonstrated.  The 
connection is not just around something common, equivalence as proposed by Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001), but also around a profound need of, and for, each other.  
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In psychology, collective action is equated to irrationality, and possibly symptomatic of 
deindividuation (Parker, 2007).  However, in ziyathungelana, the collective and 
individual interest is framed not as irreconcilable antagonism, but as the assignation of 
individual roles in the interest of the collective.  Again, a political slogan provides an 
example: the Congress of South Trade Unions (COSATU)’ slogan, chanted over and over 
at mass demonstrations and rallies was - “An injury to one is an injury to all.” In this 
slogan a violation of one member is a violation of all members.   
Even proverbs and idioms reflect and mirror this collective and individual roles 
and responsibilities.  One stands out for its rearticulation and reapropriation.  The Xhosa 
idiom or proverb Igazi liyajiya kunamanzi (blood is thicker than water) originally 
referenced that one would be moved to act in defense or solidarity when his or her 
“blood” family member was under attack or being assaulted.  In fact, the blood of the 
family is one’s own, so that the assault on the relative is also an assault on oneself.  In the 
1980s, however, this proverb was used to reference expanding family circles beyond the 
nuclear or clan, to variously be inclusive of the whole of one’s ethnic group, race, or even 
the whole anti-Apartheid family.  One thus comes to defend anyone within the anti-
Apartheid family as opposed to the Apartheid family. Dying for the family, as it were, 
was therefore a noble, and heroic death, for the good of the collective (family) even as, in 
the same instance, it was for a cause – a promise. 
It becomes clearer, now, that a white person who actively opposes Apartheid may 
be considered “blood” by the foregoing analysis whereas a Black person who may 
actually be of one’s clan, but who collaborated with the Apartheid government as a spy or 
informer, for example, may not have been considered family and worthy of regard or 
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defense.  In the black communities those who were collaborating with the Apartheid 
system, directly and indirectly, were often labeled as collaborating with the enemy, and 
assigned a devastatingly noxious (and dangerous to be branded thus) term, that of 
impimpi (an informer).  Gobodo-Madikizela (2000) correctly points out that the 
translation of impimpi as informer “does not fully capture some of the subtle meanings of 
the word” (p.125).  For example, she notes that the prefix “i-” confers “a non-personal 
status; [i]t depersonifies an individual and casts him/her into something abstract, into a 
dehumanized other” (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2000, p.125).  And, of course, beyond the 
grammatical and linguistic, the translation does not quite get to capture the affective tone 
of the word’s use, similar to the way in which calling an African American an “Uncle 
Tom” or a “house nigger” cannot be translated into a different language and context with 
the same emotional valency.   There were also words other than impimpi, such as 
Umthengisi (The sell out) or Umngcatshi (the betrayer), used to brand or mark “fallen” 
family members, as it were.  The biblical story of Judas is the obvious reference point for 
someone who puts money above trust and loyalty, and sells out one of his own to the 
enemy. In sum, political discourse in the 1980’s drew sharp lines around who was the 
enemy.  
Of course, it goes without saying that the government of the day maintained, 
propagated, and cultivated a distinctly opposing discourse.  It, for example, saw its 
actions as maintaining the rule of law while facing a revolutionary onslaught 
masterminded by communists (Norval, 1996; Posel, 1989 and Price, 1991), and the 
violence was – at base – not political at all, but criminal.  That is, protesters were 
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presented as unruly mobs, agitators and intimidators of “normal”, “law abiding” citizens 
who consequently needed the protection of the police and defense force.  
 
Necklacing 
This study aims to understand political violence in South Africa broadly, and the 
particular form thereof, known as necklacing.  Common throughout the 80s, necklacing 
has since disappeared from the South African landscape.  The practice of necklacing 
involves placing a car tire, filled with gasoline, around the victim’s neck, and lighting it.  
It became a form of execution in the townships from 1984 onwards “usually an act of an 
incensed crowd of people rather than an individual” (Schärf and Ngcokoto, 1990, p. 371), 
and was used by both pro- and anti-government groups.  As a phenomenon, necklacing 
has drawn the attention of scholars, politicians and journalists, usually as an example of 
either “black-on-black violence” or as signifying excessive violence (Krog, 2000; 
Manganyi and du Toit, 1990; Van Kessel, 2000).  When described in the literature, the 
word necklacing is accompanied by verbs such as “notorious” (van Kassel, 2000), 
“horrific” (Manganyi and du Toit, 1990), and according to Posel (1990), the South 
African media described it as barbaric and an unspeakable savagery.  Necklacing is cited 
as an example of the escalation of violence and lawlessness, and it is presented as an 
example of how political movements lost control of their followers.  Necklacing seem to 
reflect the political and social conditions of the 1980s, laying bare a strange tension 
between, on the one hand, a brutal and violent regime (Degenaar, 1990; du Toit, 1990; 
Manganyi & du Toit, 1990), and on the other, a brutal and heinous form of resisting the 
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oppressive regime.  I am approaching this work with due appreciation of that curious 
ambivalence. 
According to the TRC Report (1999), necklacing originated in 1985 in the Eastern 
Cape region, in KwaNobuhle township in Uitenhage.  This was in retaliation after police 
shot and killed 21 people, and the black residents killed a councilor along with his three 
sons.  The TRC Report provides many examples of necklacing, and describes it as a “new 
concept that was added to the vocabulary of the resistance….from the mid-1980s” (vol. 2, 
p.388).  Hitherto, this method of burning people alive did not exist.  The TRC Report 
(1999) provides statistics on deaths related to burning and necklacing; from 1984 to 1989, 
seven hundred (700) cases of necklacing and 191 cases of burning were reported.  In 
addition, the commission reported 5, 707 deaths related to political violence.  Narratives 
of what took place and who was involved accompany these figures.  The victims of 
necklacing were usually considered ‘sell-outs,’ collaborators and/ or informers (impimpi).  
The TRC Report traces the vulnerability to attacks of those classified as sell-outs in the 
1970s, particularly during the 1976 student uprising.  On the other hand, the police also 
adopted the method of burning political activists to cover their actions and casts blame 
elsewhere (TRC Report, 1999, vol. 2).  Therefore, necklacing was not only perpetrated by 
those who opposed the state but also by the state forces.  
 
Colesburg, and the Dilato Necklacing Incident 
For this research, Colesburg is not just a locale in which the drama of necklacing 
takes place.  Rather, it is a “thick place,” in the anthropological sense; an inhabited space, 
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an embodied physical space, a place of dwelling, a community.  I consequently take some 
descriptive care presenting the town.  For the purposes of the dissertation, 
phenomenologists such as Bachelard (1964), Benswanger (1979), and Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) have all commented on the phenomenological importance of space, and I provide 
an overview of their contributions.  In addition, though, I place particular emphasis on the 
way in which the black body and community is mediated, inflected, and even modified 
by the raced mark and context, drawing for this overview on Bulhan (1985), Fanon 
(1963), and Manganyi (1973).  I argue that the lived spaced and the lived body takes on a 
particular salience within Apartheid South Africa, and that it will be crucial to an 
understanding of the necklaced black body  
Benswanger (1979) states that the “phenomenology of space is a description of 
space as lived by human subject.  Places are experienced in terms of human meaning and 
not merely as ideas, property, or qualities” (p.112).  The concept of a lived space focuses 
on how people experience their environment and the meanings derived therein and 
thereof.  However, even as Colesburg presents a space that both Blacks and Whites 
inhabited, Fanon (1963) and Manganyi (1973) clue us to the fact that the Black 
experiences of Colesburg would be vastly different from those of Whites. 
A small Karoo town, almost halfway between Cape Town and Johannesburg, 
Colesburg is bisected by the national road, the N1.  Business activities such as 
restaurants, hotels and guesthouses, gas stations, and automobile services have grown 
around this national through-traffic, and these remains a major source of employment in 
the area.  Additionally, Colesburg is largely surrounded by farms, and is known to be one 
of the national hubs for lamb meat.  It has a meat-distributing center, which largely 
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services metropolitan cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town.  
These are business activities that provide jobs for mostly Blacks.  Sources of employment 
for women include being maids (cooking and cleaning houses) for Whites.  Colesburg’s 
Black population is five times larger than the White population, who largely speak 
Afrikaans, alongside a handful of English-speaking Whites.  The official language of the 
town was, and still is, Afrikaans. 
Sandwiched between hills and mountains called “koppies” (literally, “little 
heads”), Colesburg is a dry and cold town, even a harsh town.  And perhaps more so for 
its Black citizens who depended on White owned businesses for employment, or 
migrated to the former Transvaal province to work in the mines.  In truth, Colesburg was, 
and remains, a hub for migrant laborers.  But migration was not confined to those who 
were looking for better paying jobs, and also included those in search of high school 
education, and who would migrate to former homelands like the Transkei, Ciskei and the 
Eastern part of the former Cape Province.  Both of these groups - high school students 
and migrant workers - would later form the vanguard of and provide the muscle for 
resistance to Apartheid in Colesburg.   
Until the mid 80s, there was no high school in Colesburg, and students had to 
leave town upon completion of grade eight.  The primary school building was unable to 
house the large and growing number of black pupils, and consequently church buildings 
were used as classrooms throughout the black township.  I attended my first three years 
of schooling in these run down buildings with broken windows, and cold concrete floors, 
floors on which we needed to smear cow dung every Friday to maintain them.  These 
church buildings (converted to classrooms during the week) had no desks except one 
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table for the teacher.  Pupils used large wooden benches, at which we would kneel and on 
which we would place the book to write on.  Winter was the hardest time as the cold 
wind blew freely into the building through the broken windows.  The schooling 
conditions were not an anomaly and reflected those of the larger Black community in and 
outside Colesburg.  
I have always felt that no one could describe my town like Fanon.  There was a 
visceral reaction to his description of the black and white town of the colony, such that 
quoting it at length seems proper.   
The settlers town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a 
brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage-cans 
swallow all leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about.  [While] the 
town belonging to the [black] people,… is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of 
evil repute.  They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it 
matters not where nor how.  It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on 
top of each other (Fanon, 1963, p. 30). 
 
As with Fanon’s town, so with Colesburg: there is a glaring difference between white 
Colesburg and black Colesburg.  The white world is bright, clean, quiet, and spacious 
despite the few people who inhabit it.  The black world is dark, noisy, dirty, and 
overcrowded, with effluence running in the streets.  In the white world, there was not 
much difference between night and day, while for the black, the difference was 
unmistakable because the sun was the only source of light.  During the uprising, while 
police searchlights provided light, it was neither comfortable nor comforting, 
representing instead the piercing means with which to isolate comrades on the run or in 
hiding.  Within the Black town, candles, paraffin, wood and coal provided light and 
warmth.  Twenty liter-size paraffin cans, the top cut off, and holes pierced into the sides 
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(amathina in Xhosa), provided warmth, poisonous carbon monoxide emissions (the Isitim  
or “steam”) notwithstanding.   
For a description of the houses and particular living conditions of the people of 
Colesburg, Fanon’s observations are poignant yet again:   
The [White man’s] feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there 
you’re never close enough to see them.  His feet are protected by strong shoes 
although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones.  The 
[White man’s] is a well-fed town, an easy-going town; its belly is always full of 
good things. [While the Black] town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, 
of shoes, of coal, of light….is a crouching village, a town on its knees,  [It is ] a 
town wallowing in mire (Fanon, 1963, p.30).  
 
Fanon’s description captures the lives that Blacks in Colesburg led.  Seeing a 
black child’s feet was very common, whether in cold, a rainy spring day, or on an 
extremely hot and scalding summer’s day.  Within this overwhelming material poverty, 
some moments of light shine through.  I remember Sunday lunch, for example, as the one 
time to have a decent meal (decent is a relative term here).  For the most part, people 
depended on buying sheep’s insides – lungs, intestines, the stomach, and if lucky, the 
delicacy of the livers and kidneys.  Locals called these insides binnegoed and afval 
(Afrikaans words which translate to “inside stuff” and “that which ‘falls down/out’”).  
Selling these binnegoed to the community was a way of supplementing the poor payment 
workers received.  Houses had big rocks on the roof to prevent the wind from taking the 
shanty houses’ roof away, yet people had to pay rent, which never matched the value of 
the houses.  Inside the houses at night, people slept from the kitchen floor to the 
bedroom, because extended family members lived under the same roof, irrespective of 
the number of occupants.  As Ramphele (1993) states, Blacks have learnt to fit the space.  
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In such living conditions, the concept of privacy was totally foreign.  Not unlike slavery 
and the poor African American experience, “there were no bathtub, water had to be 
heated, carried, and poured into huge tin tubs.  Bathing took place in the kitchen” (hooks, 
2000, p. 11).  For the people, poverty or class was not an issue as they “concentrated on 
survival, on making do” (hooks, 2000. p. 25).   
As indicated earlier, the Apartheid government passed the Black Local 
Authorities Act in 1982, which allowed black townships to elect town councilors (van 
Kassel, 2000).  Colesburg, too, was to participate in such elections.  From its inception, 
however, the idea of Black Local Authorities (BLA’s) met with fierce resistance from the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) and civic associations were formed in protest (Carter, 
1992; Seekings, 1992; Van Kassel, 2000).  BLA’s were seen as tokens of the Apartheid 
government and an extension of separate development policies which were meant to 
exclude Blacks from making significant decisions about their lives.  Consequently, 
throughout the country, Black communities asked these elected councilors to resign from 
their positions.  According to Van Kassel (2000), by 1983, 240 councilors resigned, the 
majority of them in the Eastern Cape.  One of the main issues that confronted people and 
led to confrontation with councilors was the rent increment.  The rent increment was 
coupled with the election of BLA’s, and opposition to the rent increase became a central 
feature of civic black resistance in the 1980’s (Seekings, 1992; TRC Report, 1999; van 
Kassel, 2000).  It is probably worth noting that the first victim of necklacing was a 
community councilor and his family in KwaNobuhle, Uitenhage (van Kassel, 2000; TRC 
Report, 1999).  The rent increase was also the initial site and issue around which 
resistance in Colesburg would be organized.  
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Meetings in Black communities were called to address the rent increase, and 
BLA’s were mandated to go to the White local authorities and inform them of the 
demand to decrease the rent.  BLA’s presented this demand in an ineffective manner that 
produced no satisfaction, and in fact revealed them to be little more than puppets of the 
regime; hence they were referred to as Oo-hulle sê (“they sayers”) and also asked to 
resign.  The community organized themselves outside of the BLA’s, and ordered a rent 
boycott.  According to the TRC Report (1999), the first recorded rent boycott took place 
in the Vaal Triangle, and then spread to the entire country.  In addition, the presence of 
the South African Defense Force (SADF) in the community led to numerous clashes with 
Colesburg youth, known as Amaqabane (comrades).  Like many black townships, 
Colesburg had a youth organization, the Colesburg Youth Organization (COYO).  The 
TRC Report (1999) mentions a series of events that took place between June and October 
1985.   
According to the report, “from June to October local organization took up a 
campaign around the lack of facilities” (TRC Report, 1999, p.431).  In June, and prior to 
that, there were many students who came back for winter break and others came because 
their schools were closed due to political unrest.  The TRC Report (1999) continues that 
on July 2nd a clash broke out between the SADF soldiers and youth, after the SADF set 
up camp outside the residential area.  Consequently, on July 3rd there were arrests and 
cars were set on fire.  That evening, four people were shot and killed by police - three of 
the victims were 17 years and one was 23 years old.  Hereafter, trenches were dug 
throughout the township, and around the entire city to block the police and SADF 
entrance to the black communities.  The clouds of smoke were not only from coal fires 
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but also from car tires set ablaze as the youth were fighting to regain control of their 
community.  These car tire fires also kept them warm.  Young people left their homes and 
hid in the surrounding hills.  According to the TRC Report (1999), seventy nine people 
were arrested and tortured, sixty of whom were children.  Nineteen days later, reports 
indicate another conflict erupted with the police, injuring fourteen people, including a 
prominent local figure, the Reverend Mcoyana (TRC Report, 1999).   
From the period of June to October and beyond there were a series of boycotts 
that were called, including rent, consumer, and stay away from work protests.  For 
Colesburg these were means with which to hit and apply pressure to the White 
community.  Blacks knew they had a strong buying power, and were flexing their 
economic muscle.  Moreover, if all people, including women working as maids and 
nannies, stayed away from work, the smooth flow of events in the White communities 
would be disrupted, as a means to put pressure on that community.  These events also led 
to clashes within the Black community with those who were breaking these boycotts, 
either by going to work or buying in stores that were not designated by the community 
leadership.  Comrades (Amaqabane) enforced these boycotts.  The case of necklacing in 
Colesburg, according to the TRC Report (1999), arose because “boycott-breakers were 
severely dealt with by those who volunteered to monitor the boycott” (vol. 2, p. 390).  
Here are the recorded details of the necklacing case from the TRC Report 
Ms Nombulelo Julia Delato [CT 00390/KAR] was seen by a group of youth buying meat 
during a consumer boycott in Colesburg.  She was confronted and her meat was trampled 
on.  She laid charges with the police who began searching for those responsible.  Ms 
Delato was a supporter of community organizations, but was seen as an informer after the 
incident.  As she was married to a former Prison Department employee, Mr. Stanford 
Thembile Delato, who became a community policeman in 1983, the Delato family were 
increasingly labeled as impimpi (sell-outs).  Delato’s home was stoned and police began 
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guarding it and escorted her publicly.  When, after few weeks the police guard relaxed, 
Ms Delato was caught by a group of youth and set alight.  She died in hospital.  The 
Delato family could not bury her in Colesburg because of community hostility.  A 
number of people charged with the murder including Mr. Tembile Falati, Mr. Zolile 
Silwane [incorrectly spelled, it is Silwanyane] Mr. Thabo Gusha, Mr. Pingdyaan Kelem, 
Mr. Tisha Mhlakulo, and Mr Tefo Paul Setlaba.  Setlaba was sentenced to death while 
others received long prison sentence. (TRC Report, 1999. p. 390, my correction in italics) 
 
Alongside the TRC Report, the noted journalist and poet, Antjie Krog (2000), 
reported on the same incident.   
As noted earlier Schärf and Ngcokoto (1990) described necklacing as “usually an 
act of an incensed crowd of people rather than an individual act” (p. 371).  These authors 
propose that the role of an individual should not be considered, but that the group and its 
behavior takes precedence over the individuals who constitute the group.  Closer to how 
the TRC Report takes it, “necklace killings can be attributed to a number of individuals 
and groups.  The nature of the responsibility ranges from failure to condemn, to verbal 
encouragement to the commission of the act itself” (TRC Report, 1999, vol.2, p.390).  
These two approaches to necklacing place more emphasis on the group will and action 
even as, especially in the case of the TRC, it is not entirely dismissive of individual 
action and role.   
Herein lies a central tensive fault line, as has perhaps become evident by now:  
whereas psychologists tend to focus on the individual’s internal make-up as the source of 
violence, other disciplines such as sociology and political science focus on the group 
phenomenon, and the role an individual plays is minimized.  The TRC report seems 
similarly caught in this tension, struggling to find a place for responsibility.  It is also a 
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central tension for this dissertation, and is perhaps the defining question from which all of 
the others accrue. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
The Present Study, Method, and Procedure 
The Present Study 
This dissertation aims to examine political violence in South Africa during the 
1980’s, and particularly necklacing, as it played out in the small farming town of 
Colesberg, South Africa. There are various forms of violence, but this study focuses on 
political violence, paying particular attention to the ways in which “political” qualifies 
violence, or perhaps even the other way around – that is, the extent to which violence 
may qualify the political.  To complicate matters further, it may well be argued that there 
are various forms of political violence, and by the focus on necklacing, these forms may 
be brought into sharper relief. 
The literature review has highlighted decided lacunae in the psychological 
understanding of political violence, as well as the group based theories of political 
violence prevalent in the disciplines of sociology, political science, and anthropology.  
Fundamentally, and perhaps simplistically, there seem to be an explanatory emphasis 
either on the individual or the collective, neither of which is entirely satisfactory.  It is in 
this gap or tension that this dissertation steps, hoping to offer some insights as to a 
possible synthesis or at least an outline and vision for such integration with a more 
fulfilling theory of political violence.   
 
 
  73
Method 
The manner and procedure by which I aim to investigate the incidence of 
necklacing in Colesberg (the study’s methodology, in other words), has to hold a 
particular tension:  First, it needs to be able to access dynamics and processes specific to 
Colesberg and the particular case or “happening” of necklacing there, and second, to risk 
a reading of a broader generality, inclusive of how necklacing and political violence 
worked in the political semiotics of anti-Apartheid action during the 1980s in South 
Africa.  This tension between the specific and the general was also demonstrated in the 
literature review, alongside those of the individual and the collective, Apartheid and anti-
Apartheid, black and white, enemy and friend, outside and inside. It is, therefore, a 
desired aim that the research methodology for this study is able to hold on to, tolerate, or 
even straddle between these different positions.  Additionally, and arising from the 
literature review as well, it is important that an appropriate research methodology 
achieves three – but not confined to these three – framing goals.  In short, it needs to 1) 
rest on human action and experience, 2)  respect the role played by language in the 
constitution of such experience, 3)  be able to tack between individual and collective 
experiences, without privileging one over the other.   
I examine the event of necklacing from various data sources.  Each source 
provides a different point of view on the same event.  First, I was aware of a particular 
incidence of necklacing which occurred in my small town, Colesberg, and had a 
colloquial and circumstantial understanding of the event, as is generated in small town 
conversation, dialogue, and gossip.  This piqued my interest, and I decided to interview 
those people supposedly involved in the event – all of whom I knew to varying degrees of 
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familiarity, or knew someone who could introduce me or vouch for me.  In the end I 
interviewed three, all but one accused perpetrators in this event.  I sought to interview a 
fourth person implicated in the event, but that person declined participation. 
The necklacing of Nokwakha2 has been something that continues to linger over 
Colesberg. From the day it happened, there was both shock and also an attempt, I 
venture, to flee from the event.  People did not talk about it openly, which can be 
attributed to the gruesome nature of the event or the fear of reprisal.  A Xhosa phrase —
into engathethekiyo—comes to mind, which references something that is unspeakable. 
According to this phrase, necklacing is both something that people cannot bear to talk 
about, as well as what available language cannot bear.  However, the circumstances 
surrounding this event never escaped our community.  Not only are the children and 
husband of Nokwakha still in Colesburg, but so too are the perpetrators3.   
The first data sources for this dissertation are interviews conducted with three of 
the perpetrators of the necklacing incident.  Participant 1 was sentenced to death, which – 
on successful appeal - was commuted to 20 years in jail.  Participant 2 was also found 
guilty of murder, and sentenced to 17 years and an additional 3 years for public violence.   
Both P1 and P2 were released in the 1990’s —during the release of all political 
                                                 
2  The reader will note, at varying times, and depending on the account considered, that the victim 
is referred to either as Mrs. Delato, Julia Delato, or Nokwakha.  They all refer to the same person, 
but – as I will illustrate in the discussion section – there is particular salience in the way she is 
named, and in the fact that the perpetrators and the court, for example, refer to her in different 
ways. 
3 It is maybe telling that another event, the shooting of four youths by the police (known as the 
Colesburg 4) has been integrated in the community’s story, whereas the necklacing of Nokwakha 
is surrounded by silence.  Maybe it is easier to attribute a certain barbarism to the othered enemy 
without, than to acknowledge a moral and behavioral challenge from within. 
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prisoners—and were given amnesty, negotiated and settled by the African National 
Congress and the Apartheid government. When they came back to Colesberg, both 
received a heroes’ welcome as freedom fighters from the community.  Currently both P1 
and P2 command respect from the community and carry on as productive citizens.  
Participant 3 was the state’s witness, and in exchange for his testimony on behalf of the 
state, he was not prosecuted.  For a long time, I lived one block away from Nokwakha’s 
house and later on, three blocks away.  I had seen her in the community, and know her 
children, especially her son who is approximately eight years younger than me. Similarly, 
growing up in the same community as the perpetrators, I knew them as well to varying 
degrees.  P2, for example, served his prison sentence with a friend and acquaintance that 
was nothing less than a mentor to me. In addition one of P2’s aunts lives across my 
house.  P3 and I were in the same Primary School (K-7 grade), and sang in the same 
school choir for many years.  In fact, we stood next to each other often, singing and 
dancing together in the choir.  Additionally, there were friends of friends in that six 
degrees of separation manner, such that the perpetrators’ names would come up from 
time to time.  Hence, although we were not friends or intimately knew each other, we 
knew of each other in the sense that a small and close community allows.  
A second data source is the court proceedings, documenting the trial of the 
perpetrators. While there are many people who were arrested (including state witnesses) 
regarding the necklacing of Nokwakha, five stood trial for the case.  The case was 
referred to the Supreme Court of South Africa division in Graaff-Reinet.  The court sat 
for the case in December 1986, more than a year after the event.  The trial was presided 
over by Justice Kannemeyer, and the prosecutors were Advocates Kingsley and Tyler, 
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with Advocate Jappie as the defense attorney4. Of the five accused of murder in this case, 
three were found guilty, and two were acquitted.  It should be mentioned here, although I 
come back to it later, that the names of the five accused are in the public record, and that 
whereas I identify the perpetrators I interviewed only as Participant 1, 2, or 3, it is 
possible to compare references in the interviews to the court transcripts in order to 
identify the participants.  I cannot, therefore, promise complete confidentiality, a fact of 
which participants were thoroughly appraised of.   
A third data source is a book on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
authored by the respected and well known poet and journalist, Antjie Krog (Krog, 1999).  
In this book, Krog makes particular mention of the Colesberg incident, and spends some 
time recounting how it was presented before the TRC.  However, the book is not only a 
work of reportage in the journalistic vein, but also a work of literature (and occasional 
poetry).  As such, it is also an artistic, aesthetic, creative, and ultimately interpretative 
rendering of the event as well.    
Each of these accounts provide different perspective on the same event.  The 
purpose is to treat each source of data as a text but also allow that they – individually 
and/or collectively - exist within a larger con-text, and in relation to other texts.  I decided 
                                                 
4  The South African legal system is based, in large part, on an amalgam of English common law 
and Roman-Dutch civil law.  There are, consequently, some marked differences from American 
law.  For example, certain offenses, like murder, cannot be heard in lower courts, and only 
advocates (as opposed to lawyers) can argue and defend cases in the higher, supreme court 
(which is not, as is the case in the USA, primarily a constitutional court.  A separate constitutional 
court in South Africa operates similar to the Supreme Court in the USA).  Moreover, a judge or a 
judge assisted by two others delivers both verdict and sentence, as opposed to a jury in the 
United States.  
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to take a method that would allow me to oscillate between each data point, namely 
hermeneutic semiology. 
What is Hermeneutic Semiology? 
The method for this research is highly influenced by the work of Hugh Silverman, and 
particularly as elucidated in his book, Textualities (1994).  Silverman advocates and 
theorizes an oscillation between hermeneutics and semiotics, in what he (Silverman, 
1994, 1997) calls “hermeneutic semiology,” which “can be formulated as the 
understanding of a set of signs ordered into a coherent textual complex.” (Silverman, 
1994, p. 2)  He continues: “Such understanding will disclose the aspects of a particular 
text or textualization but always in relation to (or in the context of) alternative texts and 
textualizations” (Silverman, 1994, p.2).  Applied to my project, hermeneutic semiology 
aims at exploring not only the “what” of a particular event of necklacing, but also the 
“how” – that is, how it is brought into meaning.  What necklacing means and how it 
means what it means is the subject of hermeneutic semiology.   
Hermeneutic semiology as developed by Silverman (1994) is both a philosophical 
and methodological approach to text.  Silverman draws from the major thinkers in the 
tradition of phenomenological hermeneutics such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Ricoeur.  This is juxtaposed with semiology and deconstruction.  Silverman draws 
from each philosophical tradition, and argues that whereas there are differences between 
them, they can be taken together and enrich the other.  For example, on one account there 
is a world of difference between the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the 
deconstrution of Jacques Derrida, but Silverman (1994) takes Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
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interrogation, and demonstrates how it can be related to, even open up and pave the way, 
for deconstruction such that there need not be an absolute and irreconcilable antagonism.   
In my own appropriation of hermeneutic semiology, it was, however, two Xhosa 
proverbs that served as both a methodological anchoring and an opening.  They are:  
“Umntu yincwadi ebaliweyo” (a person is a written text). 
  “Umntu ubonakala ngezenzo” (a person is seen through their actions). 
In its cultural context, the proverb - Umntu yincwadi ebaliweyo - is taken to mean 
that a person is both written and open: that is, to write is to read, and to write is to share 
publicly.  If there is no private language, in a way that is perhaps not as evident in the 
West, so the proverb suggests there is no private writing.  This also, and maybe even 
especially, because the very mark or inscription is a sending, and a severing – a 
movement out and away into the realm of an other.  Even a coded writing, the key of 
which may only be known to the writer, is still sent, still circulates in re-appropriation 
and the new ownership of the other’s reading, or attempts at reading.  In a sense, a person 
is a public text.  In fact, who writes is also in question – to what extent has the public 
contributed to the writing as opposed to a singular, private, or individual self.  But, the 
tense of the proverb’s verb calls our attention to something more.  The past tense or past 
participle suggests that a person is always and already an inscription, he or she is 
engraved, carved and/or marked at the origin.  The arising question, of course, if indeed a 
person is a written text, is how do we read this text?  It is in response to this question that 
the second proverb is invoked: umntu-ubonakala-ngezenzo (a person is seen through their 
actions).  
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Uku-bonakala means ‘appearance,’ ‘to be visible,’ or to be noticeable. It also 
means to ‘be seen,’ and to ‘be intelligible.’  The root of the word is bona, which means 
see, behold, perceive and find.  Further, Ndiya-bona (I see or I understand) and Uku-bona  
means to see.  According to this proverb, our daily performances, actions and interactions 
announce our being; outside these, we disappear.  We are always engaged, even when 
common vernacular may state we are doing “nothing.”  In addition, this proverb implies 
that actions are traces or prints left behind to be viewed/seen.  They point or refer back to 
the actors.  Human actions bespeak humans.  It was not uncommon – in Colesberg – for 
parents and teachers to remind children that their actions bespoke their 
background/homes or family.  Here, of course, I am including speech as action, speech 
acts that puts paid to the dichotomy of the English proverb - actions speak louder than 
words.  Moreover, is it not that actions speak, in speaking write, in writing marks, and in 
marking can be read, and in reading, meaning is circulated.  Perhaps, too, it strikes me, 
the closeness of speaking and writing, or speaking and marking (as opposed to the West, 
where it is writing and marking) could be traced to, or is traced by, the orality of the 
culture in memory and naming in the present.  
The essence of these proverbs is that human actions are texts that can be read, 
interpreted and comprehended, though not in toto.  It is also understood that actions are 
accessed by reading, and through this reading of actions we can come to know, recognize 
and sense the person.  The relevance of these proverbs is not only to the culture of the 
participants, which I am from as well, but also to the method of this research.  In his 
paper, The model of the Text: Meaningful action considered as a text, Paul Ricoeur 
(1991), captures the spirit of these proverbs when he proposes human action be treated as 
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an open work—a text.  Silverman (1994) asserts that “the text is located and operates at 
the intersection of semiotics and hermeneutics” (1994, p.28).  Echoing the Xhosa 
proverbs, Ricoeur (1991), states that human action is open to anyone who can read.  One 
might add that hermeneutics is  an important methodological way of reading human 
action.  
Hermeneutics. 
The definition of hermeneutics is a contested terrain, for it is also a philosophical 
endeavor.  However, the etymology of hermeneutics might be a good starting point.  
According to Palmer (1969) the origins of the “word hermeneutics lie in the Greek verb 
hermeneuein, generally translated ‘to interpret’ and the noun hermeneia, [translated]  
‘interpretation’” (p.12).  However, both of these words are traced back to Hermes, the 
mythological messenger to the Greek gods (Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969).  
Even in today’s world of instant messages, or text messages, misunderstandings still 
occur such that an explanation or interpretation is called for, the assumption being that 
there is a truth or meaning to the message, to be clarified, explained, and/or interpreted.  
This happens within language as well as across different languages.  In Ancient Greece, 
Hermes was the one who decoded the messages.  Therefore, Hermes was not just a 
messenger between the gods and humans but also responsible for rendering the messages 
understandable (Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969).  In a sense, what Hermes does 
is to bridge worlds and render each side accessible to the other.  Hermeneutics is in honor 
of his name and his role, and therefore, refers to the process or business of interpreting 
(Packer, 2007, Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969).  Echoing this understanding, 
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the Oxford Dictionary (1991) defines hermeneutics as “to explain the meaning of 
something foreign, to bring out the meaning of work” (p 621).   
Necklacing will be held up to the hermeneutic hammer –– borrowing the 
Heideggerian analogy.  The goal is to craft an understanding that, in a sense, makes the 
unfamiliar, familiar and vice-versa.  The fact that necklacing attracted my attention also 
speaks of its prima facie foreignness.  As Silverman (1994) says, a successful 
interpretation produces understanding or a meaning, and meanings are conceptual 
backbones of interpretative research.  Alluding to the importance and contribution of a 
hermeneutic approach to research in psychology, Parker (1985) states that hermeneutics 
“provides a way of understanding and studying human action that is grounded in 
considering such action as having a semantic rather than logical or causal organization” 
(p. 1081).  
Hermeneutics, however, is but one leg of the methodology. Indeed, when 
questions of con-text emerge, it is my belief that hermeneutics as an approach begins to 
falter.  Inasmuch as a traditional hermeneutics concerns itself with revealing the meaning 
of what appears in the text, the fact of intertextuality, of the text always and already 
participating in meaning proliferation, is less accessible, and points to semiology.  
Semiology. 
Silverman (1994) defines semiology as “the general science of signs” (p. 16), 
while Chandler (2007) is more specific: “[semiotics] is a science that studies the role of 
signs as part of social life” (p. 16).  Semiology examines what and how things are woven 
to form the fabric of life or reality.  Both Chandler (2007) and Silverman (1994) adopt 
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the Saussurean (1998) definition of a sign as constitutive of both the signifier and the 
signified, that the connection between the two is arbitrary, and that the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified is signification (Chandler, 2007; Silverman, 1994).  
A signifier takes the form of a word, or sound-image while the signified is a concept.  
Signs are not just part of our everyday life; they also constitute, map, frame, shape and 
direct our everyday lives in varying degrees.  As Chandler (2007) suggests, “signs can 
take a form of words, images, sounds, flavors, acts, or objects and become signs only 
when we invest them with meaning” (p.12).  Signs are signs because they are meaningful; 
however, as Silverman says with respect to language, “a sign has no signification in 
isolation from other signs in the same language system” (Silverman, 1994, p.16).  
Corroborating Silverman, Chandler (2007) asserts that a sign is a sign because it is “part 
of the semiotic sign system” (Chandler 2007, p.17).  Therefore, signification is an inter-
weave, a web of signs which “have signification because they participate in a signifying 
chain” (Chandler, 2007, p.17).  The sign system or signifying chain is the vehicle for the 
construction of meaning.  
This project is not primarily concerned with finding an underlying, essential 
meaning to necklacing, but is also interested in how it is made meaningful.  This often 
necessitates finding gaps and holes in assertions of meaning, being sensitive to surpluses 
and reserves of meaning, and following those new prospects and horizons within the 
social text.  To do this, my project incorporates two other approaches discussed by 
Silverman: Interrogation and Deconstruction. 
Interrogation is an interpretive approach, which is interested in the interstices of 
meaning.  It was developed by Merleau-Ponty in his later work, The Visible and the 
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Invisible (1969).  In drawing the parallel between interpretation and interrogation, 
Silverman (1994) say they both 
happen in the space of difference where the production of discursive 
meaning is decentered and “praxical.” Their task is to raise questions 
rather than answer them, to ask about rather than to conclude for, to make 
a place where positions can occur rather than speak from positions. 
(Silverman, 1994, p. 31)  
Interrogation opens the field.  Interrogation looks beyond what is seen by seeing through 
and questioning it.  Unlike hermeneutics, the task of which is to establish a meaning, 
interrogation does not come to rest on meaning.  In fact, the supposed meaning is the 
point of departure, in a quest for further questioning.  Again, quoting Silverman (1994) in 
length will demonstrate the point that  
Interrogation animates all the question of cognition, but is of another sort 
than they”. This means that by seeking the meaning and origin of 
questions, interrogation distinguishes itself from the visible world. 
Interrogation operates in what Heidegger calls the Open. An intertwining 
of the visible and invisible, of what sees, touches, hears, says, understands 
and the seen, touched, heard, said, understood, sets up the chiasmatic 
space in which interrogation occurs. Here, then, interrogation provides the 
life of cognition. It is not itself cognition. Interrogation is also not 
interpretation cum cognition; rather it is the questioning that makes 
interpretation possible. (Silverman, 1994, p.35) 
 Therefore, when one questions what is visible – seen, touched, heard, said, and 
understood – one opens the possibility of the invisible which would otherwise be out-of-
reach.  It is when we reach out of the visible and manifest to the invisible that 
deconstruction shows up.    
Deconstruction, on Silverman’s (1994) account, “is concerned with texts and their 
inscribed interrelations”, and “requires a text to be examined for its differences (from 
other texts) and its defferals (into other texts)” (Silverman, 1994, p.44).  Deconstruction 
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acknowledges that the frame and the boundaries of the text might actually be its 
beginning.  The text is never complete, it goes beyond what meets the eye (I). Another 
way to present this aspect of deconstruction, is through the notion of supplementarity, 
which, in juxtaposing the visible and the invisible, Silverman claims that “visibility is a 
sort of phenomenological supplementarity and supplementarity is sort of textual 
visibility” (Silverman, 1994, p.41).  Suppplementarity “suggests that there is always the 
‘further’ that one can go but at the same time that is a limit to where one has gone” 
(Silverman, 1994, p.43).  This means that the bounds of the text points to its 
unboundedness.  Each data point can be interrogated further, “for something more lies at 
the edge[s] of the text” (Silverman, 1994, p.43), which are the other texts.  Signification 
makes signs visible for further interrogation, and as we go further into the text, 
deconstruction moves one even further to what the text defers and how the text is 
different from other texts.  This can be clarified with an example: While reading the court 
documents about the necklacing incident, I was struck by the fact that there was no 
mention of Apartheid anywhere in the court document.  One could use all the tools of 
hermeneutic analysis, and come to an articulation of the meaning of the text, for example, 
without any mention of Apartheid.  Semiology, now, could bring into account the 
politico-symbolic work that necklacing does, and points to, while interrogation and 
deconstruction opens up the text for questioning the omission of certain signifiers from 
the court document (and the placement of others), for intertextuality, and for what the 
document suppresses and represses.   
Hermeneutic semiology, it becomes clear, is not just a willy nilly throwing 
together of hermeneutics and semiology; rather, it is a pulling together of different 
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strands and trends into a working or operational purpose.  If hermeneutics focuses on the 
‘final product’ which is meaning, then semiology studies the ‘production line’, that is, 
meaning-making.  In addition, and allied to this process, interrogation and deconstructive 
strategies “opens up the field” (Silverman, 1994).  Hermeneutic semiology lies between 
text and con- text, inside and outside, a position Silverman calls the third position and I 
call the mediative position.  Herewith, the interpretative aim is a particular kind of 
understanding and explanation that is not all that separable from the act of interpretation, 
in the manner that people’s understanding of their everyday activities is also an 
explanation.  This is not an altogether novel insight, as Paul Ricoeur, in his essay on 
Explanation and Understanding, (1991) clearly notes the fallacy of separating 
explanation from understanding.  He argues that the two are inseparable, and are in fact 
“relative moments in a complex process that could be termed interpretation” (Ricoeur, 
1991, p. 126).  The interpretation occurs, therefore, not only by the articulation of 
understanding or explanation in the manifest narration, but also when there are ruptures, 
and discontinuities in the narration.  Furthermore, interpretation is situated within the 
social world, also demonstrating the dialogical nature of explanation and understanding, 
stated by Ricoeur (1991) as follows:   
Understanding calls for explanation when the dialogical situation ceases to 
exist, when the play of questions and answers no longer permits us to 
verify our interpretation as the dialogue unfolds.  In a simple situation of 
dialogue, explaining and understanding just about overlap with one 
another.  (p.129  
 
This process renders the phenomenon more visible to those who are involved, and 
in a way, an intersubjective meaning is constructed.  However, it does not render the 
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phenomenon complete and therefore, one is in the circle of interpretation – one that 
inevitably involves the researcher him or herself.  My familiarity with the history of 
violence and resistance against Apartheid in South Africa, particularly Colesburg, will be 
used as interpretive tool as well.  Parker (2005) proposes that the researcher’s 
involvement in the research must be acknowledged.  That is, there is an intersubjective 
world that exists during the whole research process, from the interview process, to 
transcription and analysis.  
Narrative. 
Having positioned myself within the epistemological and methodological 
framework of hermeneutic semiology, it is also necessary to examine narrative and 
narrative analysis.  This is so because I approach the text as a story, as a narrative.  Much 
has been written about narratives and stories, and especially given the discursive 
affinities expressed in this dissertation, stories and story-structures are of particular note 
and importance.  In fact, the researcher enters an already existing story, which he or she 
both wants to tell and modifies in the telling.  So, for example, with respect to Apartheid, 
Ross (2003) notes that the TRC institutionalised both a way of telling a story of 
Apartheid as it storied Apartheid.  It  becomes a nationally acclaimed channel of having a 
voice, speaking and being heard.  Tutu even goes as far as to venture that  
Storytelling is central, not only to many religious practices in this country 
[South Africa] but also to the African tradition of which we are part.  Ellen 
Kuzwayo is quoted … as saying: ‘Africa is a place a storytelling.  We 
need more stories, never mind how painful the exercise may be … Stories 
help us to understand, to forgive and to see things through someone else’s 
eyes.  (quoted in Ross, 2003, p. 328)  
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Bruner (1991), not unlike Tutu above, states that people “organize experience[s] 
and memory of human happenings mainly in a form of a narrative” (p. 4).  People 
organize their experience in narrative so as they can make sense, or be communicated 
with other human beings.  Hence Polkinghorne (1988) notes that narrative refers to “the 
kind of organizational scheme expressed in story form” (p.13).  Similarly, researchers 
like Bruner (1991), Ricoeur (1980), Riessman (1993), and Scholes (1980) focus on what 
constitutes narrative and its role.  In addition to providing a structure for individual 
experience and meaning, narrative is also a means with which people engage one another, 
a distinctly human act.   
It is true, as Riessman (1993) notes, that researchers “do not have direct access to 
one another’s experience. We deal with ambiguous representation of [such experiences 
by the participants]” (p.8).  The participants will be providing the “image”, not the actual 
experience; they will be making a story.  Of course, the descriptions of experiences 
happen within linguistic and cultural bounds.  Bruner (1991) states that narrative is 
“transmitted culturally and constrained by each individual’s level of mastery and by his 
conglomerate of prosthetic devices” (p. 4).  These “devices” include a particular culture’s 
narrative tools, such as clichés, phrases, shared myths, etc., which provide a shorthand 
means of structuring human experience.  Therefore, narrative is how we are attending to 
and telling about our experience; an act of interpretation.  
Employing a hermeneutic semiology within the cader of the narrative therefore 
seeks to capture both aspects of narrative: its content, and its structure.  Participants have 
an understanding of necklacing, for example, which is “the activity of synthesizing all the 
various (cultural) elements together into an organic functional whole” (Wright, 1988, p. 
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43).  However, this understanding, expressed or not, takes place within a cultural, 
historical, and linguistic context.  This understanding informs and connects subjectivities, 
which are grounded in common language, customs, institutions and practices.  Clearly, 
people interact with each other and their interaction is infused through with 
interpretations, which mediate and permeate their actions inasmuch as participants are 
attuned to their world.   
But narrative is also related to time, both with respect to its telling at a point in 
time, so to speak, and for the manner in which the narrative is organized in temporal 
terms.  Ricoeur, in an article entitled Narrative Time (1980), argues that “narrativity and 
temporality are closely related” (p.169).  For him, when one moves beyond the “illusion 
of sequence,” to a dialectical approach toward narrative and time, grounded in existence 
in the world, we find temporality as “that of existence that reaches language in narrativity 
and narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent” 
(p.169).  In this case narrative and time cannot be viewed as separate entities moving 
towards different or same directions.  Interviewees bring the past to the present by 
enunciating the events; by “retrieving” them.  Ricoeur further argues there is a unity in 
temporality; a unity of the future, past, and present.  Explicating his idea further, Ricoeur 
(1980) states that “narrative time is, from the outset, time of being-with-others” (p.188).  
Therefore, narratives about Apartheid are always and already about the treatment of the 
Other.   
Ricoeur’s theory of time and narrative comes to be clearly evident in the notion of 
“plot” as a narrative structure.  In this case plot refers to “the intelligible whole that 
governs a succession of events in any story.” (Ricoeur, 1980 p.171)  In other words, “a 
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story is made out of events to the extent that plot makes events into a story” (Ricoeur, 
1980, p.171).  Therefore, a plot is the intersection between temporality and narrativity.  It 
is crucial to bear in mind that in our everydayness, in the making of stories, we plot 
events into a story.  In effect, I asked participants to recollect the events that constituted 
necklacing and plot them into a story.  Similarly (and differently!), the court wanted to 
plot a story, as did Antjie Krog.  According to Ricoeur (1980), “a plot establishes human 
actions not only in time, but [also] within memory” (p.180).  
When people tell their stories, it is not a random or unintentional process of 
organizing experience.  As Polkinghorne (1995) states, “narrative is the type of discourse 
composition that draws together diverse events, happenings, and actions of human lives 
into thematically goal-directed processes” (p.5).  Narrative is a frame which organizes 
human experiences in a languaged manner.  Narrative is also a languaging of 
experiences.  Here narrative is used to “refer specifically to texts that are thematically 
organized by plots” (Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 5).  There is an internal coherence that plots 
and, therefore narrative, supposes – a process that Polkinghorne (1995) has theorized as 
emplotment, which is an outcome of plotting: a chaining together of plots.  For 
Polkinghorne (1988, 1995, 2006), emplotment is an operation of integrating plots to 
generate a story.  Although we treat stories as transparent, unequivocal, and clearly 
representing the real, the notion of emplotment suggests otherwise.   
Although necklacing took place, it remains unfinished, incomplete until it is 
brought to language.  How it is told hinges on its languaging.  Narrative plots configure 
lived actions into meaningful wholes and thereby unveil the order and coherence that did 
not previously appear in life as lived (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 43).  The order created 
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relationship between events and how they unfolded.  According to Ricoeur (1983),  
narrative emplotment first transforms diverse events and or incidents into a whole, which 
is a meaningfull story.  Like a puzzle, it is brought to whole/life by the combination of 
the different pieces.  The second mediative way is that “emplotment brings together 
factors as heterogenous as agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected 
results” (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 65).  Inherent in a meaningful story is not only an intelligible 
organization of events but also such entities as protagonists, antagonists, goals and means 
to achieve the results.   Consequently, emplotment “allows an even greater extension 
[which  includes] pitiable and fearful incidents, suddens reversals, recognitions and 
violent effects within the complex plot” (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 65).  The story takes different 
angles: some expected and others not.  There are surprises and shocking moments.  
Finally, the plot mediates the temporal characteristics and therefore, generalizes as a plot.  
Compacted with diverse aspects, factors, and meanderings and historicity, a narrative is 
configured.   
Polkinghorne (2006) suggests three elements of narrative construction.  The first, 
is memory as reconstruction.  Narrative construction rests on memorized events, while 
their memorization speaks to their signification.  Therefore, “narrative construction is a 
retrospective, interpretative composition that displays past events in the light of current 
understanding and evaluation of their significance” (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 44).  The fact 
that retrospection and interpretation are influenced by current events suggests that the 
construction of a narrative is not  fixed nor permanent; rather situated and dynamic.  The 
second element is narrative smoothing, which is the production of a coherent whole.  
Narrative smoothing departs from life as lived because the latter “is more diverse and 
  91
disjointed than the stories we tell about it” (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 45).  Life is not 
smooth and chronological as stories would like us to believe.  Finally, narrative 
construction is also built up by culturally available plots.  In this level, “meaning-giving 
interpretative plots are adapted from the repertoire of stories made available in one’s 
culture” (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 45).  Stories about Apartheid South Africa take their 
meaning in the current milieu, and with time they too would undergo transformation.   
In other words, people live stories, and live to tell their stories.  Personal narrative 
informs human actions; their roles.  Emplotment creates a pretext, it re-orients the 
individuals to play out the role they configured.  Using Ricoeur (1983), told stories 
emerge from living imbrication, which is the background as well.  Narrative mediates 
between background and the horizons of our experiences.  Therefore, narrative constructs 
reality (Bruner, 1991).  If we would recall in the previous pages, we already established 
that narrative is always and already referring to “time of being-with-others” (Ricoeur, 
1980), time as lived in the everyday.  However, there is an element that not only instructs 
the actors but also woos, seduces, appeals to those who are the audience.  In constructing 
a reality, narrative plays on both rhetorical and discursive aspects.  Narrative has 
function, it normalizes events or human activities, while demonstrating their strangeness.  
That is, while things might seem strange within the narrative, they are constituted as 
eventualities, foregone conclusions, which they suspend.  In a narrative emplotment even 
suprises are constituted as such.  If one takes Ricouer’s argument that stories emerge 
from ‘living imbrication’ then narratives are dense, multilayered, and are themselves 
imbrication.  Therefore, a one-dimensional approach to narrative would be violent, 
pinning it down to one thing a banality.  Narrative is a text, an intersection between 
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hermenuetics and semiology, the space between the background and the horizon, between 
the spoken and the non-spoken, private and the public.  It is the action mediated by 
language.  It is a text rich and dense, broad and deep, between surface and depth.  
Narrative does not only produce meaning, but preserves it as well.  It calls one to be here 
and there at the same time and hence staying between as in hermenuetic semiology.  
This theory will be helpful as we approach necklacing in Colesberg.  I enter the 
scene through hermeneutics and exit through semiotic deconstruction, mindful that the 
scene is narrative.  That is, as the hermeneutic semiosis is attuned to both the what and 
the how of the narrative, the narrative itself provides – as narrative – a structure for what 
and how.  Hence, I will divine a hermeneutic meaning, but present it in deferral and in 
relation to the deconstructive sense of meaning as supplement, as difference and deferral, 
outside of the text, and in intertextual others.   
 
Procedure and Data Analysis 
 
As mentioned before, three primary data points are used in this research. Firstly, 
interviews were conducted with three persons who were all involved in one way or the 
other in this incident.  Participant 1 was arrested by the police and charged with the 
murder of Nokwakha, and with public violence.  As mentioned, he was found guilty, 
sentenced to death and released in the 1990s under amnesty provisions.  Participant 2 was 
also arrested by the police and charged with the murder of Nokwakha, was found guilty 
and sentenced to 17 years for murder and 3 years for public violence. P2 was also 
released in 1990 under amnesty provisions. Participant 3 was arrested and turned state 
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witness: it is not clear if charges were even brought against him.  A fourth person who 
was also involved by the record of his arrest and conviction, was approached, and 
initially agreed to participate, but when the time came to sit down for the interviews, he 
did not show up.  Interviews were rescheduled, but he missed those as well, and the 
researcher concluded that the person had changed his mind about participating in the 
study.  
Participants were recruited through word of mouth and directly by the researcher.  
Interviews were conducted in a face-to-face conversation with the participants.  Semi-
structured and exploratory guiding questions were used throughout the interview process. 
(These are provided as Appendix A).  Each participant was interviewed at least once, and 
one participant was interviewed twice.  Again, additional or follow-up interviews were 
scheduled and did not take place due to the unavailability of the participants.  One 
interview was conducted in Xhosa and translated into English.  The other two interviews 
were in English even as the participants were offered to be interviewed in Xhosa.  
However, during the interviews, these two participants had moments when they reverted 
to their ‘first language’, Xhosa.  
Although I had arranged to conduct all the interviews at the local school to avoid 
disturbances, this did not quite pan out as intended.  Only one interview was conducted at 
the school, on a Sunday. The other two participants’ workplaces are not in Colesberg.  
Therefore, they either visit on weekends or when they are off work.  That is the reason 
why one participant was interviewed at my house and both times in the evenings.  We sat 
down in a separate room to avoid being distracted.  The last interview was conducted at 
the local library; again we used a private or separate room.  The interviews were recorded 
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using a digital voice recorder, but I took occasional notes as well.  The purpose was to 
record non-verbal activities that were beyond voice recording.  Hereafter, I transcribed 
the interviews for the purposes of analysis (see Appendices B, C and D) 
The second primary data source is the transcript of the court proceedings.  These 
are the records of the entire Supreme Court session on this case.  Five people were 
arrested and stood trial for the Necklacing of Nokwakha.  The case was referred to the 
Supreme Court of South Africa, division of Graaff-Reinet.  The court sat for two days, 
from the 10th to 11th of December 1986, more than a year after the incident.  As 
mentioned earlier, the trial was presided over by Justice Kannemeyer, the prosecutors 
were Advocates Kingsley and Tyler, and the defense attorney was Advocate Jappie.  The 
five accused of murder in this case were Messrs. Setlaba, Gusha, Maliti, Kelem, and 
Skoen.  At the trial’s conclusion, Simphiwe Maliti and Tommy Skoen were acquitted.  
Accused number 1 (Setlaba) was convicted and sentenced to death; he appealed his 
sentence successfully to 20 years in prison, and was released in 1992 under the amnesty 
provisions for political prisoners. Thabo Gusha and Pienkjan Kelem were both sentenced 
to seventeen years and were also released in 1991 as political prisoners.  All those who 
were convicted were granted amnesty as part of the transitional negotiations with the 
outgoing Apartheid government.  It is important to reiterate, in order to avoid confusion, 
that whereas amnesty was granted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to all 
manner of people who committed politically motivated atrocities (on both sides of the 
spectrum, Apartheid and anti-Apartheid forces), provided they “came clean” and told all, 
the perpetrators in this case were not granted amnesty under these conditions.  In fact, 
they were part of an earlier group, before the TRC even existed, who were granted 
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amnesty as a result of good faith negotiations between a still sitting Apartheid 
government, and liberation organizations readying to take up office pending democratic 
elections.  Hence, they never told their stories in public, never got to face the relatives of 
their victim, nor did they hear firsthand how the relatives and friends of the victim were 
affected by their actions, as was the format and manner of the TRC, held later in the 90s.  
One could still appear before the TRC to tell one’s story of suffering and pain, and the 
incident in question – Ms. Delato’s murder – was related before the TRC, as is evidenced 
in the next section, but this was done without the perpetrators being present; there was no 
way to compel the perpetrators to appear and in fact they were not even asked or invited 
(especially as at least one of the three, as we will see later, dearly wanted such an 
opportunity to face the surviving victims).   
Thirdly, and with respect to the last comment above, a very influential book by 
Antjie Krog, Country of my skull (2000), provides a journalistic account of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee.  When this book was originally published, it shook the 
Colesberg community to the bone.  It was the first time attention was brought to the case 
of Nokhwakha Delato, and in fact introduced the case to the world.  Krog’s contribution 
is important in many ways.  Herself an established Afrikaans poet, Krog is able to not 
only provide a journalistic account, but to then delve further into the various semiotic 
impacts that Apartheid and reconciliation afford.  The subtitle of her book, “Guilt, 
Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa” provide a glimpse into 
the “extra-textual” issues her book addresses.  I reflect on these throughout my analysis, 
because of Krog’s ability to articulate some of the complex cultural issues enshrined in 
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the larger cultural sphere that were  not available through a simple reflection on the state 
sanctioned “facts.” 
From here onwards, these data sources will be referred to as “data points”.  They 
are points in so far as they are positions, intentions, purposes, meanings, and/or 
arguments which provide a line of reasoning.  Furthermore, they are points as they are 
features or aspects; indeed points of viewing this incident.  
There are two questions that I ask the texts: (a) how is the incident told; how is it 
plotted into a story?  This involves its organization and presentation.  The second 
question is: (b) how is the story constructed discursively.  In this section, I examined the 
ideological purposes; the projected belief system and values, and how these shape acts 
and understanding.  This is examined through the tropes that organize the narrative.  The 
discursive construction also examines how the narrative carries an implicit message about 
the way the world is organized. First I analyze participants’ narratives, followed with the 
court proceedings and then Krog’s book.    
 
Analysis of the Data  
Hopefully the methodology and theoretical research placement as elucidated earlier in 
this chapter is clear, precise, and perhaps even suggestive of procedural “steps” in data 
analysis.  This, unfortunately, is not the case – cannot be the case, at least not in any 
linear or “cookbook” – manner.  Yet, whereas there was no “step by step” analysis, the 
analysis was systematic.   
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In its broadest outlines, I approached the text as a story.  At the beginning of the 
analysis I read the story with an open mind, simply asking myself “what is happening 
here?”  During the reading and thereafter, I asked myself what struck me; what piqued 
my interest and why?  What did I take away from this story?  Then, I might go back to 
the story, this time observing how each account was organized as a whole unit, a 
narrative.  I noted how the story was presented, what themes stitched it together, how the 
plot was developed and unfolded.  Or, for example, inasmuch as each narrative presents 
characters, I asked who was involved, what roles they played, to what extent, and to what 
end vis-à-vis the plot.  I observed the sequence of actions, and related events, which does 
not have to be sequential – that is, whereas the events unfolded in a certain sequence in 
reality, its telling need not be organized in like manner, and often was not.  Additionally, 
I was sensitive to what the characters did, or was told to have done, as opposed to what 
was attributed to them in motivational or “intrapsychic” terms. 
In short, this systematic reading aimed at meaning, at how the story was presented 
and constructed as a meaningful whole.  Yet, I emphasize again, this process involved a 
continuing back and forth process; a progressive and regressive process.  The material 
presented here is ambiguous and therefore required that I went back and forth in my 
analysis.  I allowed my curiosity to be as influential as the procedure was.  Sometimes I 
was struck by a discursive theme as I read, sometimes something struck me days later, 
and I went back to the story, or sometimes something was said in an other interview or 
data source that sent me back to a rereading and engagement with the first source. 
 If, thus far, the procedural sense was meaning from a reading of the text itself, 
the next movement (or phase, if one likes), which does not exclude the prior, nor was it 
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really this discrete, was to question what was said, presented, and therefore, appeared.  I 
actively assumed a semiotic position that every theme is a sign, which can be understood 
in relation to other signs.  As such, whereas each story appeared meaningful by itself, I 
now related it to other stories, and to what was missing or incomplete, given that 
intertextual relation and con-text.  This is the process of interrogating this visible and 
thereby inviting the invisible to appear.  The goal is to arrive at what is absent through the 
present.  Hence I observed interruptions, ruptures, repetition and how strange things 
become familiar and how the familiar things become strange.  I asked myself what 
question does the data raise and which ones are silenced by the very nature or 
expectations of the questions.  For example, the court spent many hours trying to 
“understand” the act, yet never mentions Apartheid.  The fact that it is not mentioned, 
that it is absent from the text, has meaning, and it is to that (hidden) meaning that this 
second movement is oriented.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results and Analysis 
The Interviews 
The results of the interviews are presented in two parts.  I offer, first, how the event is 
presented by the participants.  Here, the focus is on how this event is plotted into a 
meaningful whole act.  I also provide interrogative questions spurred by the text and the 
manifest narrative meaning.  Hereafter, I examine the narratives alongside each other, 
and provide a sense of what ties the stories together, and how they differ.   
Participant 1: I Do Not Know (What Happened) 
The P1 narrative is plotted around knowing and not knowing (see Appendix B).  P1 
relates his experience of this incident around not being present when the burning took 
place, and that he consequently “does not know anything.”  For P1, knowing is specific to 
being present at the event; the burning of Nokwakha.  In fact, P1 seemed to be present at 
all the events that led to the burning except the burning itself.  He was with the people on 
October 2nd and was part of the decision that action be taken against Nokwakha.  
According to him, “it was a 2nd of October if I am not mistaken we were meeting down 
there and we said to ourselves ‘people! let us get rid of this lady.’”  
P1 reports that he was among the people gathered to “take action” against 
Nokwakha, and “sent one guy who was … on a bicycle and said to him ‘go and check if 
this lady will be coming down here to her work,’ it was like that.  The guy came back to 
us and reported that to us that the lady was coming.”  Until this point in his narrative, P1 
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knew of the plans and was part of their creation (demonstrated by his use of such 
pronouns as “we,” and “us.”).  The breach or the gap of knowing comes right after he and 
others were informed that the lady was “coming down.”  While we were standing there 
on the rock, some of the masses went to Kataarstraat and found the lady.” (my 
emphasis).   
I did not see (hearsay). 
Along the lines of not knowing what happened, P1 elaborates by saying that he 
did not see what happened.  Here is an exchange towards the end of the interview,   
Sipho: When this happened, did you see it happening or were you there or what? 
P1: I would say as I stated before, we were on the rock we didn’t see the action 
that happened there [at the scene], but we went there after receiving the 
information that this lady has been burnt there.  
Sipho: Okay 
P1: That was the cause of our arrest. 
Sipho: So you have no idea as to what happened? Who was there?  Who said 
what and how did it unfold?   
P1: No. but what happened is that there were people on the scene who said so-
and-so poured patrol and so-and-so lit the matches. That is the guy I am saying is 
Thamin but who is nowhere to be found today and the guy who lit the matches is 
AA, that is the information we got from the people who were on the scene; that’s 
the hearsay to us.  
P1 suggests that what he knows about the event is hearsay, that he was not 
involved.  Here, P1 has distanced himself from the event, “They [the masses] poured 
petrol … on her in fact and they set her alight.  When we moved from the rock to the 
scene now where whole issue happened.”  The use of the pronoun “they” seems to effect 
distance as opposed to the “we” and “us” of the planning stages.  When P1 references 
“the cause for our arrest” it is not altogether clear if he suggest that the cause of his arrest 
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was that he went to the scene after she was burned, or that he was arrested because he 
was among the people who decided that they should “get rid of the lady”.  This takes us 
to the next narrative development,  
Where is fairness? 
P1 observes the absence of fairness, and even his innocence, when he mentioned 
in a more emphatic manner, and in response to a challenging question from me that he 
was arrested, and wasn’t even on the scene, while Thami who poured the petrol “is 
nowhere to be found today”, and AA, “the guy who lit the matches” were never even 
arrested.  Indeed, P1’s observation of the lack of fairness seems to be largely directed at 
the police and the justice system.  The police tortured him even though he told them he 
did  not know anything.  P1 described his interaction with the police,  
They [the police] arrived in the afternoon. When they arrived they said to me 
Maliti himself “P1tell me who burned that lady.” I said, “no I do not know 
anything.” And they said to me “would you have liked if that was your sister who 
have passed away, should have been killed in that manner?” and I said, “no! I 
don’t know anything.”  So they started torturing us there. [after torturing] the guy 
came to me and … said to me “P1 tell us the truth.” And I said I do not know 
anything. 
For P1, it seems unfair that the police continued to torture him, even though he told them 
he knew nothing.  Again here P1 seem to base the “truth” or knowing something on being 
at the scene – on seeing or witnessing what took place.   
 The sense of unfairness does not end with his arrest and treatment at the hands of 
the police, but continued when P1 was on trial.  Notwithstanding the fact he was part of 
the group of people who decided they should “get rid of this mama,” he was not on the 
scene, which somehow exonerates him in his recounting of the story.  In fact, his 
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conviction is perceived as unfair and the whole trial was flawed and contributes to the 
organization of his story around unfairness.  For example:    
 [P1]you see I am little bit puzzled because before the case itself we were in the 
waiting trial there came a guy called Kinsely. [He] asked if we needed a legal 
representative and if we needed a bail and we said yes. Then he met with our 
parents aside and told them we won’t get bail because of the gruesomeness of this 
case and at the end of the day, [to his surprise] this Kinsley who was said 
[introduced] to be our lawyer, was the prosecutor.  So now, where is the fairness 
because he knows exactly how our case goes? 
The prosecutor obtained privileged information because he posed as their lawyer, 
an unfair occurrence which mystifies P1 because it contributed to his being sentenced to 
death.  Even the fact that he had recourse to a successful appeal, is painted with a sense of 
having been treated unfairly - P1 states he was “puzzled” again because     
Justice Kannemeyer … was the president Judge of the Eastern Cape when I was 
given the stay of execution, and instead sentenced to 20 years. Then he (Justice 
Kannemeyer) said “it will be a mistake to be your judge because I sentenced this 
guy accordingly and if they ever release him I will resign” and he definitely said 
that. If you can look at the 1998 Bleed you will get that statement. It was January 
or February, you will get that statement.  
Justice Kannemeyer was the person who issued the death sentence and when P1 
successfully appealed the sentence, the judge threatened to resign, claiming that he 
sentenced P1 fairly. P1, on the other hand, held himself not culpable because he was not 
at the scene.  P1 tells his own experience of being tortured, being given electric shocks 
and on being put on death row, which were all “unfair” because he was not at the scene 
of the crime.  
 
 
  103
Interrogative 
As indicated in the method section, there is a hermeneutic aspect of the analysis 
which interprets what is visible, seen or perceived.  This is what I did in the previous 
sections.  Now I interrogate the narrative, asking questions of it in order to open it up 
both for further interpretation and deconstruction beyond what is seen or present.   
P1’s narrative opens up questions regarding knowing or not knowing; to see or 
not to see; and to be present at the scene or be absent.  And, what the implication may be 
for culpability and responsibility in the light of what it means to be a witness or not.  
Other questions stirred by P1’s narrative regard (un)fairness, a central organizing theme 
for his story.  What does fairness mean for P1, especially if I asked the same question he 
asked (“where is the fairness in this case?”) to include Nokwakha Dilato and her 
surviving children and husband?     
 Further, P1 seems absent and distant from his own story. Why is that?  P1 
described the events surrounding both the necklacing and the subsequent trial as 
“puzzling,” “unfortunate,” and almost as if he had no agency in these events.  At what 
point, and how does he relinquish a sense of an “I” to “the community”, “the people”, or 
“the masses”?  Yet, furthermore, just as P1 is absent from the story, so is Nokwakha in 
his narrative.  Like himself, Nokwakha hardly appears in the description of the events and 
she is never really acknowledged by P1.  Why is this?  What is happening here?  There is 
a moment when P1 begrudgingly points out that “it is her deeds that led to her death”, 
without any acknowledgement of his decision and part that led to her death as well.  
  104
It strikes me that P1’s story is one of victimization or victimhood.  As a victim, P1 
is also searching for fairness; equality or justice.  In a strange twist, he presents himself as 
a victim of violence perpetrated by Nokwakha.  Upon hearing of the incident by the 
marshals that Nokwakha violated the boycott, he along with other leaders “went to her to 
try and resolve the matter” but she threatened them with prison.  “So we tried to negotiate 
with her but unfortunately all our negotiation were in vain.”  P1’s peaceful intention were 
met with violence, which “was unfortunate for us because when we arrive there—she was 
staying in Bongweni—a lot of people came out of her house with pangas” (a kind of 
machete).  Furthermore, Nokwakha misread his intentions; “our intention was to talk to 
the lady as we stated before, unfortunately we were confronted with violence and resorted 
to violence and it went a long way.”  That “long way” was October 2 when Nokwakha 
was necklaced.  
P1 is also a victim of violence perpetrated by the state through its agencies; the 
police and the court. P1 was tortured by the police “for no reason” - he was not even at 
the scene.  P1 was also a victim of the court that sentenced him to death even though the 
people who were responsible for Nokwakha’s death were not even arrested.  Yet, he is 
also a victim of – in his telling – a larger, nobler cause in that “we did what we did 
because of politics, we did not want our people to suffer.  There was a cause for us to do 
all those things.”    
In the end, the narrative organization, style and tone of his story, all portray him 
as a victim of circumstance. 
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P2’s Narrative 
Betrayal. 
P2’s narration figures around betrayal as an overarching organizational theme and 
plot (See Appendix C).  For P2, betrayal runs deep and in various ways: self, his 
community, political comrades, family, and even the Truth and Reconciliation 
commission (TRC).  As a person who says he “tends[s] to look deeper into things”, P2 
examines the depths of his senses of betrayal.  Furthermore, there seem to be a breadth 
and depth to how P2 has examined this incident that distinguishes him from the other 
participants.  He states that, “well while I was in prison, I kept reflecting… on this 
incident, thinking about it; trying to think critically”  
Self-betrayal. 
Self-betrayal seems to be used in a sense that P2 acted in a way that is contrary to 
a belief, value, and/or a position that he holds or held.  The following excerpts serve to 
demonstrate:  
But I still believe, you know, hurting another person, or killing, for that matter, 
killing a person… I don’t think its something that people should do amongst each 
other or against each other. 
Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing [necklacing], but still, 
as a human being, you think… as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who’s 
got a heart [chuckles], when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you 
know? Especially when you see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad 
situation, you’ll… you’ll feel pity… you’ll ask yourself questions, like I said, you 
know? When I saw this Grootman [“big man”, Ms. Delato’s husband] drunk and 
he’s not the gentle and clean person I used to know, I would start wondering, 
what if, you know, his wife was still around… he would definitely not be like this.  
In spite of his participation in necklacing Julia Delato, P2 “still” does not believe 
in killing.  Before, but especially after, and notably in the reminding faces and 
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circumstances of the surviving children and husband of Nokhwaka Delato, P2 is brought 
to an acknowledgment of the event having taken place, and his role in it (he refers to 
them as “his” victims, inasmuch as they are victims by his doing).  P2 narrates himself as 
a person with a heart; someone who does not believe in killing, who is compassionate, 
and affectionate.  He feels pity, sadness, and sympathy and he “wonders [is/are?] the kids 
of the deceased” well cared for.  On another occasion, P2 notes    
 [I] sort of sympathize with him in the situation I see now.  This Grootman, you 
know, maybe [I] think that… maybe he is in this situation because, maybe the 
wife is no longer here, or… you know, it also traumatic to him as well as it is 
traumatic to us as perpetrators, you know?  
The narration suggests a continuing trauma, or wound, for the victim and the 
perpetrator, although P2 does not elaborate on the nature or quality of the trauma.  It 
seems, though, that “the circumstances that led to that thing” somehow worked to deny, 
subvert, or suppress what and whom he considered himself “to be” – a betrayal of his 
sense of self which he now has to deal with, particularly in the reminders that the victim 
was not only the person who died, but the living children and husband as well, whose fate 
P2 had so particularly a hand in.   
Relational betrayal. 
In addition to a betrayal of self, others are also implicated in a consistent pattern 
of betrayal.  First, P2 indicts his father and his lawyer.  After the incident, P2 went to his 
father and he expressed a desire to go into exile.  However, his father convinced him 
otherwise   
I was trying to get out of the country, like many youths at that time, but while I 
was in Bloemfontein where my father is, he felt like, “ey! don’t go away; you 
know, your mother has just passed away; you’ve got your siblings behind you… 
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blah blah,” you know.  And he compelled me, you know, to go to his lawyer, and 
I told him, “Hey look! [chuckles] the lawyer, he might be a lawyer and a friend of 
yours, but maybe he is not acquainted with things like this,” and all that.  But he 
insisted that we do that, and apparently the lawyer phoned the police in Colesberg 
[and] said, “are you looking for this person?”  And they asked, “where is this 
person at?” “Okay, he is a son of my friend and he is around” and they said, “no, 
call him into your office.”  And I was called into his office.  I was arrested 
[chuckles] in that office. I was arrested by Bloemfontein police there and later on, 
Colesberg police came to fetch me.  
 
In addition, P2 notes betrayal by fellow comrades. After the incident,  
 I believe, or perhaps we believe, that the police only arrested us, you know, 
started to be looking for us, for this incident of the burning of Nokwakwa because 
P1 made a confession. ---Okay--- and out of that confession, then they found 
witnesses [including P3].  
The betrayal continued during the hearing of the case.  Many fellow comrades and 
community members testified against P2. Discussing the court proceedings, P2 says,  
in court the way it happened was most disturbing [was that] people whom you 
thought you know, you’ve got no grudges against them. People whom you regard 
as friends, they were to testify against you, and they will come up with the 
testimony which is totally not what really happened; that is disturbing. --- So, I 
mean, this guy, [P3]  shame though, “well, he cannot live with that [being a state 
witness] for the rest of his life, so he better spill the beans and say, what has led to 
his testimony;  [his] fabricated testimony in court”  
 P2 was aggrieved by the testimonies, which according to him did not even present 
what happened.  He considered those who testified against him as friends.  He struggles 
to reconcile the motivation for such betrayal and he examines his relationship – grudges – 
with those who testified against him.  On the other hand, P2 recognizes that P3 (who 
testified as the key state witness) rectified his testimony when P1 was appealing the death 
sentence. In fact, the word shame is the expression of the sympathy towards P3. It is a 
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demonstration of his heart as he feels pity for perhaps the “shame” P3 went through for 
having made consequential statements.  It is worth noting that P2 does not seem to be 
betrayed by the court proceedings as an institution.  It seems that he did not expect justice 
or fairness. Nor did he feel betrayed by the way police handled him or the case. However, 
this cannot be said for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
 Institutional betrayal. 
 P2 reacts to the TRC, and the publication of Country of my skull, as having 
betrayed him and the cause of reconciliation. Here he examines the purpose of the TRC  
The idea of the TRC was good to bring the perpetrator together [with the victim] 
and to tell what happened.  I hoped to have a chance to make peace with them, 
and I think the TRC failed to [let me do] that. I would like to know if they [the 
victim’s family] made peace with this. I would like to face the victims. I have to 
tell this because my children, too, will ask me questions and wonder what kind of 
a person their father is. So, to tell this [event] will also provide them [children] 
with the right information.   
P2 was hoping that the TRC would bring him and the victims of his actions 
together.  The TRC was meant to bring together two sides, the victim and the perpetrator.  
For P2, the TRC would bring together these two sides in him as well; the perpetrator and 
the person with a heart.  Therefore, the sense that the TRC let him down runs deep, 
especially since the TRC was a post-Apartheid, national institution.   
 Nokwakha’s betrayal. 
The community had spoken – had made a decision, and Nokwakha Delato chose to 
ignore that decision. Furthermore,   
We also had people within the system the South African Police who were giving 
information to us. Like, they will indicate certain people who were selling people 
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out; giving information to the security branch, it was discovered that the deceased 
was also one of those people who were who was giving information to the 
security branch.  Her husband was also an official of the then --- Bantu 
Administration Board, Bantu Administration something I can recall what is the 
proper name. So it was easy for the security branch to approach her since the 
husband was---also working there that is our thinking, so we thought perhaps she 
agreed to cooperate with the special branch because her husband was working for 
the then Apartheid government and maybe she thought if she doesn’t cooperate 
with the security her husband might lose his jobs all that.   
 Setting the record straight. 
Related to the sense of betrayal by the TRC, and really every other actor in the 
story, is the desire to “Set the record straight”.  In fact, P2 notes that he consented to 
participate in this research as a means by which he may reconcile with himself, his 
victims and those who betrayed him.   
It has been my wish, you know, to set the record straight because I even tried to 
secure the records of our trial.  Charles helped me to get them through the lawyers 
for human rights, and my intention was that we were going to set the record 
straight. I even thought, when the TRC came into being, that maybe I would get a 
chance to put our story straight. We were approached by the investigators but they 
never really called us in when the TRC came to Colesberg. 
 Futhermore, setting the record straight involves clearing the names of “all those 
people who are wrongly implicated there [in TRC proceedings], you know that I am 
prepared we can sit down and help, and write our [own] book.”  In addition to the TRC 
records, P2 also wants to set the court record straight.  He states that it was “difficult for 
us, you know, we couldn’t set the record straight then in court.  Because we were denying 
that we took part in the necklacing of the deceased, we couldn’t set the record straight.” 
In sum, P2’s narrative is plotted around the motifs of betrayal on the one hand, 
and the desire to “set the record straight”, on the other.  P2 desires to tell his story to 
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achieve reconciliation and clear those who are wrongfully implicated or accused, 
including P1. According to P2,  
[A]lthough P1, initially, before we necklaced Nokwakha, when we decided that, 
“okay let us necklace her,” he was part of that, but in the actual act he was never 
there.  However, he was sentenced to death because of [the] distorted evidence 
which was given in court. 
 
Interrogative 
This interview strikes me as elaborate, deliberate, and committed.  P2 struck me 
as attempting to “reflect” “critically” on his actions and the consequences thereof.  I 
wonder, given his presentation of himself as a compassionate person, how this incident 
questions his compassion or perhaps also reveals a certain passion - an intensity and heat 
that may lead to acts like necklacing.  Is (com)passion involved in the act itself?  How 
Does compassion relate to P2’s avowed desire to clear those who were wrongfully 
implicated?   
Throughout the interview, there were moments when P2 chuckled, as here where 
he describes his reaction witnessing Nokwakha’s burning. 
although I was...we, you know, have been angry at the Apartheid regime, [at] 
their police, soldiers and even informants, but she was lying there crying… 
screaming, you know… flames all over her body… [pauses]  I was scared 
[chuckles, shifts his seating]. I was scared; you know why I was scared? 
Or,   
I must also mention that I [was] quite young; [chuckles] I think I was sixteen 
years old.  And that is also the reason I didn’t get the death sentence, because [at] 
the time [of] the offence, I was underage, according to the high court or Supreme 
Court. 
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And also, you know, [chuckles] there is my inner self you know, I think it will 
[be] a healing process also, you know.  I … I don’t have anything to hide, as I told 
you.  It is not because I am proud of I what I’ve done or whatever.  No!  I regret 
that we went to that extent, you know, to kill a person. 
Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing, but still, as a human 
being, you think… as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who’s got a heart 
[chuckles], when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? 
Especially when you see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, 
you’ll… you’ll feel pity. 
Chuckling seems to occur when P2 is moved, touched or unsettled; in the first 
excerpt he actually shifts his seating. And most of the times when he chuckled he would 
tilt his head down a bit.  What might this mean or signify? 
In his story, P2 describes sympathy with Nokwakha’s children, and links to his 
wanting to tell this story because he is a father as well.  Is there more to this “setting the 
record straight” because he is a father, as well?  What is it, to set the record/s straight?  
What record?  By whose account?  By whose reckoning?  How is this dissertation a 
record?  Is P2 asking about how the event will be archived, which is also to say how it 
will be remembered?  Why is this important to him?   
Beyond setting the record straight, the other pivotal leg of P2’s narrative is plotted 
around betrayal.  But it seems as if part of the betrayal he describes also invokes loss.  Is 
there a linkage?  Perhaps with respect to mourning as well?  Indeed, thinking about it this 
way opens up a realization of the story as one of loss, grief and even tragedy.  There is, 
for example, the portrayal of a noble person, but with as glaring a flaw in his character, or 
as damning an implication in a heinous act, the tragic error committed against nature; 
there are the elements that propel one, and that is bigger than one in the mandate and the 
sense of fighting a just war, and having been part of something bigger than him, whose 
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will he had to satisfy, but which causes him to no conflictual end; and there is the tragic 
hero’s anagnorisis, or new recognition from ignorance to the Aristotelian awareness of 
the bonds of love and hate. P2 also lost something the day Nokwakha was necklaced, and 
ever since then, he may be searching, or yearning for, or mourning what he lost.  The 
chuckles often appear when P2 doubts what he knows and what he thinks about himself, 
whether “a person with heart” can be a person who took a mother away from her kids.  
The words “eyi” become pertinent, as an indication of weariness, and he knows he can 
never walk away, that his act will always be on his path, by the way, a reminder – kanene 
– all the political and historical reasons and justifications and circumstances 
notwithstanding (“this crosses my mind and it does not make [me] feel good; kanene, I 
took a parent away from her children, never mind the circumstances; the children, you 
know?”).    
Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing, but still, as a human being, 
you think… as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who’s got a heart [chuckles], 
when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? Especially when you 
see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, you’ll… you’ll feel pity. 
Is this why P2 wishes to face Nokwakha’s children?  What does he want from them?  
What is it to reconcile?    
P2: But one would ask what I have done [chuckles] so far? Absolutely nothing. 
You know, I’m also a hectic person… Okay, maybe that is an excuse. [chuckles] 
Whether [it] is valid or not, is another question.  I didn’t do that, you know, also, 
with mixed feeling, I… ay!... should I approach them? How would they see it? 
Should they be angry? You know, that’s the other thing; one of the things that 
delayed me to approach them… you know, I don’t know, how would they take it? 
[Heavy sigh] 
Sipho: Mhm; Okay. 
P2: But you should really… maybe… maybe if you could help me with that… I 
would appreciate that.  
Sipho:  Okay, mhh. 
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P2:  To meet them, talk, you know, I mean; that’s what I think the TRC failed to 
do.  I mean, the whole TRC process. I think it was about reconciliation… 
P2:  What if they hate me; I mean they still hate me, you know? Because the TRC 
never did anything, and if we, we really want true reconciliation, I think we 
should start with ourselves you know?  You start with yourself, reconcile with 
yourself with certain things, then go to others. [clears throat] And as far as I am 
concerned, we never reconciled to them.  Okay, I might say, you know, within 
me, I would like to talk to them, and all that, but, who knows… how do they feel 
about me? Nobody knows.  
 
P3’s Narrative  
I witnessed. 
P3’s story is organized around that of the witness; a person who was present both to the 
event that led to the incident and the incident itself (See Appendix D).  In addition, he 
took the stand as a state witness, by his account because he was tortured by the police.   
 I [eye] witness as a participant. 
P3 admits that he was part of the entire event that led to the burning of Nokwakha 
Delato.  As a marshal, P3 was among the people who witnessed Nokwakha purchasing 
food from a boycotted butchery, and who trampled on her meat.  As marshal, he was a 
witness for the community, the eyes of the people: “I was present. --- (Okay) I’m saying 
by the time she was caught for buying meat.---Yes, I was present, because we were 
marshals.”  P3 monitored adherence to the boycott, and was tasked with ensuring it took 
place.   
There was a consumer boycott you see. So people were not buying at certain 
places and they were compelled to buy at certain places (stores).  So what 
happened there was Sisi Nokwakha Delato whom we warned not to buy from (the 
white) butchery. It becomes clear that she was not listening (to our warnings) and 
she continued buying from this butchery.  So the first day we confiscated her 
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things (groceries) from her and trampled on it.   Despite of this she kept on doing 
this. We then went to her house and there was no one in the house, we entered the 
house through the window. 
 Destroying Nokwakha’s groceries was intended as a warning, as was going to her 
house and breaking in.  For P3 “A community meeting was called and everybody was 
told where to buy from and where not to buy from.  So every resident knew about this –
where to buy and where not to buy.”  However, for P3 what made things worse was that 
the deceased brought the police into this: “she laid charges against us with the police 
because we took her groceries.”  Again, P3 offers a sense of a community decision to 
which people should be bound; “we decided at the meeting that if a person buys from 
boycotted shops, his or her groceries will be destroyed.” 
Inasmuch as to witness is to observe, to participate, and ultimately to take a stand, 
P3 was delegated to this role by the community as a marshal.  However, in a parallel 
sense, he was to become a delegate for the state as well, to become a witness against the 
very people that were his political comrades.  Explaining how and why he became a state 
witness, P3 says:  
It become clear that no, I could not stand the torturing. So I told them what 
happened. Then they told me not to tell it as it had happened and that I should tell 
it their way. They then made me a state witness. So we went to Graaff-Reinet for 
the hearings of the case where I gave false statement. The statement I gave in 
court was the statement that I was told by them. 
P3 goes into graphic details about the torture, which led to his confession and agreement 
to take the stand as state witness.  
They found and arrested us one by one and locking us in cells. They took us one 
by one and did whatever they wanted to do when interrogating you.  So they beat 
you, and they did not play with you; put tube on your face. There was a bag that 
they put over your face. The police took your testicles, put them in the drawer 
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(desk drawer), and put your penis on the desk. They then close drawer with you 
testicles inside it. They then beat you and there is nothing you could do.  They tie 
you to the tree naked. They tie your feet and arms (stretched). Beneath you on the 
ground they made fire and they made braai [barbeque]. Then what burned you 
was the heat that comes from the braai [barbeque] fire. Even in the cells, they shot 
us with teargas whilst we were inside the cell. We end up with bleeding nose. You 
see?  
 It was these extreme measures of torture or “enhanced interrogation” that P3 
endured and could not stand.  He then became a state witness, professing a version of 
events on behalf of the state.  However, “The statement I gave in court was the statement 
that I was told by them,” which was “false that they said she was lit by P1.”  The 
narrative suggests that in court P3 was following the orders of the police and in 
necklacing Ms. Delato, he was following the orders of the community.  As a marshal he 
followed and enforced community orders; he marshaled people into the community cause.  
What I am saying that this was happening at the time of the Apartheid 
government, which was oppressive. So we wanted our people to unite, act in 
unison or as one.  So that there would not be a person who does his or her own 
thing even though they see that this [Apartheid government] is oppressing us. 
Nokwakha Delato “did her own thing”; she would not follow the community line, even 
though she knew or saw that the Apartheid government was oppressive.  P3 takes it as a 
given that Nokwakha knew, and witnessed the oppressive nature of the government and 
therefore, should act in unison with the rest of the community.  The boycott had a 
purpose  
Because the reason that we should boycott their shops ...  because we wanted 
these whites to feel the hardship, so that they can turn against their government. 
So it was like that.  
P3 sees boycott as a weapon against Whites and also an assault on the government.  It 
was intended or directed at the Apartheid government, and with Nokwakha doing her 
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own thing, including soliciting the aid of Apartheid agents like the police and laying 
charges against the comrades, she was effectively aiding the enemy and betraying her 
community and the anti-Apartheid cause.   
 I could not do anything/otherwise. 
 P3 does not only present himself as a witness, but also as a witness who “could 
not do anything” because he “had to” abide by the community decisions, or the demands 
of the police (or he would be tortured more); similarly it is as if Nokwakha brought the 
burning upon herself because she was warned several times and did not listen.  
when I just about think it,  eyi man. Yes things were horrible, painful… Yes, they 
were horrible but we could not do otherwise because, eyi, it is indeed true that the 
government treated us badly, you see. Therefore, we were against the government 
of that era. Those were ways of freeing us. So no, it was indeed during those 
painful times. 
This incident was just as horrible and painful as the way things were under the Apartheid 
government.  So, P3 was forced to play the hand he was dealt; a hand that he played. 
Being unable to do anything different goes in two directions; not having an array of 
choices to choose from and also having chosen already.  On the one hand, an action is 
taken because there were no alternative actions to choose from.  On the other hand, the 
choice was made from an array of alternatives, as the best one available.  For example, a 
consumer boycott was chosen as the “best” way to hurt Whites (economically) and force 
recognition of their demands and agenda.   
No there was nothing that I felt, only that I felt it was amasikizi (Xhosa) scary 
(gruesome). Although we were doing it, it was amasikizi scary (gruesome); it was 
amasikizi gruesome scary because it was a killing of a person.  Only that I could 
do nothing because it was a decision that was taken and moet (Afrikaans for must, 
or had to)  we had to do this thing because we had warned her several times  … I 
was [I had amasikizi] scared, because you know this thing; in fact it was the first 
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time such a thing happened at Colesberg. It was the first time it happened. When 
we you are an informer (impimpi) you knew that you would end up being burnt. 
You’ll be burned if there was no other way of killing but be burnt.   
As a witness, P3 is faithful to the word or command from the community.  
Nokwakha was warned several times and did not heed to the warnings, which left P3 with 
no options… 
We warned her. If I remember well we warned her three times. She kept on 
buying and we kept on warning her. Until we took the decision….. We decided to 
burn her once and all because she persistently kept on buying from places that 
were boycotted.  Another thing she had laid charges against us with the police, 
because we took her shoppings from her and destroyed them. So we decided that 
we would do what we did. A community meeting was called and everybody was 
told where to buy from and where not to buy from. So every resident knew about 
this –where to buy and where not to buy.  
[When she was burning] we told her … you are burning now because you are an 
informer. If you had listened, you would not be in this situation now. Moreover, 
you turned us in to the police for trampling on your belongings.  And we talked to 
you several times and you would not listen ...  remember you said we would do 
nothing (to you). (Italics my emphasis) 
P3 engages with this incident from a witness position, which is, even though P3 
did not take the decision alone, or by himself, he was part of the decision, and bore 
responsibility for its enforcement.  P3 does not contest culpability, but suggests that it is 
not his alone.  There are many participants, and culpability is spread around – he is just 
the agent or means, which in fact implies that he sets aside his “own” sense of horror and 
recognition of the gruesomeness of his act.  
 
Interrogative 
Throughout his story P3 describe his roles as a witness, and his narrative raises 
questions regarding the meaning of witnessing.  What does it mean to be a witness; 
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presence versus absence; participation versus observation; culpability versus guilt? 
Another question raised by P3’s narrative is the distinction between an individual 
decision versus a community decision.  For example the boycott was meant to hurt the 
white community by hurting individual white businesses.  And an individual act of 
buying from a boycotted store is understood to have hurt the entire black community.  
Pushing the line of questioning further, now, did the burning of Nokwakha —an attempt 
to remove the cancerous threat to the “unity” of the community – actually “heal” and 
achieve its desired aim, or did it end up hurting?  Whom did it hurt, if it did – a 
community?  An individual perpetrator?  Surviving family members, who are nonetheless 
also “community”?   
Not unlike P1, P3’s story struck me as a story crafted around being a victim of 
circumstances.  As a victim of Nokwakha’s decision to buy at a butchery that she knew 
was boycotted, his hands are forced to take the meat and destroy it.  Furthermore, 
Nokwakha exacerbated the situation by laying charges against him, as though he was the 
one who decided on the boycott when in fact he was but an agent for the community 
whom he served dutifully.  As he states “I could do nothing because it was a decision that 
was taken and moet (Afrikaans for must, or had to) we had to do this thing because we 
had warned her several times.”  Hereafter P3 becomes as victim of police brutality, and 
then a victim of the justice system, which abused him.  What does all of this mean in 
relation to Nokwakha, herself a victim?  This especially because he relates the freedom 
songs sung on the day of Nokwakha’s necklacing.  One song says Igazi labazali bethu 
limpompoza ezitalatweni thabath’uAkha Gerila (Xhosa translation: For the blood of our 
parents is gashing into the streets; take up an AK (AK-47) guerrilla) and another, 
  119
safik’eSanlam kugcwele ngamabhulu, sathi masingena saka kuvaliwe, sathi masikroba 
safika kuphalal’igazi lomnt’omnyama (Xhosa translation: We arrived at Sanlam5, it was 
full of Whites.  We attempted to go it was locked; when we peered in we saw black 
people’s blood spilling.).  Nokwakha is both a parent and black. Is there not an irony 
here? Where is Nokwakha as victim in this story of the perpetrator as victim?  
 
Cross Narrative Analysis – Similarity and Difference 
There are similarities and particularities across each participant’s story. At the 
outset, the very story is premised on the similarity of them all having had a role in the 
death of Nokwakha Delato.  This, after all, is the departure point for their involvement, 
and the central concern of this dissertation.  And, whereas the whole story in a sense 
relates to the event, the moment the event is of particular salience.  
“The Moment”  
Some of the ways in which the participants recount this moment include:   
She was crying now saying we must forgive her, this and that. We were telling 
her we would not forgive her because we warned you several times and you 
would not listen, you did it deliberately and then you go reported us to the police 
for destroying your goods. ---We beat her with hand and stones, you see---we 
poured her with petrol and lit her … after he lit her, we did not give her a chance 
of getting inside the house. We kept on beating her until people screamed “here 
comes the police”. So we ran away leaving her burning. No only that we told her 
to burn, you are burning now because you are an informer. If you had listened, 
you would not be in this situation now. Moreover, you turned us to the police for 
trampling on your belongings.  And we talked to you several times and you would 
                                                 
5 Sanlam center was a Police Headquarters in Port Elizabeth.   
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not listen.  Rather, remember what you said we would do nothing. Now we’ve 
found you. (P3)   
No there was nothing that I felt, only that I felt it was amasikizi (Xhosa for scary 
gruesome). Although we were doing it [burning her], it was scary (gruesome); it 
was scary because it was killing of a person, do you see … I could do nothing 
because it was a decision that was taken and (Moet) we had to do this thing 
because we had warned her several times … [when this was happening] I was 
scared, because this thing in fact it was the first time such a thing happened at 
Colesberg. It was the first time it happened [burning] and when we say you are an 
informer (impimpi). You knew that you would end up burnt. You’ll be burned 
there is no other way of killing but be burnt. (P 3) 
You know out of that anger and frustration we decided at the spur-of-the-moment 
that we were going to do that. I don’t know how the petrol came in but I recall 
that some of us took even petrol from the petrol bombs because there was no 
petrol at hand ready you know to necklace her, there were also no tires to 
necklace her you know it was not a premeditated thing you know but we 
eventually managed to get hold of the tire. Although we were angry—I would talk 
for myself—I don’t know how the other people felt. I can only imagine how they 
felt but, you know, although I was, we you know have been angry for the 
Apartheid regime their police, soldiers, and even informants, but [when] she was 
lying there crying, screaming you know flames all over her body, (paused).   I was 
scared (chuckles re-shift his seating), I was scared, you know why I was scared? I 
never hurt anyone in the past. But you know, now I could see here is the person,  
she is burning, screaming. I sometimes, you know, I felt I could have gone again 
try to help her but at the back of my mind, again, Ag! We had comrades who 
passed away because of these informants, perhaps this is also her time too to go.  I 
must also mention that I was quite young (chuckles) I think I was sixteen years 
old and that is also the reason I didn’t get the death sentence, because by the time 
the offence I was under age according to the high court or Supreme Court.  (P 2) 
What struck me about the description of the event, in various ways across interviews, was 
the persistence and recurrence of the word scary, or amasikizi, which may be roughly 
translated as “fear”, but signifies so much more.  This will be examined in greater detail 
in the next chapter.  Secondly, amasikizi is conjured up because it was “a person” that 
was burning, that was being murdered.  The moment of the offense is one that involves a 
recognition of a “person” and of what is happening as amasikizi.   
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Community Proxies / Leadership 
The participants present themselves as acting on behalf of the community. For 
example, P1 and P2 were members of Colesberg Youth Organization (COYO), and P3 
was a marshal, enforcing the consumer boycott. In fact, the participants present 
themselves as part of the collective, by their use of words like “the masses,” “the people,” 
“the community,” and “we.”  For example, the excerpts from P1 and P2: 
…what happened is that some of our marshals[including P3], I will term them as 
marshals found out that this lady bought meat there and [they] took the meat and 
trampled on it and they gave it to the dogs.  Okay, we as leadership of the youth 
organization—Colesberg Youth Organization (COYO)—went to her to try and 
resolve the matter… 
P1 demonstrated that “we” means the leadership but also the people who were at the 
helm of power in the running of the community affairs. P2 reinforces what P1 said, but 
also sheds light to the fact the COYO worked “in conjunction with civic organizations”: 
[P2] I was the chairman of the youths’ organization called COYO, Colesberg 
Youth Organization.  I was also the active member of the civic organization in 
Colesberg.  I can’t recall the name of this civic organization in conjunction with 
[the] youth organization. 
The participants were all part of the community as well as its leaders; they led the 
community to decisions, and were bound by them – which meant, as leaders, that they 
were also responsible for implementing the community’s decisions.  They presented their 
actions as part of the community’s will, and, in fact, suggested that their “own”, 
individual will or selves were placed second to that of the community.  The actions of the 
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participants were not just as a part of the collective, but also in the interest of the 
collective.  
The Importance of Background/Grounding Back 
All three participants relate the burning of Nokwakha as having a background, a 
“back story”, as it were, that reaches and traces to the boycott, which has, in turn, roots in 
the poor living conditions of the black community of Colesberg, and which is attributable 
to the long and sorry history of Apartheid.  It is meaningful that all the participants place 
their stories, as P2 stated “well, first, perhaps, it will be good to give you a little bit of a 
background as to that fateful day.”  Both P1 and P3 provide the consumer boycott as the 
background, while P2 even supplies the background to the consumer boycott.  The 
background is the environment, milieu, a setting, and condition that led to the burning of 
Nokwakha.  The suggestion to me was that I cannot understand the incident without 
understanding the information characterized as the background.  For example: P2 notes 
that a meeting was called to reject the rent increase on the deplorable general living 
conditions.  The community demanded a sewage system to replace the current bucket 
system and these demands were presented to the Superintendent responsible for the black 
township.  The government was “given 14 days” to “respond to the community 
demands.”     
[P2] And when these 14 days lapsed, we were told, in no uncertain terms, by the 
authorities, that look, they are not going to talk to us. They will do things as they 
wish. I mean, the bucket system was there to stay with us. So, that led to the 
dissatisfaction amongst the people.  It was decided by the Colesberg community that, 
well, they [the authorities] didn’t meet our demands and they didn’t give a 
satisfactory solution, so we don’t [didn’t] have [an] alternative.  The only thing that 
we can [could] do which might be effective was the consumer boycott, seeing that 
most of the businesses were owned by white people, and we were doing our 
  123
businesses in town.  So, we decided, “look, we are not going to buy from the whites,” 
though we were buying from certain white shops people who sympathize with our 
cause.  
 
Clarifying the Enemy, Fighting the Enemy  
  The clash between the “people/masses/community” and an enemy, variously 
presented as Whites, White businesses, Boers, police, the State, the Apartheid 
government, and later informers and impimpi from within the community, is also 
presented as an event that led up to the burning of Nokwakha.  The police, for example, 
was quite a visible and accessible representative of the White Apartheid government, and 
came to embody its atrocities, as it defended it:  
[P3] we were going down towards town and the Whites (Boers) had already 
entered.  They were now shooting us with pellets and rubber bullets.  So we then 
threw stones at them with slingers ... We (were not) sleeping in our homes 
because they were hunting us. So we ended up sleeping in church building and in 
the houses we knew had no occupants.  
[P2] Well, there was this incident also, in July of killing of OoKrakra.  I think 
that has also made especially the youth very angry; people were arrested before 
and after that incident.  They were beaten up by the police, brutally beaten up.  
There were even civil claims launched against the minister of police, the then 
minister of police.  I know a few people who were brutally beaten by the police 
then. All that police brutality, you know, led or contributed to the anger that we 
had as citizens. You know, this didn’t happen once and the police would go, 
you know?  It happened continuously. People would be detained without a 
trial, and whilst being detained, they would be beaten up, come back, you 
know… they would share their experience while they were detained.  All that, 
you know, creates anger. 
 
Both P2 and P3 allude to the clash between the “people” and the police which 
seem to have created a vicious circle between the two camps – a battle for control of 
black townships.  On July, 3 1985 four youths were killed - Ookraka Maciki, Funeka 
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Siyonzana, December Morumo and Juda Mongezi - commonly referred to as the 
“Colesberg Four.”  P1 points to this as the cause of anger: 
[P1] You see after the death of these 4 children, they were youths who should 
have made a change in our community but unfortunately the forces of the 
previous government felt that these are not human beings so they should die.  
[Be]cause on that particular day on the 2nd we went to the late Mfengwana’s place 
and the late Tata Maliti was staying in front, wherefore the 4 comrades  fallen.  
And because of anger we felt that we have to go door to door in these [black] 
police houses we started with Chris Labane’s house, where we took his car out of 
the yard and set alight.   
[P1] I can say after we burnt Chris’s car a lot of people were arrested. A lot of 
people were arrested and whenever you are arrested you had to explain to them; 
who set the car alight. And we felt intokuba (that) “Asiwafuni Amapolisa” (we do 
not want the police living in the community).  
Black police officers were driven out of the community and battle lines were 
clearly drawn as to who belonged to the anti-Apartheid family and who belonged to the 
enemy.  
[P2] we would fight by perhaps burning his/her [their] property or [by] forcing 
them out [of] the township like all the police or people who had the close ties with 
the Apartheid regime.  They were chased away from the township; their houses 
were burnt, cars [were] also damaged and burnt, you will recall Chris Labane’s 
incident …..  So, there was still that anger amongst the people, [clears throat] 
including myself, of course.  So we wanted to do anything just to revenge 
[avenge] you know -- cause some harm to the Apartheid regime. 
 
The Court Proceedings 
The second data point is the court proceedings of the trial, in which five people were 
charged with the necklacing incident (all three of the participants above were charged).    
The case was heard at the Supreme Court in Graaf-Reinet, during December 1986, more 
than a year after the incident took place.  
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The Court’s Narrative or Representation 
One of the first things to note about the court’s telling of the story, is that it 
positions itself first.  That is, before it even attempts the story, it situated itself in terms of 
apportioning a societal role to itself, which is perhaps not only to situate the manner of 
the story’s telling, but also a warning or a caution that the telling has consequences.  
Judge Kannemeyer says: 
The [Court’s] paramount consideration in any application, … is that the Court 
should see that the process of justice is in no way hampered or hindered, weighing 
this always against the interest of the liberty of the individual.  
As such, the violation to be responded to is listed and characterized by the court 
as murder, a killing and therefore a most egregious violation of the law.  In the name, 
now, of that very justice the court protects and aspires to, the goal is to establish the facts 
of the case, as it were, inclusive of the intent to kill – but not “only” to kill or to take life, 
but, in the words of the judge, having done so “… in one of the most cruel manners one 
can imagine” (Supreme Court of South Africa, Case CC755/86, p.1826).  The “onus is on 
the State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused each of them participated to 
some degree in one or either or both offenses covered by two accounts” (p.167), those 
accounts being “murder” and “public violence”.   
The way in which the court works, and tells its story, is to chart an almost linear 
backwards arc, by tracing actions that led (causes) to the murder.  Hence it is as if the 
death of Nokwakha serves as the story’s starting point, and it becomes imperative to be 
very clear about this starting point, and to rule out anything that might cause doubt as to 
                                                 
6 For all the court proceedings and references, I will cite from The Supreme Court of South Africa: Graaff-
Reinet Circuit Local Division.  Case number CC755/86 presided on the day of December 10, 1986; pages 
1-213.  Hereafter, I will only provide page numbers referencing this document.    
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what caused Nokwakha’s death.  This is achieved, in the first instance, via a biological 
and bodily attestation, by establishing numerous aspects of Nokwakha’s health or bodily 
functioning before and after the burning.  
 Having established the cause of death in biological terms, the court now turns to 
the supposed agents of death, the actors responsible for the biological state of death.  This 
is a rather peculiar way to divine intent (as it is on occasion referenced to be), not as 
some or other reason or motive in the heads of the actors or in the surround, but as a 
simple, clear, and empirical action leading to a demonstrable result.  The accused stand 
under a clear charge: a “wrongful and intentional assault, caus(ing) certain injuries from 
the effect of which Mrs. D. died.” (p. 1) 
 Nokwakha died from burn injuries.  To establish the material/biological and the 
behavioral/intent, state and expert witnesses are called to testify, to confirm and bear 
witness.  Hence, the expert medical practitioners and pathologists provide lengthy 
explication as to precisely the course and cause of death, while the state witness is 
presumed to provide as detailed and particular a behavioral account of who did what and 
when.  The role of the witnesses is to corroborate the material evidence and the events 
which led to the death of Nokwakha in such a way for it to be incontrovertible and, in 
fact, to become part of the Summary of Substantial Facts, as stated for example: 
1. On Saturday the 21st of September 1985 an incident took place which was to lead 
to the death of the deceased. The deceased had purchased meat in Colesberg 
which she was taking home. She was accosted and the meat was destroyed and 
the deceased then laid a complaint to the local police station. From that time 
onwards she was hounded by the said accused and their friends. On the 24th of 
September 1985, for example, the home of the deceased’s husband was attacked 
by the accused and their friends.  Stones thrown by these persons caused a certain 
amount of damage.  
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2. Later, on the 2nd of October 1985, the deceased was going to work when she was 
set upon by the accused. Petrol was poured over her and she was set alight. She 
fled the scene and was treated nearby with raw eggs being rubbed upon her 
wounds. She was removed to the hospital in Bloemfontein where she later died. 
All this because she was regarded as ‘impimpi’. 
3. The deceased suffered burns to approximately 60 % of her body - these turned 
septic. The cause of death was ‘septiese brandwonde met lewer, nier, en 
longversaking.’ (Afrikaans for septic burn wounds with liver, kidney, and lung 
failure).    
 
The court aimed at demonstrating how each event led to another, resulting in the eventual 
burning and death of Nokwakha. In relating this narrative, the court focuses on 
materiality and the observable as constitutive of the fact, and in a circular sense, they are 
facts (and true) because they have been observed and shown to be true.  Indeed, it is 
even—on various occasions—the case that the observable evidence provides a broader, 
contextual background, as opposed to a broader, contextual background providing a 
situating of the observable evidence.  This “background that has emerged from the 
evidence,” (Judge, p. 164) is also the background for the judgment and therefore 
sentencing, summarized by the judge as: 
• It appears, and it is common cause, that in September 1985 there was a consumer 
boycott being observed by the black community in Colesberg and it appears that 
on or about 21 of September the deceased, in defiance of this boycott, bought 
meat from a certain butchery known as “Try Me Butchery” 
• When she took her meat to the township, she was stopped by those people who 
were enforcing the boycott. The meat was thrown to the ground, stamped upon 
and made useless. 
• Being indignant because of this, she reported the incident to the police. Thereupon 
as far as those in favour of and enforcing the boycott was concerned, she was 
considered an impimpi, informer, or a traitor to the cause which they purportedly 
espoused.  
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• From then until the 24 September groups of young men stood outside the house 
that she and her husband occupied and eventually on 24 September a large group 
of young men and boys attacked the house and chased the deceased, who ran into 
the house to escape injury. The house was then stoned, windowpanes were broken 
and damage, amounting to approximately R50.  
• On the 2nd of October at about 7:30 in the morning, the deceased left her home, on 
her way to work.  While she was on her way and still in the township, she was set 
upon by a group of people. Petrol was poured on her and set her on fire.  
• The deceased was found by Sergeant van Rensburg of the police, who took her to 
the Colesberg Hospital where she was seen by a local doctor, Dr. de Jongh, who, 
having applied emergency treatment to her, then arranged for her to be transferred 
to Pelonomi Hospital for specialist treatment. She died on 9 October 1985.   
 
Assigning Identity and Identification of the body 
The first segment of the court proceedings aimed to ascertain and demonstrate 
that death took place, and the cause(s) of death.  Additionally, of course, “who” died has 
to be established, that is, a proper name is to be associated with the particular death and 
the cause of death.  The manner in which this is achieved, at least in terms of the court 
relying on the state pathologist to testify to the deceased’s identity, is a bureaucratic 
matter of associating paperwork and identificatory tags to match the name Julia Dilato7 to 
the body the pathologist is to testify about.  Having made the identification, the proper 
name is no longer needed or used, and the court now refers to “the deceased”. 
[Prosecutor] My lord, call a first witness for the state and just before I do that, I may 
intimate that it may have appeared from My Learned Friend’s plea already that there 
is no problem with the identity of the deceased. (p.8)   
[Court] Record that the Defense admits that the identity of the deceased mentioned 
in the charge-sheet, known as Julia Dilato and admits it was on her body that the post-
mortem examination was conducted, concerning which there will be evidence in this 
                                                 
7 Julia Dilato is the same person as Nokwakha, or as Ms. Delato, spelled with an “e”.  
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case and also admits that from the time of the incident referred to the charge-sheet on 
2 October second 1985 until the time of the post-mortem she received no further 
injuries (p. 8).   
Having matched a body with a name, the name is soon to be dropped in favor of 
the amorphous and generalized (dead) body, and the court now sets out to confirm that 
the cause of death was burning, which also involves demonstrating that “the deceased” 
was healthy or had no injuries before the attack. It is a matter of identifying the historical 
functioning of the injured body, in a sense.  
[Prosecutor] Now what did the deceased do when you ran away?  
[J. Dilato (brother-in-law of Nokwakha)] She ran away and they chased her and 
caught up with her.  
[Prosecutor] Now did the deceased have any injuries before they caught up with 
her?  
[J. Dilato] No. (p. 17) 
 
The deceased was a person who could run and therefore, active enough to assume 
the body was functioning well, and that there were no “deviations” in the functioning of 
the body.  Of course the reference is to the mechanical functioning of the body and its 
organs.  The pathologist testified that:   
 
[Pathologist] Except the burn wounds and its consequence, there were no 
deviations in the skull. The content of the skull show no deviations. The eyes, the 
nose, the ears, the mouth, the tongue and the structures of the neck showed no 
deviations. (p. 63) 
 
Hence, without any prior “deviations” of bodily functioning, and all indications of 
generally effective functioning, what caused death?  
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The Cause of Death 
The second task, and also the second segmentary narrative of the court 
proceedings, pertains to establishing cause of death.  In establishing (proving), ultimately, 
that the burn wounds were the cause of death, the court again focuses on the material and 
the wholly observable, the particularized and scientifically quantifiable, given voice by 
the state pathologist. For example, as:  
[State Pathologist] There were extensive septic burn wounds around 
approximately sixty percent of the body surface. The examination noted further 
signs of kidney, liver, and lung failure. It was my opinion that death occurred 
approximately 126 hours before my examination and as the result of septic burn 
wounds with liver, kidney and lung failure. (p. 62) 
The deceased is dead, therefore, and ultimately, because her internal organs failed.  But 
now the link needs to be made between the failure of those internal organs as the end of 
the causal chain, back, as it were – and to do so in as clear and unambiguous a manner as 
possible, clearing up any or all “complicating” factors in drawing the chain of causality.  
Hence, the prosecutor moves from the internal to the external, gradually to the body 
substrate, as he questions the pathologist:   
[Prosecutor] Do I understand the [your] report correctly, please excuse me if I 
don’t follow as quickly? Do I understand the report correctly if I should say that 
burn wounds were septic on the outside and as consequence, as it were, went 
inside and affected the internal organs?  
[State Pathologist] That is totally correct, the sepsis in the burn wounds led to the 
internal kidney, lung and liver failure.  
[Prosecutor] I would like you to speculate and in a way pull on your experience 
to what extent it could be expected from someone with 60 percent burn wounds 
on his or her body that the consequences as you noticed would be the case?  
[State Pathologist] Unfortunately, it is a very common complication; all three of 
these are very common.  
[Prosecutor] With burn wounds? 
[State Pathologist] Yes with burn wounds and we find that clinicians already 
early in the treatment try to prevent and to fight this condition or possibility, but 
unfortunately in our experience throughout the years a person with wounds 60 
percent extent with sepsis the chances are really very small to recover (p. 66).  
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The exchange presumably does not yield as clear an answer to realize the link between 
outside burns and the internal organ failure, leading the prosecutor to press for more,   
 
[Prosecutor] But I do not know if you understand me correctly, the appearance as 
it were of sepsis, to which extent is it be expected that it would happen after such 
burn wounds. 
[State Pathologist] I don’t follow your question?  
[Prosecutor] Let me put to you this way, if you have someone, a person with 60 
percent of burn wounds over his body moments after it happens, what is your 
prediction or expectations, what are the chances that sepsis will occur with such a 
person?  
[State Pathologist] Unfortunately quite large, because it is also burn wounds is 
after all a damaging of the skin, a protective skin is taken away, there is a loss of 
liquid by the wound and the chances of sepsis is almost 100 percent 
[Prosecutor] This sepsis can it occur?  
[State Pathologist] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Can it occur in clinical conditions, in a hospital for example?  
[State Pathologist] Unfortunately, in our experience it occurs even in the best of 
intensive care units. (p. 66-67) 
 
What is established is not only that the internal organs failed because the 
protective skin was damaged, but also that the hospital could not have been the cause of 
the sepsis.  Once it was established that the death was the result of the failure of internal 
organs, the pathologist describes in detail all the organs involved: the liver, lungs, heart 
and the kidneys.  The descriptions focused on the material condition of each organ, which 
demonstrated their deviated conditions; their compromised state. 
 
Who Caused Death? 
Thus established that death was caused by burning, the court then sought to assign 
culpability to an agent(s) responsible for the burning – the next link in the causal chain, 
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working backwards from the fact of someone’s death.  Establishing now who did what 
and when, the state relies on witnesses, and particularly those it deems “friendly” to the 
state, to wit, “state witnesses.”  In keeping, though, with the theme of the directed 
material and observable emphasis, the court guides the witnesses through a serious of 
questions that aim to provide and establish precisely who was where and what they were 
doing.  The very ability to testify truthfully, that is, the veracity of the witness’ tale, is 
dependent precisely on where they were with respect to the various scenes and moments 
of the incident.  The state witness consequently verified that he was on the scene in his 
exchange with the prosecutor;  
[Prosecutor] Are you sixteen years old and do you live in the black township of 
Colesberg?  
[X. S Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Are you now in standard 4? 
[X.S. Bonase] Yes. 
[Prosecutor] Now the deceased in this case had the name of Nokwakha, did you 
know her, this is Julia Dilato? 
[X.S. Bonase]  Yes.  
[Prosecutor] On the 2nd October last year approximately quarter before 8 o’clock 
in the morning, it is correct that you were on your way to your uncle in New 
Location? 
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] As you were walking did you notice that a number of people at the 
certain scene that looked out of their homes and that gathered together in the 
street? Is that correct?  
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Now what did you notice as you approached this place?  
[X. S. Bonase] I saw Nokwakha being taken out of the house (p. 101-102). 
 
Not only must the witness be placed at the scene, though; he or she must also be 
able to make sense of the scene and what’s happening, both in terms of his mental 
capacities and his ability to identify others at the scene, inclusive of both the deceased 
and the accused.  Having thus established the witness at the scene, the witness’ ability to 
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identify the actors at the scene, the witness is now to relay the action - what he saw, what 
he noticed, what struck him, what was unusual, what happened?     
[Prosecutor]  Now how is she taken out of the house?  
[X.S. Bonase] The one pushed her and the other pulled her.  
[Prosecutor] Now who is the person that pushed and who is the one that pulled 
her?  
[X.S. Bonase] Tefo pushed, Tommy pulled her. 
[Prosecutor] Is that accused 1 and 5?  
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Now what did they do then that you noticed?  
[X.S. Bonase] They took her and Spyker poured a liter of petrol over her.  
[Prosecutor] Now which one is Spyker, could he stand up?  
[X.S. Bonase] Accused number 3.  
[Prosecutor] Is it him, do you see they have numbers on?  
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] You said he poured a litter of petrol over her, is that correct? 
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Now where were you at this stage when number 3 poured the petrol 
over her?  
[X.S. Bonase] I am in the back yard. 
[Prosecutor] Is it where it happened? (p. 102)  
 
Again the event is divided into discrete stages and the witness has to verify the part he 
played in each stage (hence, for example, “where were you at this stage?”), as well as the 
parts played by the other people he witnessed.  The stage is both the arena and the phases 
of the event.  As the witness identifies the phases of the event he also identifies the 
actors.  In the following excerpt the witness identified those who participated in the act 
and what each of them did.  
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.  
[Prosecutor] How is it that you got to be there? 
[X.S. Bonase] Spyker invited me? 
[Prosecutor] Now did you know Spyker at that stage?  
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.  
[Prosecutor] Were the two of you good friends? 
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.  
[Prosecutor] And did you also know accused 1 and 5?  
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[X.S. Bonase] Number 5 yes.  
[Prosecutor] And number 1?  
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.  
[Prosecutor] Now you were invited to come to the backyard by accused number 
3, and what did you do further in that backyard?  
[X.S. Bonase] I threw sand at the deceased. 
[Prosecutor] Now when did you do this? At what stage was it? 
[X.S. Bonase] When she started to burn.  
[Prosecutor] When she?  
[X.S. Bonase] Started to burn. 
 [Prosecutor] Why did you do that? 
 [X.S. Bonase] Spyker told me to throw the sand so that she does not burn in her 
face.  
[Prosecutor] So did you throw the sand in her face? 
 [X.S. Bonase] That is correct. (p. 102-103) 
  
The witness was able to point at the participants, including himself.  He stated 
what each person did and said to whom.  The witness takes the court through various 
stages of this incident.  However, it is now also asked of the witness to offer a motivation, 
a possible reason for the action;  
[Prosecutor] Now do you know why she burned? – 
[X.S. Bonase/State Witness] I know.  
[Prosecutor] Excuse me?  
[X.S. Bonase] I know.  
[Prosecutor] Could you tell the court why? 
 [X.S. Bonase] It was told that she was an impimpi.  
[Prosecutor] Who said so?  
[X.S. Bonase] Many of them there in the township. 
 [Prosecutor] Now accused number 4, Pienkjan, do you know him? 
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Now did you notice him in the vicinity on that day?  
[X.S. Bonase] I saw him.  
[Prosecutor] What was he doing?  
[X.S. Bonase] He stood at the gate with the knife in his hand and he chased people 
away.  
[Prosecutor] People that wanted to come and help, that wanted to come and help 
the deceased?  
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct, 
[Prosecutor] Did you hear accused number 4 say anything to anyone there? 
[X.S. Bonase] He said she should be burned because she is impimpi.  
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[Prosecutor] You said accused number 3 poured petrol over her…now did 
accused number…let me just ask you this first, do you know accused number 2 
Thabo Gusha in this case? 
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Did you see him there that day?  
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.  
[Prosecutor] Did he do anything to the deceased?  
[X.S. Bonase] He threw her with a “dumpy” petrol.  
[Prosecutor] Is that a small bottle?  
[X.S. Bonase] Yes. 
 [Prosecutor] Now who threw first number 3 or 2? 
[X.S. Bonase] number 3.  
 [Prosecutor] After that she was put alight?   
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct?  
[Prosecutor] Now who is the person that lit her?  
[X.S. Bonase] Tamsanqa T.a.m.s.a.n.q.a. (p. 103)  
 
From accused number 1 to accused number 5, the witness can locate each person 
and what they did.  The witness also provided the reason for the action, namely that 
Nokwakha was impimpi and that is why she was burned.   
The court has established what led to the death of Nokwakha: septic burn wounds 
with resultant liver, kidney and lung failure.  The court also established how Nokwakha 
incurred the burn wounds and who were responsible for inflicting those wounds.   
The Verdict 
The court now determines that the burning of Nokwakha was unjustifiable. It 
contravened the laws of the society.  The accused are found guilty.    
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Mitigating or Extenuating Circumstances 
The following segment of the court narrative, having determined guilt, is to 
determine extenuating or mitigating circumstances, in order to determine a “just” 
punishment.  The judge defined extenuating circumstances “as circumstances which 
morally, although not legal, reduce the enormity of the offence.” (p. 181).  The court 
continues to list some mitigating circumstance such as: age, education, and mental 
functioning.  As a result, the judge considered age, and decided against the death penalty 
for the accused who committed the offense when they were under the age of 18 years.  
Additionally, the judge considered education for accused number 1—who was sentenced 
to death— and notes that he “has enjoyed education; he passed standard 10 [grade 12],” 
meaning high school education.  Hence, there was no mitigating circumstance inasmuch 
as he should have known better, by his education.  Similarly, adding education to mental 
functioning and/or capacity, the judge said of accused number 2, “he is the person of full 
age who had enjoyed an education.  He had time to think about what was taking place” 
(p. 182). The Judge’s deliberations were as follows;  
[Judge] In our view there is no justification for a crime such as this, morally or 
otherwise.  This woman was killed because she had done no more than to go and 
buy meat, when certain self-appointed persons had determined that she should not 
and because she had done what she was perfectly entitled to do, she was set upon 
and killed in one of the most cruel manners one can imagine. (p.182)….  It is our 
unhappy experience, sitting in this Division [of Law], that it is youths of this age 
who frequently are responsible for acts of this type of terrorism against their own 
people.  When they act as adults and behave as adults and try and enforce their 
will on others, this removes the extenuation that age would normally give them. It 
shows an inherent wickedness when they act this way (p. 183). 
The judgment makes it clear that there are no moral justifications for such a 
crime.  This was an act of terrorism by people self-appointed to uphold false and 
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illegitimate rules.  The accused had no jurisdiction over where Nokwakha could or could 
not buy.  So there was no moral impetus or justification for the perpetration of the crime. 
Rather, the accused were fully functioning people who, even though they were under age 
of 18, acted like adults and therefore should be treated as such.  
 
The influence of the times. 
The defense attorney argued that the times should be considered as mitigating 
factor.  However, in both the defense attorney’s plea, and the judge’s response to it, there 
appears a reluctance or even an  avoidance of considering  the possibility of the times (the 
context) as bearing any mitigating influence.  One might even ascribe a misunderstanding 
of the times to both the defense attorney and the judge.  In fact, the judge mentioned time 
as factor only in relation to Nokwakha’s family inasmuch as “it must be borne in mind 
that Joseph [Dilato] was living in unusual times in his township when violence and unrest 
was the order of the day.  He had been subjected to one attack already” (p. 169). As it 
pertains specifically to the defense attorney’s request, and the application to the accused, 
the judge responded that,    
It has been suggested that he is a young man and could have been influenced by 
the time and the circumstances in which he lives and that he was doing what he 
did in furtherance of a cause, even if that cause is not one easily justified.  It is 
said he did this not for personal gain (p. 182).  
The judge continues to reject his own summary as having had an influence on this 
event and that there was nothing about and with these individuals’ actions that is of any 
extenuating consequence.  Rather, he expressed his belief in “an inherent wickedness 
when they act this way” (p. 183).  
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Therefore there is something above and beyond the times and the context: there is, 
within the actors, something inherently evil.  Hence, the equation is rather 
straightforward: because there is something inherently evil within the accused, it was 
expressed in an evil and barbarous act.   
 
The Sentence 
Having considered extenuating and mitigating possibilities, and fundamentally 
finding none, the next step is sentencing:  the judge says that the sentence must make it 
“clear to young men of your age in the township that savage conduct of this sort can 
never be tolerated in any civilized community” (p. 187).  The court proved the burning 
was a murder, committed “in a most cruel manner” and therefore an “ultimate crime” 
calling for ultimate sentences, including death.  Hence one of the accused is sentenced to 
death, two others are sentenced to twenty years each, and two are acquitted, one of whom 
is the state witness who, while he was there and participated in the burning of Ms. Dilato, 
goes free presumably because of his “assistance” and testimony for the state. 
 
Interrogative  
For all its insistence on the facts, on empirical evidence in order to get the story 
straight, the ultimate irony is that the very person sentenced to die, is the one that was not 
present at the event.  The fabrication of the state witness as to who was where and did 
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what puts paid to the notion of this impartial and objective justice meted out with regard 
only to the truth of the action.   
Moreover, I am struck by the absence of Apartheid in the court.  There is no 
mention of Apartheid as having any influence on the event or on the trial, or being 
considered in any way as impacting an understanding of the event.  The Judge and the 
prosecutor are following “strict” professional codes or duties of impartiality and 
supposed objectivity.  The court, in that it considers “paramount … that the … process of 
justice is in no way hampered or hindered, weighing this always against the interest of the 
liberty of the individual” (p. 161), wholly overlooks and ignores Apartheid in meting out 
justice.  The question is: can it do so justly?  This when Apartheid permeates the room – 
for example what does the judge mean when he said the accused were committing acts of 
“terrorism against their own people”—including Nokwakha? (my emphasis).  Are the 
perpetrators and Nokwakha not the judge’s people?  Indeed, the questions of what 
qualifies as extenuating circumstances, whether there are any moral justifications for a 
crime of this sort, or not, or what the judge means when he says this crime “shows 
inherent wickedness” are not examined or struggled with, even as they seem to bear so 
deliberately and profoundly on the case. 
The court’s narrative is a formulaic one, a linear one with a rule-bound protocol 
as to its telling that seems wholly out of step with how life is lived.  Everybody involved 
seemed distant, mechanical, or robotically rational.  There are no grey areas, no or very 
little affect; it is a story of experiences without experience; of pain without pain, of fact 
without affect.  Mr Dilato is not asked to describe the last moments with Nokwakha, his 
sister-in-law, but he is asked to relate the chronological unfolding of the events placing 
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people in the scene and their possible role. Beyond giving facts, witnesses are required to 
either confirm or deny the Judge or the Prosecutor’s scenario with “yes” or “no” 
confirming or denying answers seemingly the most valued.  The quest to prove guilt or 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt seems to show a fear of doubt.  A strange thing 
indeed if one considers that doubt is crucial to reason.  
 
Country of My Skull by Antjie Krog 
The third data source is a book on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
authored by the respected and well-known poet and journalist, Antjie Krog (Krog, 1999).  
In this book, Krog makes particular mention of the Colesberg incident, and spends some 
time recounting how it was presented before the TRC.  The book covers the cases over 
the lifespan of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as extensive as it is.  While the 
Colesburg incident takes up a very small portion of the whole, its importance is less in 
the number of pages or the extensiveness of the description, than in how this case is 
reported, and what it is made to signify.  
On one level, the book is an account of the TRC hearings – Krog, after all, was a 
journalist covering the hearings as it happened.  But, Krog is also an accomplished poet, 
and the book becomes much more than a journalistic account.  It also explores political 
and moral philosophy, on the one broad level, and by means of an intensely honest, open, 
and reflexive biographical account, brings it all to intimate, individual, and personal 
aspects of identity, feeling, responsibility.  Indeed, the subtitle of the book is “Guilt, 
sorrow, and the limits of forgiveness in the New South Africa” (at least for the 
international release of the book.  It is interpretatively telling that the South African 
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edition does not have the subtitle; could it be that the subtitle is all too tautologically 
evident to the audience there?).   
Each of the book’s twenty three chapters are tellingly and poetically titled. After 
presenting, in the first two chapters of the book, the background to the creation of the 
TRC, the third chapter actually reports on the TRC hearings for the first time.  It is here, 
very early in this chapter, that the Colesberg case is presented.        
“Bereaved and Dumb, the High Southern Air Succumbs” 
The title above is also the title to the chapter in Krog’s book, where she notes the 
Dilato case.  Indeed, out of the many cases that Krog covered as a journalist reporting on 
the TRC, one gets the impression that she regarded the Dilato case as exceptional and 
exemplary.  That is, while the other stories were clearly all unique in some way or other, 
there was something about this incident that prompted Krog to provide it as a distilled 
example for all the others, or at least that it spoke to her, and us maybe, in a particular 
voice and tone.  In the TRC proceedings excerpt of this case, the disturbing sentiment is 
shared by one of the commissioners, and it is as if the Colesburg incident comes to stand 
in not only for other necklacing incidents, but in fact is presented as an inaugurative 
moment.  That is, even though it was not the first such incident, it seems that it 
represented a turning moment from which it spread in prevalence and frequency 
throughout the country.  Although there were smoldering sparks already, this was the 
moment of “catching fire”.  
Not altogether separate from the manner in which the Colesburg incident comes 
to stand in for others, Antjie Krog’s book itself comes to be a trope and metonym for the 
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TRC, the metonymy being about disturbance and rupture—a rupture with the past, the 
TRC, and herself. Structured around excerpts from the TRC proceedings, annotated by 
the author’s commentary, Krog offers her reactions, tries to capture the TRC atmosphere 
or mood, or otherwise draws incisive links across history, cases, or events.  With respect 
to the Colesburg incident, Krog leads into the case with a commentary about the Eastern 
Cape.  
On the Heels of the Eastern Cape 
Why the Eastern Cape – why start at this scalp of green silence?  (p. 46) 
It has to be this part of the country [the Eastern Cape] that turns us inside out, that 
renders us: bare lips. It has to be this region of fierce opposites—meadows and 
plains, waterfalls and dongas, ferns and aloes—that sparks from a speechless 
darkness the voices of the past. And at long last, we can weep in the certainty of 
this April, in the assurance of the testimony of fellow South Africa. (p. 47)  
At one level, starting her story of the Dilato case somewhere else, in the Eastern 
Cape, acknowledges a real, material, and close link between Colesberg and the Eastern 
Cape in that most Colesberg residents migrated from the Eastern Cape, share a language, 
and maintain family and ancestral ties with places and spaces in the Province of the 
Eastern Cape.  The fierce opposites of this region, its “meadows and plains, waterfalls 
and dongas, ferns and aloes,” are also contrasted to the barren desolation and semi-desert 
starkness of the Klein Karoo, where Colesberg is located.  And as people migrate(d) to 
Colesburg, so did the violence of necklacing, from its first occurrence in the Eastern 
Cape, to Colesburg, from where it would spread all over the country. 
But there is another reason, Krog seems to suggest, for prefacing the Dilato case 
with a poetic description of the Eastern Cape, an elsewhere of the event, namely that “this 
part of Africa was the first frontier between black and white, between the terrestrial 
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endeavour of Africa and the maritime endeavour of Europe” (p. 46).  The Dilato case, it 
seems, was to be seen in these terms of difference and relational enmity.  
Voices from the Speechless Darkness of the Past 
It is as if this case, for Krog, comes to epitomize and come to spark “from a 
speechless darkness the voice of the past.” Without speech, without writing, it conveys all 
the qualities of being stunned, shocked, in horror, or otherwise wordless, silent, unable to 
speak, or just difficult to express. In fact, Krog inserts here, for the first time in the book, 
a little poem – without commentary or warning: 
dare I sit in this grape dark 
during this return journey where my body is overcome 
by grief my heart coagulate resigned 
 
write I – a blue slit against this all … (p.  53) 
 
Citing one of the TRC commissioners, Krog seems to suggest for him, too, this 
Colesburg case in some way represents a voice from a speechless darkness: 
Adv. Ntsebenza: this is a unique case from all the cases we have heard. We’ve 
been listening to cases where our people were being killed by police and the 
government, but now this is unique because our people are being killed by our 
own people at the same time. (p. 49) 
 
This case is unique – and it is unique precisely in that it becomes the iterative 
moment when the precedent of the Eastern Cape is marked or installed to be brought 
back, to be repeated.  The case breaks with the pattern and expectation of killing or injury 
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in clear racial and political terms – between oppressed Blacks and White oppressors.  
Instead, this killing occurs within the very ranks of the oppressed, within the Apartheid-
ravaged communities themselves, and by the very people who live and share within those 
communities.  Indeed, it seems to the TRC that there is also a lack of political motive, or 
at the least not sufficient a political motivation for the action.  The killing is out of 
proportion to the motivation.  This is especially salient for the TRC as its very charge is 
to manage a truth premised on amnesty and reconciliation for the manner in which the 
offense was politically charged.  That is, under “usual” circumstances, there would be no 
possible justification for the action undertook.  However, during those political times, and 
the ways in which people were pressured to subscribe to certain political views, or 
seemingly freely adopted them, the circumstance might be presumably different.  But still 
… political motives consequently had to be demonstrated for the commission to reconcile 
their actions with politics, and the reconciliation such truth would fashion.  In this case 
the commission found a decided difficulty – if not inability – to publicly and clearly 
reconcile the action and the motives, making it all the more shocking.  Here is the TRC 
proceeding exchange between a witness, Mrs. Maliti who claimed to be a relative of 
Nokwakha, and the commissioner,  
Adv. Potgieter: Was there any truth in this allegation that she was an impimpi, an 
informer?  
Mrs. Maliti: That’s how they got her, but the reason why they burnt her is because 
my uncle is a policeman. 
Adv. Ntsebenza: You said while this happened there was a boycott of the shops at 
that time. Your mother’s main offense was that she went to buy meat from the 
butchery—you will correct me if I am wrong… she tried to clear her name? 
Mrs. Maliti: Yes.  
Adv. Ntsebenza: According to the report that you gave to the people who were 
taking the statement earlier, she paid 100 rand? 
Mrs. Maliti: Yes. 
Adv. Ntsebenza: where did she send this 100 rand?  
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Mrs. Maliti: She sent it to the comrades and the comrades announced it, that she 
paid this R100 trying to ask for forgiveness for buying the meat during the 
consumer boycott. They said they forgive her. Now she took the letter to the 
township.  
Adv. Ntsebenza: When she came back to the township, she was under the 
impression that she was forgiven? 
Mrs. Maliti: Yes. 
Adv. Ntsebenza: In other words…she was killed while she was still under the 
impression that she was safe, knowing that she was safe, knowing that she was 
forgiven?   
Mrs. Maliti: Yes, that’s so. 
Adv. Ntsebenza: When did the police come in? (p. 48-49) 
 
The exchange demonstrates the commissioner’s attempt to establish not only how 
the incident occurred but also why it occurred.  It is an attempt to establish the political 
context of this incident, an attempt made all the more difficult by the seeming inability to 
find precisely that political hook on which could be hung the justification for 
reconciliation, that is, the truth. 
 
Truth Unspeakable 
The case of Nokwakha seemed to stir what is unspeakable: the Truth.  For Krog 
the word “Truth” is a crucial organizer of her narrative, as it was for the Commission – it 
was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, after all.  Truth is the beginning or the 
first step toward reconciliation, if not forgiveness.  But where is it to be found?  Krog’s 
technical assistant tells her to “repeat it twenty times so that you become familiar with it. 
Truth is mos jou job!” (“Truth is your job, after all”) (p. 50).  After all is said and done 
truth is a job; the purpose of her vocation.  They were commissioned to speak the 
unspeakable truth of Apartheid violence, or violence in the Apartheid state.  
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Many aspects of this case, however, prove discomforting for the TRC and Krog, 
who notes that it “makes me uncomfortable”, and that this discomfort is especially salient 
given the assumption and search of the TRC, the country and perhaps Krog herself, for:  
The word “truth” makes me uncomfortable.  
The word “truth” still trips the tongue.  
“Your voice tightens up when you approach the word ‘truth,’ ” the technical 
assistant says, irritated. “Repeat it twenty times so that you became familiar with 
it. Truth is mos jou job!” truth is your job, after all!”).  
I hesitate at the word; I am not used to using it. Even when I type it, it ends up as 
either turth or trth. I have never bedded that word in a poem.  I prefer the word 
“lie.” The moment the lie raises its head, I smell blood. Because it is 
there…where the truth is closest. (Krog, 1999, p. 50)   
 
The word truth became difficult to approach; it led to both mental and physical 
discomfort. The tongue cannot say it, the hands cannot type it. “The word truth trips the 
tongue;” the language, speech.  The job of the TRC, which includes truth, became 
something that is not easily articulated; unfamiliar, resembling this case to the TRC. The 
burning of Nokwakha disturbed the TRC’s job.  This unusual case makes truth unfamiliar 
to the extent that it has to be repeated twenty times.  Maybe on the twentieth time it will 
be more familiar.  
 
Reconciliation as Sustenance 
While Krog stumbles when encountering the word truth, she is comfortable with 
reconciliation. In fact, the word reconciliation is her “daily bread” (p. 50).  Reconciliation 
is another organizer for Krog’s narrative. It is a daily bread, a sustenance or livelihood.  
Krog (1999), provides words that are related to reconciliation; “compromise, 
accommodate, provide, make space for. Understand. Tolerate. Empathize. Endure… 
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without it, no relationship, no work, no progress is possible” (p. 50).  What is striking in  
Krog’s description of the word reconciliation is the inherent reference to the other.  There 
is an assumption of two or more different positions which through reconciliation and 
compromise form a relationship.  The two sides tolerate and endure each other so as a 
relationship can be forged, work can be done, and progress can be made.  This is no less 
easier than truth, and “piece by piece we die into reconciliation” (p. 54). 
And from here, even reconciliation falters.  The lofty ideals of both Truth and 
Reconciliation are clearly what Krog knows is needed at the level of the country, at the 
level of “progress”, “guilt”, “mourning”, and the promise of a “new” South Africa, but as 
she listens to the testimonies, to the stories, to the fate of Nokwakha Dilato (whom, it 
seems, Krog comes to give voice to, and perhaps even identifies with profoundly, 
providing a presence in writing to Nokwakha’s absence), to the terrible violence 
recounted again, and again, what it means to her, personally, individually, in terms of her 
own psyche, becomes more and more difficult. 
However – neither truth nor reconciliation is part of my graphite when sitting in 
front of a blank page … Truth and reconciliation do not enter my anarchy.  They 
choke on betrayal and rage, they fall off my refusal to be moral. (p. 50) 
The months that have passed have proved my premonition right – the commission 
… leaves most of us physically exhausted and mentally frayed. … I stammer.  I 
freeze.  I am without language.  … the next morning the Truth Commission sends 
one of its own counselors to address he journalists. ‘You will experience the same 
symptoms as the victims.  You will find yourself powerless – without help, 
without words. (p. 51) 
I can talk about nothing but the Truth Commission.  Yet I don’t talk about it at 
all.” (p. 63) 
We tell stories not to die of life. (p. 64) 
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Responsibility Disturbed 
The subtitle of Krog’s book indicates guilt and sorrow are pertinent in her story. 
This narrative struck me as a narrative about culpability, guilt, and responsibility as the 
disturbing factor.  Although Krog has no known connection with Colesberg, this case 
moved her to the extent that her tongue (language) and fingers (pointing) are disturbed. 
Her motor coordination is disturbed. Krog (1999) states that “I write the broken line (p. 
50). I stammer. I freeze. I am without language” (p. 51).  There is something about the 
reporting on the Truth Commission that disturbed Krog’s language; the ability to express 
things.  
The disturbance is the result of hearing and seeing sorrows. Of witnessing.  And, 
having witnessed, “one cannot get rid of it. Ever.”  Indeed, one is called to respond, to 
responsibility.  One is called to respond to the question of one’s responsibility, and one’s 
culpability, especially against the backdrop of the individual and the collective.   
 
Humanity 
What is it, though, that calls one to responsibility?  It seems as if this answer has 
something to do with humanity, with the relationship to the other.  Throughout Country 
of my Skull and the section pertinent to this research, the question of humanity is posed; 
“how could we lose our humanity like that?” (p. 59 “The victims ask the hardest 
questions: how is it possible that the person I loved so much lit no spark of humanity on 
you?” (p. 61).  This may well be the question of this dissertation, as well. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Discussion and Conclusion 
To recapitulate: this dissertation examines political violence, arising as it does from my 
interest in a particular incident of violence in the town of Colesburg, South Africa, where 
I grew up.  In the service of this interest and academic study, I proceeded to provide a 
historical overview of the South African political con-text, framing it within a discursive 
theoretical limit.  I also provided a survey of the psychological literature with respect to 
political violence.  It transpired, firstly, that psychology had very little to say about 
political violence, in particular, even as it did theorize violence in general.  Extrapolating 
from such theories of violence, it was evident that psychology viewed violence largely as 
emanating from an internal disposition, structure, or psychic trait, with little to no 
credence paid to the contextual – at least not in any primary or determinative manner.  
Even those psychologists and researchers who theorize the power of the group and the 
context (for example the Zimbardo prison experiments, and his continued writing 
thereafter) nonetheless struggle to unsettle the primacy of some fundamental intrapsychic 
essence that ultimately trumps any other influence (if only one could strengthen it such 
that it comes into play in times of immoral conformity and obedience pressure, for 
example).  Indeed, political violence proves to be a particularly thorny issue for 
psychology as the very conjunction of the political with violence seems to imply some 
externality, or at least some influence of a contextual surround on the expression of an 
ostensibly internal aggression.  Moreover, the very sense of a context or a structure that 
incites, harbors, or facilitates violence, as in so called structural violence proves even 
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more of a conundrum for psychology beyond the reductionistic manner of observational 
learning, peer pressure, or learning principles, for example.  
 Proceeding, then, to those disciplines and fields of study that did examine political 
violence particularly (for example sociology and political science), the opposite trend 
seemed true – that whereas much attention was paid to the contextual and the situational, 
very little to no attention was paid to the intrapsychic or “psychological.”  Focusing very 
deliberately on structures and ideologies, and on the political, there was very little of 
agency or subjectivity in these theories.  It seemed to me that both theoretical ends 
missed important components of political violence, even as I was not quite sure yet what 
that might be.   
 Hence, this study aims to examine political violence, keeping in mind that 
particular theoretical tension between the contextual and the individual.  To that end, I 
propose a discursive positioning vis a vis theory, as well as a methodological approach 
that is able to hold complex tensions, and that is not reductionistic, but mindful of the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of divining absolute and enduring truths or essences.  A 
hermeneutic semiology is proposed.   
 In the previous section, I consequently provided a narrative hermeneutic of each 
of the three data sources used in this study, as well as provided interrogative questions 
emanating from a reading of the text for the semiotic intertextual and deferral of 
meaning.  These “data points” (and they are that for the manner in which they are 
positions, intentions, purposes, meanings, and/or arguments which provide a semantic 
reasoning) provide the basis for the discussion here.  Of course, by this method it is not 
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entirely possible to separate results and discussion as is often the case in more 
“traditional” or “natural scientific” protocols or dissertations.  Much discussion and 
interpretation already took place in the previous chapter, which was not just about a 
dispassionate presentation of results.  The reader is reminded of Ricoeur’s (1991) 
assertion that separating explanation from understanding is a fallacy in that they are 
“relative moments in a complex process that could be termed interpretation” (Ricoeur, 
1991, p. 126).   
 Each data point, firstly, was a narrative that organized the murder of Nombulelo8 
Julia9 Nokwakha10 Dilato into an understandable, meaningful, and coherent whole.  This 
meaningful story provides the first departure point for discussion.  
Making Political Violence Mean 
 Political violence takes on different meanings depending, in part, on the social 
position(ing) of the person.  The participants, the court and Krog all used different 
discursive tools and means to describe the same event, and to make meaning thereof.  
 Where the perpetrators are concerned, it is immediately apparent that political 
violence occurred, had meaning, or was the expression of a political end and aspiration, 
agreed upon by a larger collective, that is, by community grievances. In this formulation, 
the “political” in “political violence” has clear precedence, qualifies and mediates 
                                                 
8  A Xhosa name which means “one with gratitude or thankfulness“ 
9 Africans were also given Christian names, which were all English names. These names were usually 
given during or before baptism, and may or may not have been included on the birth certificate. Julia would 
be such a Christian name.  The dynamics of colonization is clearly to be read in this practise.    
10 Nokwakha was the name she was given by her in-laws. According to Xhosa tradition, when a woman 
gets married, her in-laws give her a new name that they will use when referring to her. Hence, Nombulelo 
became Nokwakha  
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“violence,” and in fact gives it being or meaning.  As such the act is not an expression of 
any individual, of particularized malice or passion, or some other individual benefit, but 
the expression of a larger will, desire, and context.  In fact, the perpetrators all suggested, 
in various ways, that they had to subordinate themselves, their selves, their senses of 
individual agency to the will and demands of a community that took precedence.  The 
participants’ narratives point out that they were extensions of the collective – individuals 
only inasmuch as they are the connected fingers of the hand, community proxies and 
willing agents of a higher authority.   
 As an expression of the political, now, the violence visited upon Nokwakha Dilato 
can only have meaning against an Apartheid backdrop, against the story of centuries long 
oppression, discontent, and racial oppression towards black South Africans.  To that end, 
the burning of Nokwakha was not an isolated individual act, rather a connected 
communal act. Particularly, and materially, participants pointed at deplorable “living 
conditions” and the lack of civil services to which they responded.  Every single 
participant/perpetrator responded by providing “background”, and “context”; by listing 
how they were, in fact, victims of violence perpetrated by the apartheid state.  When they 
provide a “background” to the burning, they list and elaborate their action to have been 
part of the environment of “dissatisfaction,” and “anger.” 
 At least at first glance, then, the contextual theories of sociology, anthropology, 
and the political sciences seem validated and borne out.  The theories of structural 
violence that proposes violence in terms of violent systems or structures that create 
violent cultures and behaviors certainly find resonance in the stories of the participants.     
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 A more difficult response, however, is to Archbishop Tutu’s and African culture 
in general’s proposition of the role of Ubuntu.  To be sure, Tutu’s assertion that Ubuntu 
involves the interdependent acknowledgment of one’s humanity in the other could quite 
simply and somewhat banally be slotted into the formulaic extension of the arguments 
above – namely that the Apartheid regime had so dehumanized these young Black men 
that they could not be humane to others.  But could it not be argued that, inasmuch as 
Ubuntu involves precisely the subordination of an individual self to that of the 
interdependent collective, to the good of the group and the collective, that the 
perpetrators were expressing Ubuntu, or a sense thereof?  If a counterargument holds that 
that is not the case, that the murder of another person reflects a corruption of Ubuntu, of 
that much prized and valorized communal “African self”, even if and as that other person 
represents a threat to the well being of the group (as Ms. Dilato was to have been), then 
how is that? Or is it the extent of the response, that is, would “roughing her up”, or 
burning down her house, have been different in the terms of Ubuntu or this 
interdependent humanity than killing her?  Ubuntu, it seems to me, needs to be theorized 
in greater depth and needs something more than the expression of interdependence or the 
axiomatic “a person is a person through other people.”  I respond to this challenge later in 
the chapter.  
 The Court’s response to political violence, to its meaning, takes a different tack, 
at first glance again, than that of the participants.  Whereas it proceeds from a communal 
authority as well (recall that “the community” had authorized and “blessed” the murder 
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of Nokwakha Dilato11), the difference is in the power the court musters to speak on 
behalf of a seemingly timeless lawfulness, a generalized precedent, and the longstanding 
truths of the nomological.  Violence contravenes the law, and murder egregiously so.  
This, the court states rather explicitly because it is about protecting “… individual 
liberties” (p.161).  
Unlike the valorization of “political” in “political violence,” the court takes just 
the opposite view – “violence” is privileged, and prioritized with little to no 
acknowledgment or concern for “political” in the compound word, “political violence”.  
Context, background, or “politics” have very little to do with the fundamental assertion of 
the extent to which a law regarding violence was transgressed, or individual liberties 
were violated.  And, to the extent that it ascertains the extent of the transgression, or the 
intent and motivation of the actors implicated, the court – like psychology – turns its gaze 
on the individual.   
 Not unlike many psychological theories, the court ascribes motivation to “an 
inherent evil,” a breakdown of parenting, or rationality, or some such individual ability to 
make moral adjudications –– to know what is right and wrong, and to act accordingly.  In 
this equation, there are no contexts or backgrounds or qualifying considerations beyond 
the indisputable fact that murder is wrong, and for the good of the society, the (deficient) 
member who murders, needs to be removed from that society and/or appropriately 
                                                 
11  Is it mere coincidence that even as benedicere (to praise or worship) is the Latin departure for bless and 
blessing, the passage into English is through proto-Germanic blotham (blood), from the pagan practice of 
sprinkling sacrificial blood on the worship altar? 
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punished.  Even an act like Necklacing, which is committed in a group situation, is 
carefully dissected to ascertain the role each individual played.  
 Krog’s response, even in the form of its telling, differs markedly from the 
preceding two responses in the way in which meaning is made.  In fact, very literally, 
meaning is made in the poetic, the cryptic, the personal and secretive, all alongside the 
descriptive and the journalistic report.  For Krog, there is no truth, or meaning, to 
violence, at least in the sense of a law, or a hermeneutic essence.  In fact, if there is a 
truth to violence, it is that it disturbs all truth, unsettles language, and points at the 
unspeakable, the unknowable, the uncanny, and the elsewhere of an other and an 
otherwise.  As such, it calls for a singular response, and responsibility. 
And now, now, all the first glances of the preceding analyses open up to reveal other 
meanings, or possibilities of meaning. 
 
Making Political Violence Mean Redux 
 Each data point revealed or told a story in presence, plotted a meaning with 
characters, action, setting, conflict and the like; each organized themes, time, and the 
meaningfulness of an event into narrative.  However, for each of these presences, I’ve 
also argued that there is an absence, a margin, or an unsaying to each of these data points’ 
said.  I’ve already demonstrated  this notion of an interrogative that allows for a 
deconstruction of presence, and for a sensitivity to the places in the story where the story 
falters, is interrupted, is made “strange,” is silent, or is otherwise discontinuous.  By this 
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kind of reading, the stories offer a linkage of violence, and this particular incident of 
violence with aspects of witnessing, responsibility, ethics, and ultimately the relation to 
the other in Ubuntu. 
 Witnessing, firstly, is a central element of each of the stories, even as it is rarely 
(and in some cases never) mentioned as such.  In some cases it is like an invisible 
structure that gives the visible form, like an out of sight, secret foundation that 
nonetheless is what holds the building together, gives it form, and forms it.  The 
participants organized their narratives on what they saw or did not see.  The court 
depended on statements of those who saw, and what was seen for all steps leading to the 
death of Nokwakha, and even thereafter. Krog’s story is not only about witnessing of 
victims and perpetrators alike, but also about witnessing the witnesses, and witnessing the 
self witnessing the witnesses.  In a real sense, so am I, and so is the reader – witnessing, 
attending, paying attention, “doing hermeneutics or deconstruction” which is to be 
present to the present, as well as those ghosts – like Nokwakha Dilato - whose absence 
haunts the present in presence.    
 Initially, one may be wont to think that witnessing or witness is a rather 
straightforward word, even ready-to-hand and requiring little thought.  Is it not, after all, 
simply “to see, or to observe”.  In this case it is to watch something happening, and is 
clearly related to its Latin roots, videre – “to see”.  But in giving us witness, videre was 
also inextricably linked to the Sanskrit veda – “to know, or knowledge”.  Hence, and to 
wit, to know was to see, and to see was also to know.  And here we see the notion of an 
action as well – it is not only to see something happening, but sometimes also to see to it 
that it happens. In this latter, shall we say active sense, it is to assert, to attest, to act, to 
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give evidence: to testify.  In fact, and in a somewhat circular motion, to testify – the Latin 
testificare – is nothing but “to bear witness”.  And the etymological plot thickens even 
more – as a verb, in the active sense, witness is directly translated in the Christian 
literature of the medieval period from “martys” – martyr.  To bear witness, is to be 
martyred; is to be troubled and to care, and to be troubled by care.   
 To witness is to be called to response, to responsibility.  Whom, or what, is the 
witness responsible to?  Whom or what calls for a response?   
Even in the heat of the event, of the violence, the perpetrators do something 
seemingly puzzling:  they throw sand on Nokwakha’s face so that it does not burn.  The 
judge, employing the linear logic of the rational, also finds this act strange – it escapes 
the discursive order of the court’s narrative; he notes that: “Number 3 accused … ordered 
him [State Witness] to throw sand over the head of the deceased to prevent that portion of 
her body from burning.  This he did, though is not clear what the purpose of this 
operation was” (Judge, 170).  
Interpreting this “strange” act, bearing witness to it, which is to say to attest to it, 
is to invoke Emmanuel Levinas (and, as I will show, later, Ubuntu).  Indeed, this strange 
interruption or discontinuity (among others which I highlight later) may well be the 
interruption of the saying into the said, which is another way perhaps of noting that as a 
“saying must bear a said … the saying is the fact that before the face I do not remain 
there contemplating it, I respond to it.  The saying is a way of greeting the Other, but to 
greet the Other is already to answer for him” (Levinas, 1982, p. 88).  For Levinas, the 
face is the opening of an entire first philosophy of ethics and the ethical.  A philosophy 
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that is also of the other and subjectivity. The face commands ethical relations between 
humans; it mediates the encounter with the Other (Levinas, 1985).  
[S]signification of the face makes it escape from being, as a correlate of knowing  
... the relation of the face is straightforward ethical. The face is what one cannot 
kill, or at least is that whose meaning consists in saying:  “thou shall not kill.” 
Murder, it is true, is a banal fact; one can kill the Other; the ethical exigency is not 
an ontological necessity. (p. 87)  
Indeed, the very meaning of subjectivity, of an “I” for Levinas is subjection to the 
other – the subject is never ‘for itself,’ but always ‘for another.’  The other is the source 
of all signification.  It is, even, that the very ability to say I, that subjectivity itself, is 
given by the other; by the I’s responsibility for, and to, the other (Levinas, 1985).  
Subjectivity cannot be in hostility to the other, but is rather in welcoming the 
other “as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated” (Levinas, 1961, p. xv).  
The other appears – says, “here I am” (a Biblical reference), and I am called to respond to 
that claim, to being claimed thus.  It is a responsibility I can never be absolved from, and 
to see the face is already to hear thou shalt not kill.  The other is what enables me to be 
myself and to recognize myself for the first time.  My response is my responsibility.  My 
responsibility is my maryred attestation, my witnessing.  For Levinas, if something has 
no face, it has no call on me, and I have no responsibility towards it (1982).  Morality is a 
response to the face.  And to respond is “the essential, primary and fundamental structure 
of subjectivity” (Levinas, 1982, p. 95).  The tie with the other is “knotted only as 
responsibility” (97), and “I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible … 
responsibility is what is incumbent on me and what, humanly, I cannot refuse” (Levinas, 
1982, p. 101). 
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 Now it is true that the face of the other breaks through and threatens being-at-
home with oneself, and does so asymmetrically.  The other comes from on high – it 
demands things of myself which I cannot demand of the other.  Yet, it is also a 
“destitute” master: “there is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master 
spoke to me.  However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor 
for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all” (Levinas, 1982, p.89).  “The face is 
exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence.  At the same time, the face is 
what forbids us to kill” (EI, 86).  The possibility of violence, therefore, is also announced 
in the appearance of the face.  
But violent action “does not consist in being in a relationship with the other; it is 
in fact an action where one is as though one were alone” (Lingis, 1987, p, 18).  Violence 
is an attempt to eradicate relation, it is to renege on responsibility, by ambush, and to 
“take hold of the substance of the other, what is strong and absolute in him, through what 
is weak in him” (Lingis, 1987, p. 19).  The other cannot be mastered, and it is precisely 
the absolute defenseless face, the nakedness of the face that says no, that - even in killing 
- cannot be killed.  The face affects us outside of all categories, and not in the indicative, 
but in the imperative. 
Is it any wonder, then, that the participants described the moment of assault in 
terms of izikizi, this unspeakable Xhosa word for the unspeakable, for what cannot be 
worded, for what is outside of experience, and the material?  
[P3]No [hayi] yayingekho into ndandiyifila, qha ke net into endandiyifila  njena 
yayingamasikizi nangona siyenza lento but yayingamasikizi because ukubulawa 
komntu yabona?  
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[P3] No there was nothing that I felt, only that I felt it was scary (gruesome). 
Although we were doing it, it was scary (gruesome); it was scary because it was a 
killing of a person you see?  
Izikizi is not really “gruesome,” but here translation fails, as it must – language as a whole 
fails here inasmuch as it attempts to describe the indescribable.  It is not that “there was 
nothing that I felt,” but that what I felt was nothing of this world, nothing that lends itself 
to this world and this word. 
[P2] [A]lthough I was, we have been angry at the Apartheid regime, [at] their 
police, soldiers, and even informants, but she was lying there crying, screaming, 
you know; flames all over her body [pauses] I was scared [chuckles, shifts his 
seating]. I was scared; you know why I was scared?  I never hurt anyone in the 
past. But, now I could see: here is a person, I also participated; she is burning, 
screaming.  I sometimes, you know, I felt I could have gone again [to] try to help 
her 
Amasikizi is a reaction to what comes from elsewhere, from witnessing something 
gruesome, or expecting something dreadful to happen not to you but to someone who is 
connected to you in one way or the other.  It is the moment when you see your child, 
whom you love more than yourself, running to the edge of the curb as the truck races 
down the road and you see the terrifying possibility of what could happen next – 
amasikizi is that fear, that dread, that gruesome possibility that is not for oneself, but for, 
and from, the other.  Isikizi, read thus, is then never and not for P2 and P3, it is not that 
they were scared, but that they were scared for Nokwakha.  Not only that, but into 
engajongekiyo (something that you cannot bear witness to, that you cannot bear to bear 
witness to, that cannot be looked at or observed).  It is, Krog reminds us, what causes the 
skies to fall, the high southern skies to succumb, bereaved and dumb.   
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 Is it any wonder that P2, and all those perpetrators of the Truth Commission 
“breaks down” in their desire to “face” the victims of their actions in this hope and 
yearning to reconcile with them, to “set the record straight,” which is, of course, an 
impossibility in itself.  There is no way, in the words of the court or the amnesty and 
pardon of the politicians, that one could have paid one’s debt to society, that the 
perpetrators could now be “productive citizens.”  To be sure, the court can adjudicate 
culpability, and assign a sentence, but culpability is not responsibility.  Culpability chains 
the person to an act, a behavior, and an activity; responsibility, on the [O]ther hand, 
chains the person to an [O]ther.   
 
Ubuntu Redux 
 I started this dissertation with the words of Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu, that 
“we are bound up in a delicate network of interdependence because as we say in our 
African idiom a person is a person through other persons,” which is a translation of a 
Xhosa proverb umntu ngumntu ngabantu which has been passed on through generations. 
Tutu (1999) goes further to say in accordance with this idiom that to dehumanize another 
person means you are inexorably dehumanizing yourself.  It is, the assumption holds, a 
violation of Ubuntu, a corruption of Umntu ngumntu ngabantu, this distilled statement of 
what it is to be human, and of humanity.   
Umntu ngumntu ngabantu, where ngu- means “it is,” and adding –mntu changes it 
to be “he or she is”.  Both the fact of “is-ness” as it is, as it were, and that one is, the is-
ness of a person is attested to, is to be announced, by nga-, a preposition which means 
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“by means of, through, with, by, about, and concerning.”  Ngabantu –– by means of an 
other person, through an other person, by an other person.  It is through the other that one 
becomes a person; each person depends on another for their humanity to be fulfilled. It is 
straightaway ethical, an ethical obligation that is asymmetrical inasmuch as it is the other 
person who takes precedence. And, to be an individual is to be always and already in a 
relationship with other person. One’s very subjectivity is given by an/other person.   
 The similarities between this seemingly ageless, ancient African sense+ability – 
Ubuntu – and the philosophy of Levinas is apparent and deliberate.  That a person 
depends on an/other person for their humanity and personhood is what Tutu (1999) 
references and Levinas theorizes.  It is a claim on all of us, all of us who have now 
witnessed, and are called to testify, to respond and bear responsibility.   
  
In Conclusion 
 In the end, this dissertation is lodged in a psychology department, and serves as a 
credentialed passage to work as a psychologist.  What, then, does it offer or promise 
psychology, in particular?   
 Firstly, this dissertation demonstrates that the psychological literature on violence 
in general, and political violence in particular, has serious and devastating shortcomings 
and lacunae.  Much, much more research and theory is needed in this area.  Hopefully, as 
well, it is clearly not just the fact of more and more research that is questioned here, but 
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also the manner thereof.  This dissertation serves as a warning for reductionistic and 
simplistic explanatory attempts, as psychology is so wont to do.   
 It is important that psychology takes context into serious account (as sociology 
and anthropology, for example, needs to take agency and subjectivity into account), and 
wrestle with the implications of such an accounting, if it is to provide a fuller sense of the 
phenomenon.  How can one understand violence in Colesberg if one is to start and end 
with the singular event of 1985?  Or the merely material and empirical?  Or the strictly 
individual and internal?  Violence, as relation, constituted the very way of people’s life.  
Apartheid, in the end, was nothing less than relation, and its violence, structural and 
particular, was all about relation.  We need a psychology, in the first instance, that can 
theorise and tolerate the violence of the structure and the relation.  I alluded to the 
promise of discourse and a discursive psychology in this regard.  It certainly is one way 
to go. 
 There are some theorists and arenas where psychology has started to play new 
kinds of roles.  For example, the burgeoning area of peace psychology is very new and 
offers much promise and potential for the incorporation therein of context, history, and 
the specificity of culture.  However, for it to deliver on that promise it needs to be 
sensitive to a reductionistic caution – already this emerging movement is starting to look 
like just another variable driven social psychology, applied to aspects of war and peace.  
If psychology in general, and these specific applications and areas in particular, are to 
offer anything new, it needs to rethink the very manner of its epistemology.  There have 
been authors that have paved the way – I’ve already referenced discursive psychology.  
Other authors like Bulhan’s (1985) work on Fanon and psychology of oppression remain 
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largely unrecognized within psychology.   Hopefully this dissertation, as well, could be 
considered an opening for such a psychology.   
 Inasmuch as a human science psychology calls on the reader or the researcher to 
respond to human experience, it   
… recognize(s) human characteristics that are not particularly amenable to 
the traditional methods of the natural sciences. These characteristics 
include humans’ simultaneous shaping of their environments even as they 
are shaped by them, behaving in accordance with their experience rather 
than just responding to external determinants, and being purposive…its 
purpose is to integrate those achievements with others that emerge from 
recognition that humans are at once physical, biological, and 
psychological –– related to their environments through consciousness, 
actions, and goals, as well as through history and  unconscious behavior 
(Fischer, 1994, p.5).  
 
But beyond the emphasis on a descriptive, qualitative, discursive, experiential, or 
otherwise nuanced, complex, and human scientific charge to the study of violence, what 
this research has also shown, is that there is an unspeakable, an ineffable, and infinite 
aspect to violence and the relational which perhaps amounts to the same thing, an ethical 
dimension through and through.  We need a psychology for the other, as it were, that can 
also take these aspects into account.  It is heartening that some such work has begun, for 
example, Gantt & Williams (2002) and Kunz (1998), but much more is needed. Their 
work suggests a pursuit of psychology as a science of the ethical, which is influenced by 
Levinas’s work. Perhaps, as well, African scholars and scholars from Africa, particularly, 
could explore a psychology of Ubuntu, or from Ubuntu, which may or may not be a very 
similar project to a Levinasian psychology.  This dissertation may be a beginning note to 
that exploration. 
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 It is true that Apartheid has insinuated itself in every aspect of our lives as South 
Africans, and for many of us, will continue to do so for generations to come.  It is true, 
too, that the particularly violent character of Apartheid tore at that delicate network of 
interconnectedness, for so long so ably expressed and directed by Ubuntu.  But even then, 
even for its tearing, there remains, and remained, the imperative that is beyond the power 
and authority of the structure - the “you, yourself (nguwe, wena),” my grandfather would 
insistently point out “who holds that mantle, it is you who allows humanity to appear” 
(ufunek’ubonakalis’ubuntu) – his way of reminding me of a responsibility before any 
politics, ideology, or structure.  A responsibility that comes from, in Levinas’ words, an 
“Otherwise than Being, or beyond essence”, and that declares one unobuntu (a person 
who has humanity).  This declaration, this unobuntu, it is equally telling, is never 
something one can bestow on oneself – it is only the other who can gift one the status of 
unobuntu, a person who has humanity – who is a person.  
In the end, and as ending, this (that) “beloved country of grief and grace” inspires a poem 
because of you 
this country no longer lies 
between us but within 
 
it breathes becalmed 
after being wounded 
in its wondrous throat 
 
in the cradle of my skull 
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it sings, it ignites 
my tongue, my inner ear, the cavity of heart 
shudders towards the outline 
new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals 
 
of my soul the retina learns to expand 
daily because of a thousand stories 
I was scorched 
 
a new skin. 
I am changed forever.  I want to say: 
 forgive me 
 forgive me 
 forgive me 
 
You whom I have wronged, please 
take me 
with you.  (Krog, 1998, 364)  
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Appendix A: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD MATERIAL 
English Consent form 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
TITLE: Political violence in South Africa: A study of Necklacing in 
Colesburg 
 
INVESTIGATOR: Sipho Mbuqe, M.A. 
 603 Worth Street  
 Apartment 1 
 Pittsburgh, PA, 15217, USA  
 Tel: 412 421 8761 
  
14 Ngqandu Street  
 Bongweni 
 Colesburg  
 9795, South Africa 
 Tel: 051 753 0243 
 
ADVISOR: Leswin Laubscher, Ph. D.  
 Department of Psychology 
 Duquesne University  
 Tel: 412 396 1843 
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PURPOSE: This study is being performed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the doctoral degree in Clinical Psychology at Duquesne University. You are asked to 
participate in a research project that seeks to investigate the occurrence of necklacing in 
Colesburg.  The purpose of this study is to better understand necklacing, and provide you 
a platform to express your experiences, thoughts, and opinions on the issue.   
  
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURE: A qualitative research method will be used. 
The data will be the descriptions of the participants’ experience.  In order to access your 
experience we will conduct one or two interviews. Each interview will take 60-90 
minutes.  In the first interview, you will be asked to describe in as much detail as possible 
your experiences of the necklacing event, including experiences thereafter as it relates to 
the event.  This interview will be tape recorded and transcribed.  The purpose of the 
second interview will be to allow clarification and elaboration of what was said in the 
first interview, if necessary.  All identifying information will be eliminated from the 
written document.  These interviews will be conducted at a place chosen by both of us.       
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS:  There is a risk that the interview may bring up painful 
feelings about the events of, and surrounding, necklacing.  However, people often benefit 
from discussing their experiences in detail with a non-judgmental and informed listener.  
The experiences you share may be helpful in understanding what you and other 
participant dealt with, how you felt and acted, and how you made sense of your 
experiences since that day.  This information will help psychologists, other mental health 
professionals, and scholars to understand your experiences.   
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COMPENSATION:  you will not be compensated for your participation. Likewise, there 
will be no fee for participating. 
 
CONFIDENTIALIY:   Your name and other identifying information will be deleted and 
will not appear in the published dissertation.  Every attempt will be made to maintain 
your confidentiality and anonymity, as well as that of other people you reference.  All 
written materials and consent forms will be stored in a locked file a researcher’s home.  
All recorded tapes material will be destroyed at the completion of the research.   
However, it is also true that your name is in the public record as far as certain documents 
are concerned (the court documents, the transcripts of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, and Antjie Krog’s book, Country of my Skull).  Inasmuch as this 
dissertation references those documents, it may be possible to align the events described 
in the dissertation with that described in the documents listed, and in that manner come to 
an identification.  
 
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW:  You are under no obligation to participate in this 
 study.  You are free to withdraw your consent to participate at any time.  
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS: A summary of the results of this research will be 
 supplied to you, at no cost, upon request.  
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VOLUNTARY CONSENT:  I have read the above statements and understand 
 what is being requested of me.  I also understand that my participation is voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time, for any reason.  On these terms, I 
certify that I am willing to participate in this research project.  
 
 
_______________________________________    ______________________________ 
Participant’s Signature   Date       
 
________________________________________    ______________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature   Date       
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Xhosa Consent Form 
 
IFOMU YOKUVUMA UKUTHATHA INXAXHEBA  KUFUNDO-PHANDO  
 
ISIHLOKO: Political violence in South Africa: A study of 
Necklacing in Colesburg 
UMPHANDI-FUNDI: Sipho Mbuqe, M.A. 
 603 Worth Street  
 Apartment 1 
 Pittsburgh, PA, 15217 
 USA  
 Tel: 412 421 8761 
 
 14 Ngqandu Street  
 Bongweni 
 Colesburg  
 9795, South Africa 
 Tel: 051 753 0243  
UMBONISI/MCEBISI: Gqirha, Leswin Laubscher, Ph. D.  
Department of Psychology 
 Duquesne University  
 Tel: 412 396 1843 
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INJONGO: Olufundo-phando luyinxalenye lweemfunekosesidanga sombuqgirha 
kwicandelo lwe-Clinical Psychology e-Duquesne University. Uyacelwa ukuba uthathe 
inxaxheba kolufundo-phando. Injongo yoluphando kukuqonda izimvo zakho, 
ngentsingiselo yesehlo ekuthiwa kuku-Neklesa.  Enye yenjongo kukuqonda ndzulu lento 
kethiwa yiNekles, kwaye sinike wena mnt’uthath’inxaxheba ithuba lukuba ucacise 
izimvo zakho ngophangaleleyo.  Eli lithuba lokuba usihlephulele kumava wakho ngalo 
mcimbi ungentla.  
Kusisela ngonya ka 1995 emva kokuba kulungwe iKomishoni yeNyani 
noXolelwaniso, abantu baseMzantsi Afrika bakwiphulo lokwakha isizwe esitsha. Yiyo ke 
lento bathethe isigqibo sokuphanda ngokutyeshelwa kamalungelo abantu, ngexhesha 
lengcinezelo phantsi korhulumente wocalucalulo. 
Naxa bebeninzi abenze ufundo-phando ngokutyeshelwa kwamalungelo abantu, 
ulwazi ngesigaba seNeklase lusemfiliba.  Ngako ke yiyo lento singanuwuyeka urhone, 
sithi make siwuyekele kumathamb’engqondo awetyise. Ukuzwe uthi thaa kutsho 
kubhents’ ubunzima balo mcimbi. Injongo kukuqanqulula sibon’ekumithwe yiNeklasi. 
Uyakuba ngomnye wabantu abathathu abazakuthath’inxaxheba kolufondo-phando. 
 
INGCACISO YENDLELA  
OLUPHANDO 
LUZAKUHAMBA NGAYO: Injongo zam kukuhlalutya, ndiphicothe, izimvo 
zenu ngaphandle kukusenbenzisa izibalo namanani. Ndizakuphonononga ekumithwe 
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zizimvo nentetho zenu.  Ndizimisele ukuba sihlale phantsi ixesha elinga nge yure (1hr) 
ukuya kwiyure ezimbini (2hrs). Mandigxininise ukuba injongo kukufumana uluvo, 
namave wenu ngalomba. Emva kwendibano yokuqala siyakuphinda sidibane ukuze 
undicacisela ngimiba engeka khanyi kum. Yonke into oyithethayo ndiyakuyishicilela 
nge-tape recorder, kwaye ndibhala kuxwebhu endakuba ndiliphethe.  Ndiyathembisa 
ukuba ndiyakutshabalalisa yonke into eyakuthi idize amagama abantu ukuba undithi 
mandeze njalo.  Intlanganiso siyakuzibambela kwendaw’ ekhethwe ndim nawe 
mbandanyekwa. 
 
UBUZAZA/NOBUNGOZI  
KUNYE INDZUZO  
YOKUTHETHIXHAXHEBA 
 KOLUPHANDO:   Olufundo lunzima ngoba lunokuvuselela imizwa nenkumbulo 
zeziganeko ezenzeka kudala, ezinye zazo sele niziphose kwelokulibala. 
Ngamany’amazwi ukuthunik’izilond’esezibuphola. Kodwa ukuba kukhu’ 
ukunqulunganya nombuzaza ngesisehlo, uthetha ngaso kungaba liyeza nako. Ugalelo 
lwakho ngaloba luyakuhlangabezana nemfuno zabo banjong’ ikusembeza nokuphanda 
sesimo nangengqond’ omntu i-psychologist. Mandigxininise kwakhona ukuba injongo 
yam ayiyokuba ngugwebi okany ijaji. Hayi, ndizimisel’ukuqonda nje kuphela.  
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INTLAWULO: Akukho ntlawulo iyakuzuzwa ngokutheth’inxaxheba kolu lufundo-
phando. Kwaye kungekho ntlawulo uyakuyenza ngokuthath’inxaxheba.  
 
UBUMFIHLELO: Kwakhona ndiyakuqinisekisa ukuba igama lakho lakuhlala 
liyimfihlelo. Ngokunjalo amagama abantu ababandekanyenayo akayakubhengezwa 
nokubhengezwa kolufundo-phando. Kwakhona mandithembise ukuba 
ndiyakutshabalalisa zonke inzinto endixishicilele ngethuba ndidibene nani. 
 
ILUNGELO LOKURHOXA: Awunyanzelekanga ukuba uthath’inxaxheba 
kolufundo-phando. Okwesibini ikwalilungelo lwakho ukuba urhoxa nangaliphina ithuba.  
 
IZIPHUMO: Ndizakukubonisa iziphumo and nekuqulathwe loluphand.  
 
ISIVUMELWANO  
SOKUTHATH’ INXAXHEBA:  Ndilufindile olu xwebhu ndiyathemda ukuba lento 
ibhalwe apha iyavakala. Kwaye ndiyaqond’ukuba andinyazelwanga ukuba 
uthath’inxaxheba, ndikwenza ngokuphuma kum.   
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________________________________________    ______________________________ 
Participant’s Signature   Date       
 
________________________________________    ______________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature   Date       
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT 1 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
 
Interview with Mr. P1  
Sipho: One, as I stated before that ….the subject of this interview, I am interested in 
understanding the case that happened here in Colesburg that involve Usis Nokwakha, and 
you are free to say no if you are not comfortable with some of the questions, but I will 
appreciate it if you can be detailed as much as you can and if I have if need more clarity 
in certain points I will ask you to say more.  
The first question is—it is not necessarily a question—but I wonder if you would 
describe what happened?  
 P1:  okay thank you, Mr. Interviewer, I, P1, I think it was on Tuesday in the morning.  
There was an uprising in Colesberg and we said we boycott each an every shop in town. 
And what happened, the said lady went and bought something from the butchery: it was 
Persie’s butchery at that time, but now today it have been renovated to N1. So what 
happened is that some of our marshals, I will term them as marshals, found out that this 
lady bought meat there and took the meat and trampled on it and they gave it to the dogs.  
Okay, we as leadership of the youth organization - Colesberg Youth Organization 
(COYO), went to her to try and resolve the matter but she said “you see, you P1, you 
Thabo, will sleep in prison today and your hair will be cut.”  And we started thereafter to 
think that this lady has got a mission against us. Knowing well her husband is a police 
officer, already we know that. So we tried to negotiate with her, but unfortunately, all our 
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negotiation were in vain. It was, I forget the dates, we went to her house when the people 
said “No! this lady  always has a Walkie-Talkie” and we went to this lady It was 
unfortunate for us because when we arrived there - she was staying in Bongweni, a lot of 
people came out of her house, with pangas and all those things and the police from 
Slagkor area to rescue her and we run away. 
Sipho: So you said you went to the house but before you went to the house people told 
you that she has a Walkie-talkie and then you went to the house and said there was….and 
when you got to the house what happened? 
P1: When we got there was lot of people who are familiar to her because we ……our 
intention was to talk to the lady as we stated before, unfortunately we were confronted 
with violence and we resorted to violence, and it went a long way. It was the 2nd of 
October, if I am not mistaken. We were meeting down there and we said to ourselves, 
“people! Let us get rid of this lady.”  
Sipho: What do you mean? You said you met down there.  
P1: It was in, you see, our house where I stay presently, no not presently my mama’s 
house, there were rocks there in front of the church there were stones.  We sat there, and 
we said “People! We get the information that this Mama always has a Walkie-talkie and 
she is the one who’s calling the police whenever we want to do something. It was okay 
and we sent one guy  
Sipho: So you said, let me just backtrack a little bit. 
P1: Okay 
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Sipho: You said you sat on the rock and people decided that she must … I didn’t get the 
other part.  
P1: No we said………As we stood there at the rock we said okay; we’ve got the 
information that this lady has a Walkie-talkie and is …she is the one who’s calling the 
police now and then whenever there is anything that is happening.  
Sipho: Okay, happening in the community?  
P1: Yes, yes 
Sipho: Mh 
P1: Then we sent one guy who was moving on the cycle, a bicycle, and said to him, “you 
go and check if this lady will be coming down to her work,” And it was like that.  And 
the guy came back to us and reported to us that the lady is coming down while we were 
still standing there on the rock.  Some of the masses went to Kartaarstraat and they find 
this lady… after finding this lady 
Sipho: Kartaartraat as in Kartaar street (gesturing)? 
P1: Yes Kartaar Street. They poured petrol above her  on her in fact and they set her 
alight.  When we moved from the rock, the scene now where whole issue happened.  We 
were there and Toto Mayaba come to us ask us, “People what happened?” No one should 
have…..no one could say Toto this is one, this is two, this three, because the rest of us 
were so much annoyed about the whole thing that happened.  
Sipho: You said when you say the rest of you guys were annoyed about the whole thing, 
which is what is the whole thing? 
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P1: The thing of the burning of the lady.  
Sipho: Okay okay I see  
P1: And we managed to run away because people said, “There are the police,”and we ran 
away.  There is an old lady whom they called Mama [mother] Siliya Dikeni. She is the 
one who came to the rescue of this lady by pouring unboiled eggs. You see unboiled eggs 
help to keep the burns from being too much and we run away.    
On the second, no on the third, I was on my way to take my children to school. I went to 
school, this school, this one, it was still SS and I left my children, I met Mama NK and 
she said to me “Man as you, as comrades, you know whenever we have problems we 
have to report to you so now I am having a problem.” We were discussing this mama’s 
case until we reached the end of the hall where there was a building, you see at the hall. 
We saw school children running all over and we questioned them, “what is happening?”  
And they said, “They  are in, the police.” Okay; I run away, T run away, O run away. 
Next to the small principal’s house—the—grey house in front of the hall, I got at the next 
house, P2 got in the principal’s house.  Toto and I slept there; I hid myself under the bed. 
Toto was on top of the bed and the police arrived and they said they “need this P1,” but 
they were talking on radios. But they said no man this P1 man is not here. We were 
always wearing overalls, blue overalls, but the guy who is always talking to Walkie-talkie 
insisted that P1 is in that house and that guy was Becker who’s an inspector today and 
th… Maliti who have passed away not Maliti from Middleburg there one was who was 
here – the old man the one who had passed away recently. 
Sipho : the old Fezile  
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P1: Fezile Maliti, those are the people who said to them P1 is there.  The Hippo arrived. 
When the hippo arrived, they went in to make a search.  They searched, and searched and 
searched at the ultimate end they got me, and they beat me up.  I even forgot a knife I 
had. I was telling telling myself that, “Whenever I am arrested, the first policeman, I will 
stab him,” but it was unfortunate I forgot all those things because they were a lot. They 
beat me up. We were taken to police station Toto and I.  When we arrived, they called the 
special branch from Middleburg. It is one of the Malitis,   Leeman Maliti; we always 
called like that and Botha. They arrived in the afternoon. When they arrived they said to 
me Maliti himself, “P1 tell me who burned that lady.” I said, “no I do not know 
anything.”  And they said to me, “would you have liked if that was your sister who have 
passed away should have been killed in that manner?” and I said, “no, I don’t know 
anything.”  So they started torturing us.  There is a what is this thing… executive case… 
executive case they called it “die swartman” [Afrikaans for “the black man”].  
Sipho: The executive…..case what is it?  
P1: This one ….like this okay 
Sipho: Briefcase  
P1:   Yes the briefcase 
Sipho: Okay.  
P1: So seemingly they were having these machines of them to torture me. And they 
tortured me to such an extent that I said I am sick and tired of this now.  And they took 
me out of the police station. They went with me to a road to Phillipstown/ Petrusville. 
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They put my legs in something like a dam you see it’s not a dam actually but whenever 
there is rain then water stops there.  They put me there, they put something on my fingers 
these finger the big fingers and then they put a cloak on my head.  
Sipho: Something in your toes? 
P1: Yes in my toes, these two toes the big one  
Sipho:  Something like what?  
P1:  Like a clamp, you see a clamp, a battery clamp.  
Sipho: And then? 
P1: They put a cloak above me then I didn’t see anything.  The only thing that I heard  I 
don’tknow whether a generator or what you see but what I felt my feet were running like 
this* (shaking)……. In the water and I was already handcuffed at the back and the guy 
came to me, Maliti, and said to me, “P1 tell us the truth.” And I said to him I don’t know 
anything. The rain was coming down and I said to him you see if I die today you will die 
also that was the words that I said to him. They took me put on the van and we went back 
to Colesberg.  From Colesberg I was in awaiting trial with the same Toto because P2 was 
already arrested in Gauteng.  
Sipho: You said you were awaiting trial 
P1: Yes, when we were here, me and Toto sat down and said you don’t know Toto, 
Thabo and I do not know him. If ever P2 can say who burn the lady it will be honest.  But 
we manage to get the information, there was a guy from Graaf Reinet, but I won’t 
remember his surname but the name is uThamsanqa who poured petrol on this lady and a 
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guy from Colesberg who set this lady alight, that is AA from Colesberg and none of these 
people were even arrested.  
Sipho: You said a guy from Colesberg.  
P1: Yes, I went to the regional court for cases like public violence, arson which I won the 
cases and there was this only case that was outstanding of murder.  I went to the Circuit 
court of the…….. it was the Eastern Cape whilst at that time in Graaf Reinet, It was me, 
J, P2, E and Y the rest of us we were five.  
Sipho: So it’s you, J, P2, E and Y.  
P1: And Y. Our case started on the 10th of December, on the 11th the rest of us were 
found guilty by the presiding Judge Kannemeyer, who was the President judge in that 
time for the Eastern Cape. And there was a senior advocate Kingsley, who was assisting 
them as a prosecutor.  On the 12th,  E and Y were acquitted.  
Sipho: You said all of you guys were found guilty.  
P1: But on the 12th,  the day of the sentence E and Y were not found… were acquitted, 
our lawyer it was Mr. Jappie from Durban who questioned that and they said because of 
their age they are not going to be charged.  
Sipho: How old were they?  
P1: They were 15 yrs,17 yrs. E was 15 and Y17. 
Sipho: So because of their age they were not going to be charged?  
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P1: Yes ……and we went on the sentence came down, P… got 17 yrs for murder, 3 yrs 
for public violence. P2 got the same sentence.  I got the death penalty with 3 yrs for 
public violence. Thereafter I will go over now to the question of Pretoria.  I was given 
…..it was on February if I am not mistaken I forget the dates now a notice of  execution 
199…1986, 1981,….. 1987, 1989 I got a notice of execution. I appealed on that but we 
manage to win the case. In 1988 when the former state President got a stroke and the late 
Oliver Tambo got a stroke after these negotiations of Groote Schuur and Pretoria minutes 
we manage to win the late….I don’t know whether he is still alive now …Heunis.  He 
was a guy for foreign affairs in the former government…. Chris Heunis he was acting in 
that place. He is the one who reprieved me from death row and I was given 20yrs 
imprisonment. I went to a lower prison in Pretoria from there I was removed from 
Pretoria to Gauteng in Sandtone in Leeukop Prison where after these whole negotiations, 
the late Chris Hani was there and old lady mama Sisulu was there who came to us. We 
were on a hunger strike; it lasted for 21 days and is when the government started to hear 
our case as political prisoners because they said in most cases we are not political 
prisoners.  But we knew very well that what we did was because of politics, we did not 
want our people to suffer. There was a cause for us to do all those things.  So the former 
government managed, I can say, he managed because of the pressure that came to them. 
They decided that “Let us release these people whereas we say they are not political 
prisoners,” because there was no …hmm… what can I say a term to say who are political 
prisoner who are not, because the cause is one.  Because even the old man himself, was 
not regarded as a political prisoner.  So we felt that we have to do this for the sake of 
ourselves and sake of our people.  
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Sipho: You mean the hunger strike 
P1: Yes, because if we would have sat there and done nothing, we would have been in a 
problem. So I was released on the 25th of September 2002, and came to this community. 
Sipho: So you were released on the 25th September 2002? 
P1: No no no man not 2002, 1992 (laugh).  So there was jubilation, people were happy.  
People said, “We are happy because you are back because we heard that you are going to 
hang and all those things. We are listening on radios but your gods…they assisted you.” 
and I said to them “I agree with you my gods have assisted me, but you have to make 
thanks to the organization because the organization are the people who fought for me.” 
They bought me lawyers and lawyers and lawyers and lawyers, you see, so that I can 
manage to win this case and I manage that, that’s all tata.  
Sipho: I have few questions, I will start where we started. So you said 1) is that there was 
a consumer boycott? 
P1: Definitely  
Sipho: So this … the lady went to buy something from Persie’s butcher store and 
Marshal caught her and you guys were informed that she bought something and went to 
negotiate…did you say you went to confront her or………? 
P1: No! What actually happened after we received the message that the lady have bought 
meat from Persie’s slaghuis we went to the lady to try and negotiate the whole issue, but 
the lady never listened to us. That was the issue.  
Sipho: Who is we, because you said we? 
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P1: It was me, and P2, and L, and S I don’t know his surname now, he was with us in the 
BEC. 
Sipho: Is that S? 
P1: Yes.  
Sipho: Hmm…you went to you said you went to resolve the matter? 
P1: The matter… 
Sipho: Mhh… 
P1:  and what happened there is that the lady didn’t want to talk to us and started 
insulting us and she said “ons sat maar gaan slap met kort hare, niyakulala nichetyiwe” 
Sipho: Julle gaan slaap…….?  
P1: “Ons gaan slaap met die geskeerde kop geskeerde koppe” that is what made I, [the] 
community to be ibenomsindo (angry) I can say that to be angry because we went to the 
community and reported ba [that] one there is this thing now.  
Sipho:  So after she said this you went to the community to report…? 
P1: Yes yes yes …because we were puzzled P2 was not there, I was not there, and J was 
there but the marshals were there. So our names came in now. She felt that you as 
leadership you know the whole issue by naming our names.   
Sipho: So you guys were not there when they tramped on her meat?  
P1: No, no, no, we were not there. 
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Sipho: You said she felt that you as leadership were 
Break ………..Break………….. 
Sipho: So you said then you went back and reported and then…? 
P1: After the community realized that there this question of i- [a] walkie-talkie that this 
lady was always having, and what happened intoba [was that] why should this lady have 
a walkie-talkie so there was suspicions already that this lady is an informer, and that 
brought to a conclusion that we have to do our utmost best to monitor her. And that led to 
this unfortunate…this unfaithful day of her burning.  
Sipho: Unfaithful? 
P1: Yes, it was unfaithful because she was on her way to work and there were already 
people waiting for her; for her own inter….for her own deeds that causes that caused the 
death of her.  
Sipho: There were people waiting for her? 
P1: Yes…and that happened like that as I elaborated before, that so and so came to her 
rescue and all of those things  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P1: Yes. 
Sipho: When this happened, did you see it happening or were you there or what?  
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P1: I would say as I stated before, we were on the rock. We didn’t see the action that 
happened there [at the scene], but we went there after receiving the information that this 
lady has been burnt there.  
Sipho: Okay. 
P1: That was cause of our arrest.  
Sipho: Mhh. 
Sipho: So you have no idea as to what people did? Who was there?  Who said what and 
how did it unfold?   
P1: No! But what happened is that there were people in the scene who said so and so 
poured petrol, and so and so lit the matches. That is the guy I am saying is Thami, but 
who is nowhere to be found today, and the guy who lit the matches is AA, that is the 
information we got from the people who were on the scene.  That’s the hearsay to us.  
Sipho: So what did the communit….the decision was taken by community is to just 
monitor her? 
P1: Yes. 
Sipho: Okay. 
P1: And not set her alight.  
Sipho: Okay. 
P1:  You know what? There were people whenever there is this boycotts who did their 
own things. But we, as the community, the community always reported to us as 
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leadership. There was not a standing order that says if you P1 made this, you should burn 
this but the only thing is that what they said as the community is that you go to P1 and 
reprimand him. But on that particular day it was unfortunate; without the blessing of the 
leadership. Injalo ke tata. 
Sipho: Okay. 
Sipho: When you said somebody went to check whether she was going to work or not, 
can you tell me more about that?  
P1: What we did is,  she was working at what this garage, Coleskop somewhere there at 
the top next to International. Yes, what we said is that you have to check that if she going 
to work because usually there was a transport that was fetching her. But she felt that I 
should go on foot and if you know this location next to mama Rosa’s place down there in 
Kartaar street there was a street behind that house, it is were J found her because we sent 
J on a bicycle to go and check and J came back to us and reported that the people started 
beating her up and she was sent to Bloemfontein where she passed away. This same 
community said you are not going to bury this lady in this cemetery of ours. And we, as 
leadership the later Siyonzana Bhabhana, we can’t do it like that. But the community said 
our children have died after the 4th of…  shooting of the four children of Colesberg and 
they said we are not going to allow that… and was the standing order from the 
community. We as leaders, we just accepted what the community demanded because we 
do not lead ourselves.   
Sipho: When? Did you said the 4th of? 
P1: The 4th of July.  
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Sipho:  When they killed 4 people?  
P1:  No no no it on the 3rd. 
Sipho: Mh… 
P1: After that people started an uprising. 
Sipho: Mh… 
P1: You see after the death of these 4 children, they were youth who should have made a 
change in our community, but unfortunately the forces of the previous government felt 
that these are not human beings so they should die. …Cause on that particular day on the 
second, we went to the late Mfengwana’s place and the late Tata Maliti was staying in 
front, wherefore the 4 comrades fell [died]…and because of anger we felt that we have to 
go door to door in these police houses. We started with Chris Labane’s house, where we 
took his car out of the yard and set it alight.  Because the reason for us to set his car alight 
was because ba (of) he doesn’t have a place and the next to him it was three room place. 
So we feared that if we set Chris Labane’s house alight then other person will also 
suffer…and that was the start of this arrest. 
Sipho: The start of arrest?  
P1: Yes. 
Sipho: Of who? 
P1: I can say after the we burnt Chris’s car, a lot of people were arrested ….a lot of 
people and they should have explained to them whenever you are arrested you have to 
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say who set the car alight, as from in the old township  [at] Vuka but whilst the whole 
issue happened in Bongweni but you have to know the person. And we felt intokuba 
(that) “Asiwafuni Amapolisa!” (We do not want or hate the police.) That was our term.  
Thereafter I went back to Ciskei whilst having a branch on COSAS, but I never I stayed 
long, there I had to run away because Amagreen Barete  
(the green berets) were looking after me. 
Sipho: Amagreen Barete (the green berets)?  
P1: Yha we always called them like that; the soldiers. So I felt instead of being arrested 
by the Ciskei government, I rather be arrested at home, Colesberg.  
Sipho: So, what happened to her body? You said the community did not allow her to be 
buried in Colesberg. Did the decision go that way or it was changed? 
P1: Father/Tata it was during the time after our arrest and they said she won’t buried here 
in Colesberg. We heard that from our visitors since we were in jail for our trial. No! She 
was not buried in Colesberg she was cremated in Bloemfontein. 
Sipho: Anything that you want to share about this process or anything?  
P1: No tata (father) I won’t say a lot about this, you see, I will say I am little bit puzzled 
because before the case itself we were in the waiting trial there came guy called Kingsely 
and asked if we need a representative?  If we wanted bail and we said yes. He met with 
our parents aside and told them we won’t get bail. We we won’t get bail because of  the  
gruesomeness of this case. And at the end of the day, the same Kingsley whom we told is 
our lawyer was actually the prosecutor on the case. So now, where is the fairness in this 
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case? Because he knows exactly how our case went.  And to go on that I will quote u-
Justice Kannemeyer; he was the president Jugde of the Eastern Cape xa ndinikwa (when I 
was given) i-stay of execution ndinikwa (sentenced) le 20 years. Then he said it will be a 
mistake to be your judge because I sentence this guy accordingly and if ever they 
released him I will resign and he did that definitely. If you can look to the Bleed ka 98 
you will get that statement. It was January or February issue you will get his statement. 
Sipho:  The 1998  Bleed?  
P1: Either 98 or 99 between these two years.  
Sipho: Is it February?  
P1: Yes.  
Sipho: Okay.  
P1: That is how it is father.   
Sipho: Okay, thank you.  
P1: Okay. 
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APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT 2 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
Interview with Mr. P2 
 
Sipho:  I think by now you have an idea about the purpose of this meeting?  
P2: Mhhh. 
Sipho:  and my first question; it’s not necessarily a question, I just would like you to 
describe that day or what happened in that incident. Tell me what you know.  
P2: Well, first, perhaps, it will be good to give you a little bit of a background as to that 
fateful day, or whatever you might call it.  About [a] few months, I would say four to five 
months, before the necklacing of the late Nokwakha, there were some problems, you 
know, with the local community authorities in Colesberg, because of living conditions 
that were prevailing then.  Some of those conditions, they still prevail (clears throat).  I 
was the chairman of the youths’ organization called COYO, Colesberg Youth 
Organization.  I was also the active member of the civic organization in Colesberg.  I 
can’t recall the name of this civic organization in conjunction with [the] youth 
organization. We had, eh... eh... ehh....  several demands that we made to the local 
government authorities, like the ending of the bucket... eh... system, like better housing, 
amongst others. While, okay, the regional Superintendent in those days... eh... for the 
black townships… there [are] some regional superintendents who were responsible for 
[a] certain township or a certain area of black people, [clears throat] and they will run 
their affairs, like housing, tarring of roads, you know, all those civil matters.  They made 
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an undertaking at the meeting which was held at the Colesberg... ehh... primary school.  It 
was... ah...  a public meeting, so this regional superintended made an undertaking that 
they will [would] look into the problems of the bucket system, the building of proper 
houses for the houseless, etcetera. And they were given 14 days to respond to that, 
however, some few days before the lapse of this 14-day period, what the people saw 
instead was [clears throat] a lot of soldiers in town, riot police gathering.  And when these 
14 days lapsed, we were told, in no uncertain terms, by the authorities, that, look... ehm... 
they are not going to talk to us.  They will do things as they wish; I mean, the bucket 
system was there to stay with us.  So, that led to the dissatisfaction amongst the people.  
It was decided by the Colesberg community that, well, they [the authorities] didn’t meet 
our demands and they didn’t give a satisfactory solution, so we don’t [didn’t] have [an] 
alternative.  The only thing that we can [could] do which might be effective was the 
consumer boycott, seeing that most of the businesses were owned by white people, and 
we were doing our businesses in town.  So, we decided, “look, we are going to buy from 
the white,” though we were buying from certain white... ah… shops people who 
sympathize with our cause.  The deceased, I must mention, she was a very active person 
in the civic organization, she was one of the people who would talk and, you know, many 
elder people, you know, would follow suit; listen to her. We even included her in one 
those committees, you know, where we will [would] be negotiating with one of the local 
authorities. In the long run, people were victimized, some political activists. They were 
victimized, detained, beaten up, people were also killed. We also had people within the 
system, the South African Police, who were giving information to us. Like, they will 
[would] indicate certain people who were selling people out, giving information to the 
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security branch, it was discovered that the deceased was also one [of] those people who 
was [were] giving information to the security branch.  Her husband was also an official of 
the then... ahh... Bantu Administration Board, Bantu Administration something; I can 
[not] recall the proper name. So, it was easy for the security branch to approach her, since 
the husband was... was... was... also working there; that is our thinking.  So, we thought 
perhaps she agreed to cooperate with the special branch because her husband was 
working for the then Apartheid government, and maybe she thought if she doesn’t 
[didn’t] cooperate with the security, her husband might lose his jobs [and] all that.  Okay.  
By that time, there were some uprisings throughout South Africa.  The youth, especially, 
were fighting the authorities and with all those people who were coop... ah... 
collaborating with Apartheid regime agents. They were regarded by the people as 
enemies; their houses were burnt out, not only their houses, almost the all of their 
property, including themselves, like the Kinikini saga in Uitenhage, there was one in 
Gauteng, the then Transvaal. I can’t remember where, but this one of Nokwakha 
happened just shortly after those incidents.  Okay, as youth activists, we decided, well, 
since we have received the information that the deceased was selling out; we thought, 
“okay, we would fight by perhaps burning his/her [their] property or [by] forcing them 
out [of] the township like all the police or people who had the close ties with the 
apartheid regime.”  They were chased away from the township; their houses were burnt, 
cars [were] also damaged and burnt, you will recall Chris Labane’s incident… 
Mfengwane were people... ah... burnt their properties and... as a result, four people were 
shot dead.  So, there was still that anger amongst the people, [clears throat] including 
myself, of course.  So we wanted to do anything just to revenge [avenge] you know… 
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cause some harm to the apartheid regime.  And you would also perhaps recall that [in the] 
year 1985, the ANC… the then ANC president, Oliver Tambo, made a call that the 
people inside South Africa must render South Africa ungovernable, and that… we 
interpreted it as not abiding [by] any repressive laws, including persecuting those we… 
we… we… we… we deemed Apartheid agents, Apartheid regime agents. Attempts were 
made to burn the house of the deceased about a few weeks or [a] few days before she was 
necklaced.  However, that didn’t succeed because there [were] police in her house.  And 
we didn’t want to go while there were police inside because we didn’t have guns; we only 
had petrol bombs, and we couldn’t stand against R1s with petrol bombs. The necklacing: 
we never planned that, “okay today we [are] going [to] necklace Nokwakha, or what.”  
No, that just happened, while the previous night, I recall, we were fighting the police with 
stones and all that. In the morning, they went to town because they also were working 
throughout the night. And she was… you know… was very bold, the deceased. She was 
talkative, you know; she was saying whatever she wanted to say at any given time, 
because she knew that she was backed by the security branch, should anything happen to 
her.  But, okay, that morning, unfortunately, she met us, and we decided then that, “okay 
we are going to necklace her,” seeing that we wanted to burn her property but we 
couldn’t, because there were police there. You know, out of that anger and frustration, we 
decided, at the spur-of-the-moment, that we going to do that. I don’t know how the petrol 
came in, but I recall that some of us even took petrol from the petrol bombs because there 
was no petrol at hand ready, you know, to necklace her.  There were also no tires to 
necklace her, you know.  It was not a premeditated thing, you know, but we... we... we... 
we eventually managed to get hold of the tire.   
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Sipho: so when this was happening can describe how you felt? I mean...… 
P2: Although we were angry, I...  I would... I would [will] talk for myself; I don’t know 
how the other people felt. I could... I can only imagine how they felt, but, you know, 
although I was...we, you know, have been angry at the Apartheid regime, [at] their police, 
soldiers, and even informants, but she was lying there crying… screaming,you know… 
flames all over her body… [pauses]  I was scared [chuckles, shifts his seating]. I was 
scared; you know why I was scared?  I never hurt anyone in the past. But,you know, now 
I could see: here is the person, I also participated; she is burning, screaming.  I 
sometimes, you know, I felt I could have gone again [to] try to help her, but at the back of 
my mind again: “Ag! We had comrades who passed away because of these informants; 
perhaps this is also her time too to go.”  I must also mention that I [was] quite young; 
[chuckles] I think I was sixteen years old.  And that is also the reason I didn’t get the 
death sentence, because [at] the time [of] the offence, I was under age, according to the 
high court or Supreme Court.   
Sipho: Hmm.  
P2: So what was disturbing was [that] the events that led to the necklacing of sis 
Nokwakha was [were] so distorted in court by the state witnesses. So what [was] so 
difficult for us, you know, [was that] we couldn’t set the record straight then in court.  
Because we were denying that we took part in the... the... in the necklacing of the 
deceased, we couldn’t set the record straight.  Okay, although P1, initially, before we 
necklaced Nokwakha, when we... we... we decided that, “okay let us necklace her,” he 
was part of that, but in the actual act he was never there.  However, he was sentenced to 
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death because of [the] distorted evidence which was given in court.  It was alleged that he 
also participated; he brought the tire.  But when he came with the tire, I mean, she was 
already burnt, you know, lying there.  And when he saw it, he dropped it.  I can 
remember: he dropped the tire and ran away. 
Sipho: Hmm. 
P2: But we served our time; I was sentenced to 17 years for the murder and 2 years for 
public violence.  Well, while I was in prison, I kept on reflecting, you know, on this 
incident, thinking about it, trying to think critically: “but what if this didn’t happen?”  But 
I will always… always, you know, console myself by saying, “Ag! Ah... many of our 
people died; not [because] maybe they were fighting like the people in Sharpsville; they 
died because they protested peacefully.  Some of our leaders, they died mysteriously; 
some disappeared because of informants.”  But on the other hand, I was also thinking, 
“Eyi, [low-tone sigh] what about those children who are left without a mother?” Because 
I recall that the deceased [had] children; she had some of the children. They were very 
young; I think they were toddlers, if I am not mistaken. I’ve had pity, but also justified it 
by saying that, “Ag! the same happened to our comrades.  There are so many orphans 
because the parents of those orphans were killed by the Apartheid agents…” 
P2: Well, there was political change in our country [when] we got out of prison.  It has 
been my wish, you know, to set the record straight because… I even tried to secure the 
records of our trial.  Charles helped me to get them through the lawyers for human rights, 
and my intention was that we were going to set the record straight. I even thought, when 
the TRC came into being, that maybe I would get a chance to put our story straight. We 
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were approached by the investigators but they never really… ahh… called us in when the 
TRC came to Colesberg.  I recall Lucky Njozela was the investigator; he just phoned me 
and asked, “am I prepared to go to the TRC?” and [I] said “ja” [yes]. I said, “I don’t have 
any problems; I would like to do that,” because I wanted to, you know, set the record 
straight because the evidence which was given in court was immensely distorted.  But we 
were never called, to my surprise!  I heard somebody, whom I think was not even there 
that day, not even in Colesberg, who gave a version, a totally wrong version, which was 
worse than the version that was given during our trial [chuckles].  It was a totally new 
version.  She alleges [alleged] that… ahh… that the deceased was necklaced only 
because she bought from the boycotted butchery, and that was not the case.  
Sipho: Hmm. 
P2: Okay, mna… I saw it that way.  Okay, The Skull of my Country, [Country of my 
Skull]. I partially put the blame on the author [Antjie Krog].  Why I am saying so? It is 
the TRC which failed, you know, to come up with the right… to get all, you know, both 
sides’ versions. I still fail to understand why… maybe we were never called because the 
TRC only had one side of the story and never bothered to call us and I am also asking, 
you know, eh… what was really the purpose of that exercise, only hearing one side of the 
story, because the Truth and Reconciliation… ehh… Commission was really about trying 
to make peace, you know, between the perpetrators and the victims.   
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: And, I mean, that was how it happened; the perpetrators would be called and even the 
victims would also come and relate their experience. But we were never called; I don’t 
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know why, and the author then of that book, Antjie Krog, never bothered to verify, you 
know, certain things.  Even to her, she was surprised even, ehh… she is… is quoting 
advocate Dumisa Ntsebenza, saying, you know, she had heard a lot of stories, but he has 
never come across a story like that one. So, the story is not balanced because they… they 
left us out. They couldn’t come and verify this whole… but they took that version from 
only one witness at the TRC, and they never bothered to ask any questions or anything 
about what has been alleged. I think that [is] all.  
Sipho: I have one or two questions.  Ah… during the incident itself, do you remember 
anything that other people said or any song that was sung at that moment?  Do you recall 
any… 
P2:  Yhoo no! Not specific, I… I cannot recall specifically which songs were being sung.  
But, you know, generally, in those days, people would sing about… ehhh… a perceived 
informer; you know, like, ah… Nokwakha even whether you are making a toyi-toyi or 
you are singing ….ah…. any song you will mention that person, for instance, we would 
necklace you, or so and so; we would necklace you, and all that, but I can’t recall 
specifically what was the song which was sung there; but there were songs, there toyi-
toyis, there were everything I can’t remember specifically  
Sipho: Anything that other people said? or……….. 
P2: Spectators… wow. People were [chuckles] you know, people… it was the first time 
that happened in Colesberg.  People were… were shocked, and although we were also 
doing that, we were scared, you know, that maybe the police might come while we were 
doing that. I couldn’t really weigh the feelings of the… you know, of the people… no, I 
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couldn’t; I would be lying. I couldn’t really… look, it happened so fast, we were also 
scared… fearing that the police might come, and lot of things, you know, ah… were 
running in one’s mind.  
Sipho: Anything that you want to add or you think could be left out? 
P2: Oh no! You know, this happened quite some time ago; I might be leaving out some 
detail or something.  Should I recall anything, I will write it down; I will write it down 
and bring it to your attention. But what I would add… I also advise you, maybe for 
interest’s sake, but I think I would be valuable to get the records. I am not sure what the 
proper… ahh… procedure to… to…  to get such records is, but in this South Africa of 
ours, I don’t think it will be difficult for you to get the records of our trial. And I would 
also try, from my side, to get them, I think it should be easier for me to get them, you 
know, maybe I would recall lots of other things, you know.  I was going, maybe, just to 
ask our legal representative advocate, Jappie; he is now a judge. Mhh… I do not know if 
he still has many records, but I will talk to him… okay… the instructing… eh...  attorney 
was Lala, Mr. Lala; I don’t also know whether he still practicing as a lawyer? Or 
attorney? Or maybe he is, but the last time I heard, he was practicing, but advocate Juppie 
is a judge now, in Kwazulu Natal. 
Sipho: So far I would say… brah… I think you have exhausted my questions. 
P2: Okay, you can… you can, sometime, ask me if something… ah… comes to your 
mind; but I think you can get those… ahh… I think that he even encourages…   
Sipho: Records…?  
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P2:  I even sometimes encourage abo [the likes of] Charles because he was not even there 
that day, but he is mentioned in Antjie Krog, because he was… she was mentioned at the 
TRC seating; but I told that lady, “but that is blue lie it is an and utterly distorted story;” 
the women just maybe saw a chance of making a quick market and she thought she will 
lie.  
P2: But the necklacing, it is not something that I’m proud of.  I will walk tall and say “ja 
[yes], we did it.”  Although, I mentioned to you that, well, I used to reflect to this and say 
and justify my deeds, by saying, well, many of our activists [and] many of our leaders 
disappeared and were killed by the Apartheid agents, but I still believe, you know, 
hurting another person, or killing, for that matter, killing a person… I don’t think its 
something that people should do amongst each other or against each other, but, ok, then, 
the situation was difficult and was also volatile.  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2:  But under normal circumstances, I wouldn’t do such a thing.  
Sipho: Ok, I’m Ok. 
P2: Ok. 
Sipho:  As I indicated, I will write this up and if I have any questions, I will come to you.  
I am planning to do a first draft, or a preliminary analysis, and if funds permit, then I’ll 
come back and say, “this is what I have,” and get all the participants’ feedback and then 
go and do the final report; I will also make a copy available to all the participants.  And 
then, your with your permission, then I can maybe make it available to our local 
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institutions.  But at this point, I think we’ll keep it this way and maintain the 
confidentiality section of our agreement.  
P2: You know, I’m honest with you because… mna… I am not concerned about the 
confidentiality of this. Why [chuckles]? 
Sipho: Mh. 
P2: Why? The TRC was a public institution, and most of the... the sessions were open to 
the public. There was that distorted version in public, it was made in public [in] Antjie 
Krog’s book, [which] is still available now in bookstores, you know, its openly available 
uyabona [you see]. To me, this would be perhaps… be an opportunity.  I don’t know in 
what, in which way… I think maybe it would be an opportunity I have been waiting 
for… for quite sometime, in order, perhaps, to put things into perspective.  
Sipho: That’s the thing… I am also…  
P2: And also, you know, [chuckles] there is my inner self you know, I think it will [be] a 
healing process also, you know.  I … I don’t’ have anything to hide, as I told you.  It is 
not because I am proud of I what I’ve done or whatever.  No!  I regret that we went to 
that extent, you know, to kill a person, but it was… I ... I... I also take into consideration 
that the circumstances then, you know… ah… compelled me to take part in such an act.   
But normally, I wouldn’t really do any thing, for whatever reason; I wouldn’t kill a 
person. To me, confidentiality, as far as this is concerned, is not really a concern or… a... 
matter.  You don’t have to worry.  
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Sipho: I am raising [this issue] because it’s also the concern of the people who are 
supervising me…. 
P2: Okay.  
Sipho: They… well, they are very…it was even hard for me to get the University to 
approve me to go and conduct the study, “you might be risking people’s lives.” The few 
people who know the South African history and have followed the TRC said, “you know, 
it would have been much better if you could use their real names,” but for the 
institutional purposes, I think I should maintain a certain level of confidentiality just to 
guarantee people’s… eh... 
P2: Well being. Yha.  
Sipho: But I am… 
P2: But I don’t think... because this matter was handled, people could have, if there [are] 
any people who could been angry, and maybe thought of doing anything…  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: They could have done so during that time of the TRC, you know,  
Sipho: Mhh.  
P2:  Because that time, I think it opened some healed wounds.  
Sipho: Mhh. 
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P2: You would recall that there was an incident of the perpetrator after he said his story 
at the TRC; [he] went to the victim’s house; he was attacked by the son of… of... the 
victims. Things like that, you know that… that never happened here. 
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: You know, ah... you know, ja [yes]… I…  I, for one, don’t think… maybe… maybe 
I’m… downplaying it… I don’t know… [chuckles]… 
Sipho:  No, it’s not like… ah… 
P2: I don’t say… eh… you know, “what [is] good, what is right, you can do it,” but from 
my side, I don’t…  I don’t... have any problem you know… 
Sipho: mh...  
P2:  My name is already in the… book; it’s in that TRC.  I cannot erase it; I cannot save 
it and say, “don’t do this,” I mean, it happened and… But there was also a reason why it 
happened and all that, you know... Unfortunately, it happened, but it is not something I 
wish it should happen. 
Sipho: I will like… I...think with the… ehh… The thing is, American Universities have 
their own laws… 
P2: And, yha, they see things in their own way only… 
Sipho: I think once that section is done, I can release it, I can put it in a different form for 
South African citizens, but for them, they would require that. They said if I want to put in 
people’s names, I have to make a Release of Information form, which they have to 
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approve, and you guys sign it, and then I can use that… so, I can look into that, 
definitely, when I get back in the US and see… 
P2: Ag!.. to me, you know, it doesn’t matter. I understand… I understand the point to 
this… but this was… I mean, this [is] in the TRC, at the TRC, openly, publicly, so…  
Sipho: Mh. 
P2:  The TRC report was released... 
Sipho: Mh... 
P2: It’s… it’s there for public scrutiny. 
Sipho: Mh. 
P2: Antjie Krog wrote her book, which is based on that TRC report, which is open to the 
public, and our names are mentioned there; everything is mentioned, and that is why I 
also refer you to… you know, so that you can see this from a different perspective…  
Sipho: Mhh... mhh… 
P2: Also, see how these allegations were related in court. 
Sipho: In court… okay… and…  
P2:  Mhhh… I even said… mna [me] you know; I said even to abo [the likes of] T. O and 
bo bhut’ Zet ; all those people who are wrongly implicated there, you know that I am 
prepared; we can sit down and help, and write our [chuckles] book.  
Sipho: Mhhh. 
  217
P2: But I am not of the view that we should point fingers to Antjie Krog, really. 
Sipho: Mhhh. 
P2: Okay, she failed to research further, you know, maybe she saw a quick part in the 
book and she did what she wanted to do.  But I think she should have gone an extra mile.  
You… where there are still questions, there are a lot of questions in the TRC report, 
many… there are many flaws, but then, if you would like… people should see certain 
things, and… you will go an extra mile you do some research, you know, in order to 
close certain loop holes certain gaps… information gaps… but I won’t really blame her. 
[chuckles] You know, it was a report and most… you know, her book is based on that 
report.  
Sipho: Yha…….. 
P2:  [Be]cause some of the people who are quoted, they’re mentioned in the book; really, 
they are innocent, innocent they were never even near the scene. They didn’t even go 
there after, you know, the necklacing, but they are mentioned. I think in some quarters, it 
reflected, you know, it reflected bad… bad on them, you know? 
Sipho: Mhhh … hayi …mhh. I would thank you again for participating in this research.  
How are you feeling now?  
P2: No problem; to me, I take this as opportune time to tell my story and, you know, I 
after my release, I talked to the husband of the deceased and he said, you know, “P2, I 
understand…  the… situation, and I am not angry at you.” Or something like that. 
Sipho: So you talked to the husband…? 
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P2:  I owe [it to him] to explain what happened; I get scared.  I love kids and have kids of 
my own.  I want to tell… the kids of the deceased what happened. This crosses my mind 
and it does not make [me] feel good; kanene, I took a parent away from her children, 
never mind the circumstances… the children, you know?  Sometimes I wonder what are 
these children [are] saying when they are asked, “what happened to your mother?” 
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: The idea of the TRC was good to bring the perpetrator together [with the victim] and 
to tell what happened.  I hope to have a chance to make peace with them, and I think the 
TRC failed to [let me do] that. I would like to know if they [the victim’s family] made 
peace with this. I would like to face the victims and tell them what happened. I have to 
tell this because my children, too, will ask me questions and wonder what kind of a 
person their father is. So, to tell this will also provide them with the right information, 
you know, I… as I mentioned, I think about this sometimes… 
Sipho: Okay. 
P2:  And, [chuckles] you know, my aunt stays at her [deceased’s] house now, and every 
time I ask myself these questions about the… this thing, and, you know, we went to the 
deceased’s house.  We did not burn the house because there were children in the house.  
We did not plan to necklace her; it was a spur–of–the–moment [decision]. I don’t recall 
anyone planning.  
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Second or follow up interview 
Sipho: Thanks for availing yourself again; I have a few questions; some are related to 
what you said in the previous interview, and others I thought of later. Among other things 
that I would like further clarification on, there are two things come to my mind, like when 
you said… ah... sometimes, when you think about… ah... this whole situation, ah… 
when, you know, you said there is one level… where you said, when you think about it… 
you said, “at some point, you took somebody else’s parent, never mind the 
circumstances.”  I would… if you could… tell me about that; about what you meant? 
P2: Well, [clearing his throat] first of all, what I think is that, you know, some of our 
people in the liberation struggle, they lost parents…  
Sipho: Mhhh. 
P2: But at the moment, they are well cared for, you know, like, they get scholarships…  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: And etcetera… and I have been asking myself, now, since I know… I happen to 
know both the parents, these kids of the deceased, you know, the deceased and her 
husband and also the husband was… The last time I knew about his activities, he was 
unemployed…  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: And when I was starting to think, “eyi! Are they going to school?  Who’s helping the 
to go to school? Who’s helping with food and clothing?”  Things like that.  
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Sipho: Okay, so basically, you’re concerned about their welfare.  
 P2: Exactly, yha! Not that I got money [chuckles] or… perhaps there is something big I 
can do… you know, maybe… maybe… maybe… maybe… maybe… maybe… you 
know, I might… maybe… towards… maybe… their well-being… Not out of my pocket, 
but there are many institutions where… Maybe if they are at school, they are struggling 
to get funds… One can go to the premier’s bursary, can go to… blah, blah, blah… you 
know, try and get some funds to help them, you know.  I was thinking along those lines. 
Sipho: Okay. 
P2: But one… you would ask what I have done [chuckles] so far? Absolutely nothing. 
You know, I’ve also a hectic… Okay, maybe that is an excuse. [chuckles] Whether [it] is 
valid or not, is another question.  I didn’t do that, you know, also, with mixed feeling, I… 
ay!... should I approach them? How would they see it? Should they be angry? You know, 
that’s the other thing; one of the things that delayed me to approach them… you know, I 
don’t know, how would they take it? [Heavy sigh] 
Sipho: Okay. Mhm. Okay. 
P2: But you should really… maybe… maybe if you could help me with that… I would 
appreciate that.  
Sipho:  Okay, mhh. 
P2:  To meet them, talk, you know, I mean… That’s what I think the TRC failed to do.  I 
mean, the whole TRC process… I think it was about reconciliation… 
Sipho: Mhh…  
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P2:  And you can ask, “well, there was the TRC process… what has it done?”  You 
know… [clears throat]  
Sipho:  Mhh, okay…. 
P2: If they hate me… I mean… they still hate me, you know? Because the TRC never did 
anything, and if we… we really want true reconciliation, I think we should [start] with… 
you know.  You start with yourself, reconcile with yourself with certain things, then go to 
others. [clears throat] And as far as I am concerned, we never reconciled to them.  Okay, 
I might say, you know, within me, I would like to talk to them, and all that, but, who 
knows… how do they feel about me? Nobody knows.  
Sipho: Okay… eh… the other thing that struck me in the interview is that you described 
that as an “unfaithful day.”  
P2: Mhh. 
Sipho: it’s something that struck me because you are not first person I’ve interviewed 
who described it as “an unfaithful day,” so I wonder if you could tell me more… What 
would it mean to you for it to be an unfaithful day? 
P2: You know, I think perhaps I did indicate, or maybe I failed to indicate, that… that… 
eh… there were many… The previous day, there many incidents that occurred, for three 
days before that day, we went to the deceased’s house almost every day before the… 
before she was burnt… [clears throat] and all those occasions were not successful. 
Sipho: Okay… mhh. 
  222
P2: And that day, it was never a premeditated thing, that we are going to meet at this 
point and burn her, it coincidentally happened that she was met at that juncture. [clears 
throat] It was never planned… it wasn’t planned to happen, but things happen, and they 
happen so fast…  
Sipho: Mhh, okay.  
P2:  I think that’s it, not that there is a remarkable… that maybe it meant…  
Sipho: Okay... you also describe the process as traumatic; you said that…   
P2: Mhh, yha, it has been. I mean, I have been re… you know, the incident has been 
reliving itself since it happened to me for quite some time until I was in prison, but… 
ehm… okay… I was reading a lot in prison, so it… it just vanished, but the thoughts are 
still lingering on.  Hence, I am also, you know, feeling that… ay… I need to meet, you 
know, her offspring.  You know, even if they hate me, I would still want to meet them so 
that we can really reconcile, you know?  
Sipho: Mhh okay. 
P2: I know it... it won’t be an easy thing, but I would be happy if one day I die know[ing] 
that I tried to make peace with them.  
Sipho: So, you said there are times… sometimes you relived the moment of the incident.  
If you could tell me… 
P2: You know, like, I don’t see this Grootman [Afrikaans for big man, a sign of respect] 
now; I don’t even know where he is, you know, but I used to see him a lot.  I mean, he’s 
drinking and I am also drinking, and, you know, when I see… that will come honestly 
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[chuckles] you know, the issue of his wife would come and will stay with me for quite 
some time, you know, maybe for a week or so. You know, I am this kind of person; I 
tend to look deeper into things and sometimes think, when I used to meet him, I was 
always thinking, “ay! [clears throat] I wonder if his [wife] was still alive, what would… 
what would his life be?” You know, they were staying here in… what is it… this... street? 
Sipho: Main road.  
P2: Main road, ja [yes], and, apparently, I don’t know whether he sold the house or what, 
if he sold the house, under which circumstances did he sell the house? I am asking 
myself, you know, those kinds of questions; you know?  And the… when I saw that this 
Grootman was not okay, because he was always a neat kind of person, he was drinking, 
but, you know, he was drinking responsibly.  And when you would… when I [would] 
find him drunk and… you know… (emphatic voice tone) Eyi! I feel pity and ask myself 
such questions [Clears Throat] Although, you know, I said even previously that… Eyi! 
Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing, but still, as a human being, you 
think… as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who’s got a heart [chuckles], when 
you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? Especially when you see 
them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, you’ll… you’ll feel pity… 
you’ll ask yourself questions, like I said, you know? When I saw this Grootman drunk 
and he’s not the gentle and clean person I use to know, I would start wondering, what if, 
you know, his wife was still around… he would definitely not be like this [heavy sigh]  
Sipho: Oh! Wonder if… ehh. 
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P2: [I] sort of sympathize with him in the situation I see now.  This Grootman, you know, 
maybe [I] think that… maybe he is in this situation because, maybe the wife is no longer 
here, or… you know, it also traumatic to him as well as it is traumatic to us as 
perpetrators, you know?  I was thinking along those lines.  
Sipho: Okay. 
P2: It might be something else, you know, that led to him to… for him to find himself in 
that situation. [Clears throat] I did talk to him, but we never went into detail, and [I] said 
what… what, you know, he just said, and bekus’ etywaleni [in a drinking environment], 
you know, “he said ag! Just let us just forget about that you know, mna, I have forgiven 
you.”  And you know, we never really entertain it that much.  
Sipho: Okay. 
P2:  But to me, I was happy, you know, that I talked to him. I was happy… I was happy, 
and I thought I would make a follow up, but really, I didn’t, and I am not sure whether he 
is late or still alive.  I am [not] sure what happened to him.  
Sipho: So, in your attempt to talk to him, he was receptive.  
P2: He was, ja, ja.  
Sipho: Okay, but for you, it’s like, when you see… the, you know… if I am getting you 
correctly, you said when you see him in the state that he is in now, you wonder if the 
absence or the death of his wife contributes to the state of his… 
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P2: Yha, mhh, exactly, yha, and I should say [chuckles] maybe its [been] two or three 
years ago since I saw this Grootman, honestly, you know?  Two years ago, I didn’t come 
[home] so frequently, as frequent as I do now… 
Sipho: mhh… 
P2: And that might also have contributed to the loss of contact kum naye [between us], 
but I used to see him etywaleni ntoni ntoni [in a drinking environment]. 
Sipho: Mhh, okay.  
P2: But it’s [been] quite some time, honestly, lento ndithi [that’s why I say].  
Sipho: Mhh 
P2: It’s [been] maybe three or so years.  
Sipho: Okay.  
P2:  [heavy sigh]  
Sipho: Eh… the other thing you mentioned in our previous interview was… you said 
there was anger.  You talked about, like, there was that which contributed to this or things 
that took place on or before this incident… 
P2: Mhh… 
Sipho: And you… I think you also mentioned… I think you also mentioned how, like, 
the things that, for example, that you saw, or, like, that the conditions that your mother 
worked in as… as.., 
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P2: Conditions of living. 
Sipho: Conditions of living… 
P2: General conditions of living… 
Sipho: I wonder if you can just tell me more about that and the link between them. 
P2: Okay. 
Sipho: Maybe if you can make me that connection a little bit more clearly…  
P2:  You know, I said… I can’t recall the dates and so on, but [Clears Throat] what led to 
the unrest in the township, in Colesberg then, was there were certain demands that were 
sent to authorities, you know, those were about the living conditions locally, you know, 
like better housing, like water… clean water, you know, there were many houses then 
which didn’t have taps in their yards; you had to walk some few meters sometimes, or 
maybe a kilometer or so to get clean water [Clears Throat].  There was this bucket 
system, you know, it’s very degrading, you know, even these days, you still find [it] 
degrading, too. Those were one of the… some of the demands that we set for the 
authorities to look at: that they should abolish the bucket system, they should provide 
better for all the homeless.  There were a lot of… of such demands, but instead of the… 
of the authorities doing something about the demands, they initiated this violent situation.  
We saw troops and many policemen around, and they came into the township, made 
certain announcements, you know, certain provocations, you know, because there was 
this cop called Van Heinstein who would go into the township with a loudhailer 
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[megaphone] and say whatever he wishes to say, you know, out of provocation, [clears 
throat] and as result, when they did not respond positively to those demands… 
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: People boycotted, you know, the white businesses; they didn’t allow certain vehicles, 
delivery vehicles, commercial vehicles, to come into the township.  And all that in 
response to the… no response of the authorities to our demands.  Well, there was this 
incident also, in July of ... of the killing of Krakra and others.  I think that has also made 
especially the youth very angry; people were arrested after… before and after that 
incident.  They were beaten up by the police, brutally beaten up.  There were even civil 
claims launched against the minister of police, the then minister of police.  I know a few 
people who were brutally beaten by the police then. All that police brutality, you know, 
led or contributed to the anger that we had as citizens. You know, this didn’t happen once 
off and the police would go, you know.  It happen continuously; people would be 
detained without a trial, and whilst being detained, they would be beaten up, come back, 
you know… they would share their experience while they were detained.  All that, you 
know, creates anger. 
Sipho:  So, you mean that there are things that contributed to or led… like the 
provocations from the police… 
P2: Yha! 
Sipho: That led to that situation and also to the general living conditions… 
  228
P2: Mhh yha! You know, there was a formal [community] meeting where we sensitized 
the authorities about the living [conditions] not that, in fact, that they didn’t know 
[chuckles] about our living, you know, but we sensitized them in this way, that we were 
fed up, you know, with this living in squalor and abject poverty and… whereas, just few 
meters from our township, they are living in [a] far better life, in an opulent life [Clears 
Throat].  I mean, the dumping sites, that is one of the things that we also, you know… 
you know, one of the demands we wanted [was that] they should provide better housing 
for people. Secondly, we also wanted them to do away with the bucket system. Thirdly, 
we also said they do away with dumping area, the dumping area was in the township… 
not only the dumping area, but the sewage, the dumping.  The nitesol dumping plot was 
in the township, so nitesol from everywhere, from town, from… it will [would] be 
dumped in the township, and it was also, you know… that alone was also degrading, you 
know; it showed that they didn’t even… eh... take us as fellow human beings. So, instead 
of saying they would do something or they won’t do anything, there was police 
provocation, which led to many incidents of violence. I don’t think we started violence or 
the people in Colesberg started violence; all this happened… It was because of the police; 
they initiated violence; they come [came] and detained a lot of people, about hundred 
people, beat them, and later, those charges were dropped from all those people. But 
people were beaten up; people were killed... 
Sipho: Okay... the other question that I… it’s not a question, per se, but it’s an area 
that,when I looked, I thought it wasn’t… I didn’t get it clear or covered, after, like… You 
told me, for example, you told me about the incident, the court process, and the 
procedures, and then you told me about your time in prison, how this played a role, and 
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then you also told me about afterwards, and your reaction when the TRC report came out. 
But the process leading up to the trial,when you were arrested: how was that?  I didn’t get 
your description or your experiences… 
P2:  When I was arrested …? 
Sipho: Yha, like, when… what led to that? When were you arrested, shortly after the 
incident?  What happened, and what was the situation? 
P2: Okay [chuckles].  There was a state of emergency in the country... eh…  I was trying 
to get out of the country, you know, like many youths at that time, but while I was in 
Bloemfontein [clears throat] where my father is, he felt like, “ey! don’t go away; you 
know, your mother has just passed away; you’ve got your siblings behind you… blah 
blah,” you know.  And he… he… compelled me, you know, to go to his lawyer, and I 
told him, “ey look! [chuckles] the lawyer, he might be a lawyer and a friend of yours, but 
maybe he is not acquainted with things like this,” and all that.  But he insisted that we do 
that, and apparently the lawyer phoned the police in Colesberg [and] said, “do you… are 
you looking for this person?”  And they asked, “where is this person at?” “Okay, he is a 
son of my friend and he is around…” and they said, “no, call him into your office.”  And 
I was called into his office.  I was arrested [chuckles] in that office. I was arrested by 
Bloemfontein police there and later on, Colesberg came to fetch me.  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P2: I was given a bail and… but… most the time, I spent it in prison; I was detained 
almost every second week after my release. There was a day, it was in September, 
September ’86; I was released from the detention after few months in detention… about 
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four months in detention… five months in detention, and I only stayed two days 
[chuckles] and I was frogmarched from the township to the police station in daylight 
[chuckles], only to be released few weeks before we went on trial at the then Supreme 
Court in Grahamstown… yho… in… in Graaf Reinet. 
Sipho: Mhhh  
P2: okay okay I was never tortured or beaten up during my arrest  
Sipho: Mhh ehh, you said you mentioned that most likely people in Colesberg did not 
start violence that it is the police the provocation that led… 
P2: to the incidents of violence, yha there were some few evidence of violence you know 
by the youth in Colesberg like the police were driven out of the township their houses 
were attacked, some of them their properties were burnt out.  
Sipho: Mhh… 
P2: You know, that response to the police brutality, it only happened after the police had 
beaten up people, has arrested people, has also killed people.  
Sipho: Okay.   
P2: But before that, there was no violence, hence, we made a peaceful… [clears throat] a 
peaceful meeting, and met with the authorities.  We never had any intentions of becoming 
violent… 
Sipho: Mhh. 
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P2: And, you know, last time, I also mentioned that, you know, this happened 
coincidentally, when there was this call from the then ANC president Oliver Tambo that 
we must render South Africa ungovernable.  We also interpreted that… okay, I mean 
[chuckles] the authorities in South Africa would never listen to anyone, but they will 
[would] just continue with their brutality because everywhere in the country (we could 
see from TV, newspapers), people were, you know, peaceful marches people were 
detained, people were killed, people were beaten up, et cetera; and we thought, “who are 
we for the… 
Sipho: Mhh.  
P2: Authorities to listen to us.” 
Sipho: I see what it meant, in your words.  The last issue that I would like to get further 
clarification on… you described the events in the court as disturbing.  
P2: During the trial?  
Sipho: Yes, you said the events in the court or trial were disturbing; can you tell me 
more? 
P2:  Oh! That was a distorted version of the whole state witnesses…  
Sipho: Okay… 
P2: of what has [had] transpired.  Even their witnesses, who were never there…  
Sipho: Mhhh. 
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P2:  because if they were there, like Mpikiso, I mean, he was a clear municipal police… 
what we called then “green flies” if they were around there… 
Sipho: Mhh… 
P2: they could have arrested the people, you know?  
Sipho: Okay.  
P2: They could have immediately arrested, I believe, or perhaps we believe, that the 
police only arrested us, you know, started to be looking for us, for this… for that incident 
of the burning of Nokwakwa because P1 made a confession…  
Sipho: Okay…  
P2: You know [clears throat], and out [of] that confession, then they found witnesses.  
Sipho: Okay. 
P2:  One of the witnesses was not happy about his testimony because it was a distorted 
version and it was something he was told say against us in court.  As a result, he 
approached Charles a few months after, as I understand, or as I was given to understand, 
a few months after trial, when he heard that P1 was about to be hanged, and said, “man! I 
feel so bad because what I said during the trial was really not what I experienced or what 
I witnessed; I was told to say that.”  And he made several statements under oath to that 
effect and even lawyers made application for… for… for the stay of execution based on 
the new evidence that came into light.  
Sipho: Mhh… okay. 
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P2: He was even prepared; he even went to… there was this news paper called The New 
Nation.  Zwelakhe Sisulu was the editor then; he was even… he was interviewed by New 
Nation’s journalists.  You know, there is a full story, if maybe you would [be] able to get 
to… to the archives of the now… now defunct New Nation… I am not sure where that 
is… maybe if you can find out, you might get that the now defunct New Nation… 
Sipho: Okay, so it was disturbing; I mean, the process was disturbing in the sense that 
what transpired was not presented… 
P2: Portrayed, yha, in court the way it happened… I mean, what was most disturbing 
[was that] people whom you thought you know, they got you… you’ve got no grudges 
[chuckles] against them… you know, people whom you regard as friends, they were to 
testify against you, and they will come with the testimony which is totally not what you 
know or what really happened; that is disturbing.  
Sipho: Okay, I see.  
P2: So, I mean, this guy, shame P3 thought, “well, he cannot live with that for the rest of 
his life, so he will… better, you know, spill the beans and say, you know, what has led to 
his testimony, you know, [his] fabricated testimony in court.” Mpikiso and others until 
this day, he never [chuckles] said, “you know we are meeting,” every time I do meet him, 
but… he won’t say that, but I’ve forgiven him… 
Sipho: Mhh… 
P2:  We never talked about that, but I said, “well, if I also want to be forgiven, then I 
should also forgive those who did any harm to me” [clears throat]. 
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Sipho: I would say… I don’t know if you have anything more? 
P2: No [chuckles]. 
Sipho: Well, thanks a lot, again… 
P2: Yha, no, it’s okay. As you know, as I told you, that… sometimes it’s difficult to think 
all these things.  
Sipho: Yha…  
P2: But…  
Sipho: And I…  
P2:  Don’t hesitate if you need any clarity on anything or you would like to interview me 
further… 
Sipho: Mhhh…  
P2: Just give me a shout.  
Sipho: Okay, thank you again bro’  
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Appendix D: Interview with Mr. P3 English (translated from Xhosa) 
 
Sipho: As you know, I am investigating/research about the case of Sisi Nokwakha. 
Moreover, I’m writing about it. My request to you is tell to me according to your 
understanding, what happed. If I have some question for clarity, I will ask you. And you 
are also free to ask me questions for clarity.  
P3: The date I cannot remember. It was during 1985 and there was a consumer boycott 
you see. So people were not buying at certain places and they were compelled to buy at 
certain places (stores).  So what happened there was Sisi Nokwakha Dilato whom we 
warned not to buy from (a certain) butchery and she was working at this butchery. It 
becomes clear that she was not listening (to our warnings) and she continued buying 
from this butchery you see.  So the first day we took/confiscated/seized her things 
(groceries) from her and trampled on them.   Despite of this she kept on doing this. We 
then went to her house and there was no one in the house, we entered the house through 
the window.  We then burned the inside of the house. And we then left and slept in 
another house, because police were hunting us. We slept in another house on the way to 
town. We woke up early the next morning around the same the time she was on her way 
to work. And we waited her on her way to work because we could not find a chance of 
catching her.  So we caught her in the morning on her way work, wearing her work 
overalls. Therefore, we attacked her and she ran to the nearby house, we found her in that 
house and burnt her you see. We poured petrol over her so AA lit her, AA and so that’ll 
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show we attacked her. The police came; people screamed that here are police so we ran 
away. That’s how it went. From then what happened the police started hunting us. They 
were looking for (P3 [nickname])  [nickname] P3, and I told them I am not P3 
[nickname] I am Y[giving his real name]. They eventually found and arrested me, so we 
were caught/arrested. They took us one by one and tortured us. They would put our 
testicle in the drawer. They made braai underneath, whilst hanging you and they were 
beating you while doing all those things.  It was Leeman, Libi Maliti, and this white man 
Souerman Spoorie—they called him Spoorie but he is no longer a detective—and Jansen 
and so on.  It become clear that no! I could not stand the torture. So I told them what 
happened. Then they told me not to tell it as it had happened and that I should tell it their 
way. They then made me a state witness. So we went to Graaf-Reinet for the hearings of 
the case where I gave false statement. The statement I gave in court was the statement 
that I was told by them. 
Sipho: Okay Bra I want some clarity. You say they hanged you and braai-ed. How did 
this happen? 
P3: They tie you to the tree naked. They tie your feet and arms (stretched). Beneath you 
on the ground they made fire and they made braai. Then what burned you is the 
steam/vapour that comes from the braai fire.  
Sipho: Oh, so it is the steam that burns you?  
P3: Even in the cells, they shot us with teargas whilst we were inside the cell. We ended 
up bleeding. Do you see? When we were released, outside in the community they started 
looking for us again. At one point  they shot us with pellets next to Reverend Tozi’s 
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house. The house that is now staying Bhuti Samuel.  You see what happened the police 
had tables with drawers.  So the police took your testicles, put them in the drawer, and 
put your penis on the desk. They then close drawer with you testicles inside it. They then 
beat you and there is nothing you could do. All these things were done to us by the police 
from Sanlam and by Riot Squad from Oudtsoorn 
Sipho: You said that you went to the house the first time? So how many times did she 
buy from the butchery?? 
P3: We warned her. If I remember well we warned her three times. She kept on buying 
and we kept on warning her. Until we had to take the decision.  
Sipho: Mhm what decision? 
P3: We decided to burn her once and for all because she persistently kept on buying from 
places that were boycotted.  Another thing she had laid charges against with the police, 
because we took her shopping goods from her and destroyed them. So we decided that we 
would do what we did. A community meeting was called and everybody was told where 
to buy from and where not to buy from. So every resident knew about this, where to buy 
and where not to buy.  So it was me, P1 and E. 
Sipho: Who is P1? 
P3: It is P1, E, T, JV,J was there as well,  AA, and P2  
Sipho: People who where what? What did they do? 
P3: .We were together when this happened. We all burned her. But what is false is that 
they said she was lit by.. P1, (but) AA is the one who lit her. Whilst burning her, we were 
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beating her doing all those things, you know. We wanted to… we intended…to put tyre 
on her. Because the police were called, when the police were coming we ran away before 
we could put tyre on her.  
Sipho: What did she say? 
P3:  She was crying now saying we must forgive her, this and that. We were telling her 
we would not forgive her because we warned you several times and you would not listen, 
you did it deliberately and then you go and report us to the police for destroying your 
goods. 
Sipho: Okay, Mhh. So when you caught her… where did you catch her, where? 
 
P3: At the house… you see, when you go down towards town behind Sisi Rosa’s house, 
you can see her house. We caught her you see where… Thembile Dilato’s house. That’s 
the house where Bhuti Bonani was staying, my uncle Bonani is the father of Mazwi 
Ndlambe. Bhuti Bonani is the one who used to stay in that house. So when we caught her 
she ran into that yard (premises). Therefore, we did everything there… inside that yard. 
Sipho: Mhhh 
P3: We did it in that yard. 
Sipho: Okay.  
P3: Yes  
Sipho: You say you beat her. How did you beat her or with what? 
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P3: We beat her with hand and stones, you see. 
Sipho: Okay …. 
P3: We poured petrol on and AA lit her after he lit her, we did not give her to get a 
chance to get inside the house. We kept on beating her until people screamed “here 
comes the police!” So we ran away leaving her burning. (On fire) 
Sipho: So you said.. eh… you decided that if a person buys from a boycotted shop, they 
will be burned.  
P3:  Yes we decided at a meeting that if a person buys from a boycotted shop his or her 
belongs (purchases) will be destroyed. And if she or he keeps doing the same thing, the 
decision was to burn that person. 
Sipho: So you say you were arrested.  
P3: Yes.  
Sipho: How did it happen that you were arrested? 
P3: Police were hunting us looking and searching as a result we were not sleeping in our 
homes. We slept in the houses which had no occupants. There was the pozi (shack) that 
we frequently slept at, it had no occupants or owner. We would enter this pozi late at 
night and slept there and we woke up early in the morning so that people would not be 
able to see us do you see? But they found me at my maternal uncle’s house. In fact, at 
New Brighton.  
Sipho: Mhh… okay. 
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P3: They found me I think that was about three to four in the morning. 
Sipho: At Drayini? 
P3: At New Brighton. 
Sipho: Mhhh. 
P3: So that’s where now, they kept finding us one by one and locking us in cells. They 
took us one by one and they did whatever they wanted to do with you.. interrogating you .  
So the beat you and they did not play with you, put tube on your face. There was a sack 
that they put over your face.  Yes so they did those things. 
Sipho: So what happened? Did you and others say or do anything when she was burning? 
What did the community say? 
P3: There were people watching but we did not pay attention to them. I cannot say   
heard what they said what, as I was not concentrating on them because we were 
concentrating on what we were doing. 
Sipho: What do you say to her? Others who talked to her, what did they say? Where there 
no people who said something… anything? 
P3: No. Only that we told her to burn, that she is burning because she is an informer. We 
told her, “if you had listened, you would not be in this situation now.”  We told her,  
“moreover, you turned us to the police for trampling on your belongings.  And we talked 
to you several times and you would not listen.  Rather and remember you said we would 
do you nothing. Now we’ve find you (Okay).”  
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Sipho: Oh, she said that nothing would be done on her? 
P3: Nothing would be done on her. 
Sipho: To whom did she say that? 
P3: She said that to us. 
Sipho: So you say you went to her house at night? 
P3: Yes, we went to her house couple of days before she was burnt. First thing, we went 
to her so we came to her house and she was at work. Therefore, I can say her and her 
husband were at work. Therefore, we decided to start with her house and then finish with 
her. So we find out that we had no chance because police were always there guarding her 
house. Therefore, one day we got a chance. We entered her back door house yard. We 
jumped the fence into her yard. We broke in and lit. We poured petrol, burned, and left.  
So she knew that we were targeting her. Her house now was full of police who had 
extinguished the fire and guarding her house. Therefore, we waited for her.  So we said 
we should not wait for her when she comes back from work. We should rather watch her 
when she goes to work in the morning. So we waited for her in that house. Now when… 
Sipho: Mhhhh… 
P3 …she saw us she tried to run and ran into that yard. So we have done everything in 
that yard.  
Sipho: Now, I am referring to the time when this was happening how did you feel?.. 
When this was happening, now that caught her.  
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P3: How did I feel maybe? 
Sipho: Like what did you think? How did you feel, when this was happening. Is there 
something that you feel inside you. Do you see what I mean?  
P3: No, there was nothing. The only emotion I felt was scary [isiziki].  Although we were 
doing it, it was scary (gruesome); it was scary because killing of a person, do you see? 
Sipho: Mhh… 
P3: Only that I could do nothing because it was a decision that was taken and (Moet) we 
had to do this thing because we had warned her several times so and so… 
Sipho:  Mhh… 
Sipho: By the time this happened, were you scared (Isikizi)? 
P3: I was scared, because this thing, in fact, it was the first time such a thing happened at 
Colesberg. It was the first time it happened and when we say you are an informer 
(impimpi). You knew that you would end up burnt.  You’ll be burned there is no other 
way of killing but be burnt. And even when they arrested us, we were put in different 
cells. We were not put in one cell. They divided us, they did not put us together in one 
cell / 
Sipho: Oh, so you were not put in the same cell? 
P3: We were not put in one cell. One was put in another cell and another one in another 
cell, others were taken to Norvalspont (Okay) like that. 
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Sipho: Oh, so you were not put together in the cell.  They arrested you, how did you feel 
when you were arrested?  
P3: After we’ve been arrested?  
Sipho: Yes, how did you feel when you were arrested? 
P3: It was hard; it was hard, it was painful. After we were arrested, we were tortured and 
assaulted and they did anything and everything they wanted to do to us. Perhaps it was 
their way. If you cannot tolerate the pain they will end up killing you because they did a 
lot of things to you. When they those things, you were not taken to the doctor, and your 
family was not allowed to see you. . Sometimes you are swollen, they beat you till you 
swell and would not take you to see the doctor. They’ll keep you in the cell until your 
swellings had come down. So it’s like that. 
 
Sipho: Now that this incident has passed. What do you think, how do you feel? 
P3: When I think about it ... Yes, things were horrible and these were horrible things.  
Yes, they were horrible but we could do nothing, it’s true because the government was 
treating  us badly. , Therefore, we were against the government of that era. As those were 
ways of freeing us. We wanted to be freed. So no, it was bad in those times. 
Sipho: Now when you look back, when you look at this Sisi’s case today, how do you 
feel? 
P3: No, to me that Sisi’s case was unfair? Here and there, it was unfair. 
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Sipho: Tell me more. 
P3: Because they forced me to say that it was someone else who had set her on fire. 
Whereas it was not that person who lit her. Things like that (Okay) so I decide that I 
should meet so I met. They brought Rhoshani a lawyer. I told Rhoshani how this 
happened and how it ended. So they sentenced P2 to the gallows, saying that he would be 
hanged. So I told it as it was. Moreover, P3 was saved from hanging by that way. 
(P3telling the truth as to who set her on fire.) Do you see? Roshani was a lawyer from 
Durban. So people who brought Roshani to me were Toto Mayaba, Bhuti Charles, Bhuti 
“K” Koko Asiya, do you see? They are the people who made us meet so we had to visit 
Roshani at night so and so. Therefore, we go to Roshani’s Hotel and tell him the right 
statement not the one I had given in court as I had as the state witness, not the statement 
they had given me. 
Sipho: Mhh, Ohh so you were present by the time she was caught for buying things? 
P3: I was present. 
Sipho: Okay, I’m saying by the time she was caught for buying meat. 
P3: Yes, I was present, because we were marshals.  
Sipho: Okay, after you’ve caught her, you took those things, and then she went to buy? 
P3: She went to buy again. Yes, we kept on taking her goods, throw them on the ground, 
and destroy them. We threw them out, all that. It was clear that she would not listen. She 
then put police on us and kept on doing this. We decided there is now only one decision 
if a person does a thing that is against the procedure, she should be burned. 
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Sipho: You say to me when I ask you and I need clarity—just clear clarity—how do you 
feel about her case? You say it was bad. Although I ask you what was wrong with her 
case, your reply was it was unfair that you were made to give a false statement. 
P3: Yes. 
Sipho: Okay. 
P3: Because the reason was that we should boycott their shops. We did that because we 
wanted these whites to feel the hardship so that they can turn against government so it 
was like that because in most places more coloured people were employed so now they 
do not hire black people. In places where they do not want blacks, we decided not to buy 
from. We will buy from certain places. Therefore, we only bought from De Wits and 
Khayalethu places we bought from. 
Sipho: Now these police, those you had mentioned with names, by the time they were 
beating you. What were they saying when torturing you? 
P3: They said I must tell the truth so I said there is no other truth than what I was telling 
them. In torturing me, I told them I’m not the person you say I am. They said they wanted 
[P3 referring to him by his nickname]. I say I am not [P3 nickname]. My name is P3 
P3: So they let me go in the first game. So I was freed: they hunted me again, wanting 
me. They tortured me. They released me again. The last time was the day they fetched 
me. I was asleep and it was dawn when they found me they beat me. As I’ve said, they 
said I should say it their way because the people leading us are misleading us. I said no, 
we are listening to no one. The police said our bosses were J and others what, that we 
  246
orders from J. I could not stand the torturing. I could not stand the torturing. I could not 
stand it. They ended up making me a state witness.  
Sipho: Mhh. 
P3: Yes. 
Sipho: Mhhh…they said your bosses mislead you?  
P3: Yes. 
Sipho: You were singing on that day when this was happening?  
P3: We were singing songs.  
Sipho: Do you remember which songs you were singing?  
P3: Yes the songs were “We arrived at Sanlam where there many whites.”  And the other 
song was about the spurting of our parents’ blood. If you can remember well, it says “the 
blood of our parents is gushing on the streets. Yes, Ok and we were toy-toying [singing 
and dancing to protest songs.  
P3:  the other song was “we arrived at sanlam it was filled by whites and when we 
peeped we found that blood was spilled and it was a blood of a black person.”  That 
freedom song goes that way. 
Sipho: It says we arrived at Sanlalm? 
P3: Yes it says we arrived at Sanlam and there were many whites, Sanlam was full of 
whites when we peeped black people’s blood spilling  
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Sipho: It was full. 
P3: Full of whites 
Sipho: We said. 
P3: When we peeped  
Sipho: We….? 
P3: We arrived black people blood spilling  
Sipho: Calling of black person blood spilling it end there? 
P3: Yes it ends there. 
Sipho: Okay, the one that say the blood of our parents is gushing on the streets? Does it 
end there? 
P3: Yes, the blood of our parents is gushing on the streets. Yes it also say take up an AK 
47 guerilla   
Sipho: Okay  
P3: We leave and go back home 
Sipho: Yes were these songs you sung while she was burning.  
P3: We sang we sang it before she arrived. 
We were waiting for her and we knew she was using that road, she must use it.  
Sipho: After you caught her, were you now singing? 
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P3: Now, when we caught her, there was no singing then because we were…  
Sipho: What do they say: “was “we arrived at sanlam it was filled by whites and when 
we peeped we found that blood was spilled and it was a blood of a black person.” She 
had not yet arrived?   
P3: She did not arrive then. 
Sipho: On that day after she was burned where did you go? When people said, here come 
the police. You said it was told that the police were coming. 
P3: We ran to the drayini side we went up the mountain by the graveyard and we climbed 
the mountain we went back to Bongweni. 
Sipho: Did you all leave together? 
P3: the crowd of became large; people , everybody came. Now that we were toy-toying 
the community members came out and joined the toy-toying. We were Toy-toying. 
Sipho: So you went back? Where did you start toy-toying? 
P3. Yes at Bongweni. So we toy-toyed coming down from Bongweni to town and we 
knew that we going to fight back at the whites. 
Sipho: And then what happened? 
P3: So we went, we were going down (towards town) and the whites (Boers) had already 
entered. They were now shooting us with pellets and rubber bullets so we then threw 
rocks at them with slingers. Have you seen slingers? We were not sleeping in our homes 
because they were hunting us. So we ended up sleeping in church buildings and in the 
  249
houses we knew had no occupants. We would go to these shacks and enter there at night 
so no one would see us entering or leaving.  
Sipho:  Okay, so when these people were taken to court you were at court as well, but as 
a state witness?  
P3: Yes. 
Sipho: Okay what did the police say to you when you were testifying? 
P3: They said nothing. They were happy because these people were sentenced and they 
took me back to Colesberg. 
Sipho: Okay, you, how did you feel? 
P3: No, I was not happy. I was not happy so that is why I went back to Roshani to give 
him my statement. 
Sipho: Roshani statement (Witness) you were freed 
P3: Yes. 
Sipho: Where were you then? 
P3: I was here at Colesberg, Roshani came far from Durban to take state.ments. He took 
it at Central Hotel. I gave the statement and they said that statement it would free [save] 
him from being hanged.  
Sipho: How did you feel after all this? Did they come back to tell you if that person was 
hanged or not yet? 
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P3: Yes, they came back to tell me it worked because he would not going to get the rope. 
Now he only got few years. So I was certified (happy) because he was saved from the 
rope. 
Sipho: So you not sentenced, so now nothing happened? 
P3: I was not sentenced. 
Sipho: Okay. Tata is there anything you want to tell me that I did not ask you? 
P3: There is nothing  
Sipho: Okay, for now bhuti let me say thank you.  
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: I’ll come back to you I’ll transcribe these things  
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: That’s if I’ve got questions.  
P3: Okay . 
Sipho: I will phone for you.  
P3: Okay.  
Sipho: I’ll say thanks for now. 
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: Thank you.  
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P3: Sharp.  
Sipho: Thank you.  
P3: I will be available.  
Sipho: Okay.   
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APPENDIX E: PARTICIPANT 3 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS (Xhosa) 
 
Interview with Mr. P3 
 
Sipho: Njengoko usazi ndenza uphando ngala “case” kasisi Nokwakha, ndibhala ngayo. 
Ndicela undichazele ngokwazi kwakho e-h-h-h-h ukuba kwaqhubeka ntoni. 
 Xa ndimemibuzo ndiza kubuza apho ungaqondiyo khona, nawe undibuze, nam ndiza 
kubuza apho ndingacacelwa khona. 
P3: So i“date” andisayikhumbuli, so ngo-85 into eyenzekayo kwakune“boycott” yabo. So 
abantu babengathengi kwiindawo ezithile, kufunek’ uthenge kwindawo ezithile.   So 
intw’eyenzekayo kwakunalo Sisi, uNokwakha Delato, so into eyenzakayo lo sisi 
samkhalimela into yokuba akanakuthenga eSilarheni, [be]cause akungenwa kwesi silarha 
wayephangela kuso.  So saya samwonisha kwacac’into yokuba akeva, uyaqhubekeka 
ngokumane ayekungena, ethenga kwesi silarha kungathengwa kuso,  uyabo (na). “So the 
first day” sazixutha iinto zakhe, sazinyathela, uyakona kanjalo. Kwacaci’into yokuba 
nakhona akeva, uyikhuthalele uyenza loo nto, so sahamba sobavingcela endlwini yabo.  
Kuqala safik’endlwini yakhe kungekho mntu, sangena ngefestile, satshisa phaya endlwini 
yakhe. Salala kweny’ indlu “[be]cause” amapolisa ayesi”hunter”, ubone wona amapolisa 
asifuna, so salala  kweny’indlu kwalapha kule nginq’ ibhek’e”town”. So (sa)vuka “early” 
ekuseni ngelaa xesha aphangela ngalo so sabe simlalele ke ngoku xa esihla “because” 
asinayo i“chance” yokumfumana ekuseni ephangela, enxib’i-ovaroli yakhe yomsebenzi 
  253
kanjalo.  So sabe siyamhlasela ngelo xesha ke ngoku. Wabalekela kwenye indlu, sabe 
simfumana kuloo ndlu leyo, ke ngoku sabe siyamtshisa, samgalela i“petrol”, so u AA 
wamlayita. UAA wamlayita, uA.  Sabe ngoku simhlasele, kwabe sekusiza amapolisa 
sekuthiwa nang’amapolisa, saya sabaleka injalo. Ngoku into eyenzekayo bemana besi-
“hunter” besifuna ke ngoku, so bafuna loo P3yabo, so mna ndithi andingo-Askees, mna 
igama lam nguP3. So baye bandifumane, so basithatha ke “one by one” ngoku bemana 
besithosharisha, kanjalo kufakw’ amasend’ezilayini, babraye phantsi kwakho, ujingiswe 
phezulu ubethwa nokubethwa yonke loo nto. NgooLee, Libi Maliti, noo-…. eli Bhulu,  
uSowerman, nooJansen, kanjalo. 
So kwacac’ into yokuba, no, andinyamezeli yabo(na), nokuthosharisa kwabo, so 
ndayichaza ukuba kwenzeka ntoni.  Bandixelela into yokuba mandingayibeki ngalaa 
ndlela yenzeke ngayo le nto, mandiyichaze ngolu labo uhlobo. Ndayibeka  ngalaa… then 
s’otsho enantsikeni, bandenz’i“state witness”, so saya ke kuloo “case” siyixoxa eRhafu. 
Sayixox’eRhafu, so ndachaza loo “false” yento “because” yayibubuxoki yonke laa nto 
ngohlobo bona bayibeka… nantsike ngayo, babeyibeke ngendlela yabo.  
Sipho: Okay,  so bra ubusithi,… kukho into endifuna indicacele, uthi kum,…  ubusithi 
bakuxhoma, bakubraye. Yenzeka njani?  
P3: Baya kubophelela soo emthini, (ba)bophelela inyawo, (ba)bophelel’iingalo, 
ukhululisiwe, uhamba ngaze, so phantsi kwamalahle kubasiwe mos apha, babraye, so 
wena ujinga apha, utshiswe ngelaa phunga, ngumphunga lo wenantsika.  
Sipho: Ngumphunga, okay, 
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P3:  So nasesiseleni badubul’i“teargas”.  Uphaya esiseleni, upheth’usopha, uthini-thini, 
uyabona. So bathi nangoku ke ngoku sesiphuncukile, “weer” singaphandle, bephetha 
“weer” besi”hunter”, bazosidulula futhi apha ngakwaMfundis’uTozi, phambi 
kwaMfundisi uTozi, kule ndlu ihlal’uBhuti Samyeli, basidubula apho ngepeleti.  
Indlela babezenza,… kunelayi phaya e“police station”, ezi layi zetafile. So 
bathath’amasende la wakho bawafake phakathi elayini, ipipi le yakho bayibeke phezu 
kwetafile, so iyatshixwa, bayitshixe, bakubethe.  Akukho nto unoyenza, yile genge 
kaSanlam, nale genge yeRiot yase-Oudtshoorn.   
Sipho: Uthi tata lo sisi nay’endlini yakhe. Nafika, okuqala.  Uthi uthenge kangaphi, 
wathenga kanye okanye…?  
P3: Samwonisha “because” ndiyacinga kuba ndisakhumbula kakuhle, ingathi kwakukayi- 
three  eman’ethenga, simane simwonisha, engeva.  Simane simwonisha, so 
sathath’isigqibo.  
Sipho: Mhhhh. Esithini isigqibo? 
P3: Sathath’isigqibo, into yokuba ngoku  …“because”,…. masimtshise kube kanye qha 
“because” wenz’inkani, “because” kwezi ndawo, thina masingathengi, abantu kuthiwa  
mabangathengi kuzo. Yena ukhuthalele ukuthenga kwezi ndawo. Enye eyona nto futhi 
wasifak’amapolisa “because” ukulahla kwethu iinto zakhe, so waphel’esibamba, so 
sadisayida into yokuba masimenze le nto simenze yona. (Ku)ba wonk’umntu 
wayechazelwa, (ku)ba kwakubizwa iintlanganiso, ichazwe entlanganisweni endaweni 
ezithile, nendawo ethile awunakuya kuthenga. So wonk’umntu ongumhlali ebeyazi loo 
nto leyo. So ke yayindim, nguK, uS,  
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Sipho: ngubani uK? 
P3:  NguT1, uS, nguT2, nguJV, ibe nguP, ibe nguM, ibe nguT.  
Sipho: Abantu, abantu, ni... nini ababetheni, abatheni?  
P3: Aba? Sithi sasisonke ukwenzeka kwayo yonke le nto. Samtshisa sisonke, “but” 
i”false” yile bathi phaya walayitwa ngunantsika... Zange amlayite uT1. Umntu 
owalayitayo nguAA. So ekumtshiseni kwethu sasimbetha, simenza yonk’into, uyabona, 
“because” sasifun’umlantika, sasza kumfak’itayari qha ke xa... ba... ukuba amapolisa 
cac’ukuba sekubizw’amapolisa, cab’amapolisa sesiza. Sabe siyabaleka ngaloo ndlela.  
Sipho:  Uthini yena?  
P3: Wayekhala esithi masimxolele, ntoni-ntoni. Sisithi asiz’ukumxolela ke ngoku 
“because” kudala sikunqanda, sikuwonisha, so awuva, uyenz’ enkanini “and” enye into 
ke ngoku uyajika uyahamb’ uyosibambisa kuba sithath’iinto zakho sazichitha, ntoni-
ntoni.  
Sipho: So ngoku nimbambayo, nimbamba phi, nimbambe ndawoni? 
P3: Apha kule ndlu. (U)yabona xa usihla apha emva kwasisi Rosa, uyabona kwasisi 
Rosa? Sambamba phaya.  Uyayibona le ndlu ihlal’ uThembile Dilato? Uyabona kukho 
indlu so, ... xa usihla kunendlu apha, yayihlala u..bhut’ uBonani, umalum’uBonani, utata 
kaMzwi Ndlambe, kwakuhlala yena kulaa ndlu.  Sathi ekumbambeni wabalekela kulaa 
ndlu. So sathi ekumbameni kwethu wabalekela kuloo yadi, so yonke le nto sayenzela 
kuloo yadi, phakathi eyadini apho.  
Sipho: Mhh 
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P3: Sayenzela kulaa yadi.  
Sipho: “Like”, kwathini? Nina akho nto niyithethayo ngoku nenza le nto? 
P3: Yayingekho into esasiyithetha, qha “net” sasi”busy” ngale nto siyenzayo.  
Sipho: Okay.  
P3: Yha. 
Sipho: Akhukho “like”,… uthi nambetha njani, nimbetha ngantoni? 
P3: Simbetha ngezandla, nangamatye (okay), uyabona.  
Sipho: Okay. 
P3: Sabe simgalela ke nepetrol kanjalo (okay), wamlayita ke (okay) unantsik’ uAA. 
Emlayitile njalo, ke ngoku sibe singafuni into yokuba ufun’i”chance” angen’endlwini 
(okay) uyabo(na) , so saphetha simbetha ngoku kuloo ndawo. So babe abantu bekhwaza: 
“Nang’amapolisa esiza”.  So sabaleka samshiya evuth’enjalo, (okay).  
Sipho: So kwakugqityiwe?  Nase, … nanigqibile nanimka sekugqityiwe ukuba umntu 
akuthenga uzotshiswa? 
P3: Yha, so ke kwakesikugqityiwe.  Into yokuba… xa igqityiwe into e“meetingini”, into 
yokuba aba bantu … xana  umntu  ethenge kuloo ndawo ibhokothiweyo, 
ibhoyikhothiweyo, kufunek’ ungathengi kuwo uz’ uhambe uyokuthenga iinto zakho 
ziyachithwa,” if” (uku)ba uyikhuthalele futhi nangoku sezichithiwe usaphinda usayenza 
lantw’ inye, isigqibo sasinye, into yokuba mawutshiswe.  
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Sipho: So uthi nabanjwa?  
P3: Yha  
Sipho: Kwenzeka njani ukuze nibanjwe?  
P3: Ukubanjwa, … sasimane, … bemane besizingela mos, besifuna, behambe 
besigqogqa, se’phethe ke ngoku, … upheth’ ungalali kowenu, …sihambe silale kwezi 
ndlu zingenabantu;… ke ikhona nepozi esasithand’ukulala kuyo “because” 
yayingenabantu, ingenamnikazi wayo,… s’okungena kule pozi ngobusuku, ..silal’apho, 
sivuke “early” abantu bangasiboni, uyabona. (Mhh) “but” mna ukundifumana kwabo 
bandifumana ekhaya, kwamalume wam.  ”In fact” phaa eNew Bright (Mhh, okay). 
Bandifumana apho. Ndiyacinga kwakungaboo- 4, … oo-3 (Mhh), ekuseni kanjalo, 
(Mhh).  
Sipho: Edrayini? 
P3: eNew Bright.   
Sipho: Okay, (Mhhh)  
P3: So kulapho ke ngoku, bekumane besifumana “one bye one” ke ngoku, besivalela 
esiseleni. (Ba)mane besithatha “one by one”, (ba)mane bokwenza loo nto bafun’ 
ukuyenza kuwe, (okay) yha. Bekuncwina, bokuncwina. So ukubethwa ubudlaliswa, 
ufakwe netyhupu aph’ebusweni. Ikhona ingxowa ebabeyifaka aph’ ebusweni (Mhh), yha.  
So babesenza ke lezo zinto …..(Mhh) 
Sipho:  Eheee. Ngoku baba, “like” zang’uve, xa usiva “like” nje ngeli xesha isenzeka le 
nto, bathini?  Akukho bantu babukeleyo? Bathini abany’abahlali?  
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P3:  Babekhona abantu ababebukele, bekhona abantu, babebukele qha ke zange, … 
sasi…sasingabahoyi. Andinakuthi ndandiyiva,… ndayiva into ababezithetha, ntoni- 
ntoni, so ndandinga“concentratanga” kule yabo into sasi“concentrate” kule nto 
siyenzayo into.  
Sipho: Nina nithini kuye? Abanye ababethetha kuye babesithini kuye?  Zange kubekho 
abantu ababenento, abanamazwi abawathethayo noba anjani? 
P3: No, sasimxelela nje: “Yitsha, kaloku ibibubumpimpi bakho sowusitsha nje ngoku 
“because” ukuba wawu….wawuvile ngowungekho kule nto “and” ujike wahamba 
wosi….wasibambisa nosibambisa, … (ku)ba sigqabhuz’into zakho,… sithath’ into zakho 
sazinyathela.  So ke and kudala sithetha nawe ungeva, so ke wathi wawutshilo mos ukuba 
soze wena sikwenze niks, ngoku sikufumene”, (okay) 
Sipho: Oh, wayethe yena soz’enzwe nto? 
P3: Soz’enzwe nto? 
Sipho: Wayesitsho kubani? (okay) 
P3: Wayesitsho kuthi 
Sipho: So uthi naniye endlini yakhe ebusuku? 
P3: Mhh--ya, “no” sasiye ezintsukwini endlini yakhe. Into yokuqala saqala endlini yakhe, 
so safik’ endlini yakhe sasi… wayes’emsebenzini. Ndingatsho yena nomyeni wakhe 
besemsebenzini so sa”decida” ukuba masiqale ngendlu yakhe and “then” sizobuya 
sigqibele ngaye. So safuman’into yokuba nalapho asina”chance because” amapolisa 
ayathand’ukuba phaya, agad’indlu yakhe, ntoni-ntoni. So ke safumane,… ngelinye 
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lange…i-“chance”.  Sangena kwi”yard” engasemva, satsib’iyadi, songena ke ngoku. 
Saqhekeza, sangena, salayita, sagelel’ipetrol, satshisa semka.  (Mhh) So sabe siyazi 
ukuba silalele yena. Yab’indlu yakhe ke ngoku… iphind’amapolisa, … ntoni-ntoni 
oyicima, ayigada. So samlalela yena into’ba,... sathi “no” kungcono simyeke xana 
etshayisa simgade ekuseni xana ephangela. So samlalela  kuloo ndlu ke ngoku.  Wathi 
(Mhh) xa (a)sibonayo, ezam’ukubaleka eyotshona kuloo yadi, yonk’into sayenzela kuloo 
yadi.  
Sipho:  Ngoku, sendithetha ngeli xesha yenzekayo le nto, wena uziva unjani? Ngeli 
xesha yenzakayo ngoku phaya, lo sisi sesimbambile. 
P3: Ndiziva njani, mhlawumbi?  
Sipho: E-e nje, wena,..” like” yintoni oyicingayo, oziva njani “like” ngeny’ixesha into xa 
isenzeka ukhona ne, uba nento oyifulayo apha kuwe, uyabona. 
P3:  “No”, yayingekho into ndandiyifila, qha ke net into endandiyifila  njena 
yayingamasikizi nangona siyenza le nto “but” yayingamasikizi, yayingamasikizi 
“because” ukubulawa komntu, yabona. ...(Mhh)  Qha ke kodwa ke ndingenakuthini 
“because” yayinguni.., yayisisigqibo esasithathiwe “and moet” (uku)ba siyenzile ke le 
nto “because” simwonishe kaninzi, so ke… so ke.  (Mhh) 
Sipho: Ngeli xesha yenzekayo le nto wena unamasikizi? 
P3: Ndandinamasikizi, yazi, le nto, “in fact” zange,… yayiqala ukwenzeka eColesberg 
intw’ enje. Yayiqal’ ukwenzeka, so ke xa sesitsh’ ubuyimpimpi ubuyazi ukuba “net” 
isiphetho sakho kukutshiswa qha.  Uza kutshiswa be ayikho eny’indlela yokukubulala, 
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uza kutshiswa.  “And” ke nangoku ke sebesibambile babengasivaleli ke esiseleni esinye, 
babesohlula singadityaniswa, yha (Mhh).  
Sipho: Oh, so esiselini nani… naningadityaniswa?  
P3:  Sasingadityaniswa, sasisohlulwa,… omnye kwesinye isisele, omnye kwesinye 
isisele; eny’igenge ithathwe iyobekwa komaNorvalsport. (Okay). Njalo. 
Sipho: Banibamba ngoku? Ngoku sowuzifula njani ngeli xesha sekubanjiwe? 
P3: Sesibanjiwe  
Sipho: Ewe, wena uzufula njani ngeli xesha sesibanjiwe ke ngoku?  
P3: Kwakunzima, kwakunzima. Yayiyintlungu, kwakubuhlungu ngo’sibanjiwe 
“because” sasibethwa, sisenziwa yonke into . Yayindlela nje mhla(wu)mbi, … and 
ukungakwazi ukunyamezela kuphethe mhla(wu)mbi bekubulala nokubulala, yonke loo 
nto (Mhhh) “because” ininzi into ababeyenza. (Mhh).  akukwazi “even” xa bekwenze loo 
nto leyo kwakungekho nento yokuba ngoku uza balekiselwa kugqirha “and” i“family” 
akufunekanga ikubone nokubona uphaya esiseleni. Ngeny’ixesha udumbile ,ubethwe 
wadumba, abakudibanisi nagqirha, ugcinwa kwesa sisele “till” usake.   
Sipho :(Mhh)  
P3: So kunjalo.  
Sipho: Namhlanje le nto yadlula.  Xa uyijonga pha seyidlulile… esi sehlo yintoni 
oyicingayo, ufula njani, uziv’ unjani?  
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P3:  Xa ndiyicinga nje man, e-eyi,… (pause and take a depressive tone and looks spaced). 
Yha, (i) (zi)zinto ezazibuhlungu ezi zinto, uyabona, ezazibuhlungu kodwa ke 
sasingenakwenza ngakumbi “because” ke eyi! mnyani k-e eee! urhulumente 
wayesiphethe kakubi, uyabona, so sasi“against” urhulumente welo xesha “because” 
yayizindlela zokusilis….zoku… zokusikhulula, … sikhululeke.  So hayi kwakubuhlungu 
nyani ke ngaloo maxesha. 
Sipho: Xa u… xana ke ngoku ujonga,… sesithi ke ngoku namhlanje ujonga into, i“case” 
yala sisi wena uyabona napha uziv’unjani xana…. ? 
P3: No i“case” yala sisi kum, kakhulu njena yabi… yaba “unfair” uyabona, 
kwint’ezithile yayi“unfair”.   
Sipho: Ngandicacisele, njani?   
P3: “Because” into yokubana babefostela int’okuba, .. mandithi ngubani obetshisile 
“when” ubani engakanga ndamlayita uyabona into ezinjengezo. (okay) So ndadisayida 
into yokubana mandidibane,… ndadibana,  bandiphathela uRoshani igqwetha, so 
uRoshani ndamchazela yonk’into ukuba le nto yahamba njani, yaphelela phi. So babe 
bemnike unantsike lo, UP2 lo i“hung pale” besithi uzayokuxhonywa,  
 so ndayichaza ngobunjalo bayo, so wabe ke ngoku usinda ngaloo ndlela entambeni, 
uyabona.  URoshani wayeligqwetha elisuka eDurban.  So abantu ababendidibanisa naye 
yayinguToto Mayaba  no bhuti Charles, Bhuti “K” uKoko Asiya, uyabona  
Sipho: Okay. 
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P2:  Ngabo abantu ababendidibanisa naye. So ufumanise into yokuba nakuRoshani lowo 
fune’sihambe ngobusuku ntoni-ntoni, (Mhhhh) siya kuRoshani ehotele. Yonke le nto, 
ubeke ke ngoku i“statement” esi“right”, hayi esiya isi“statement” babendingqinisa sona.  
Sipho: Mhhh, Ohhh, So wawukhona wena ngeli xesha abanjelwa ukutheng’izinto.  
P3: Ndandikhona.  
Sipho: (Okay) Sendithetha ngeli xesha abanj’ukuthengi nyama.  
P3:  Ndandikhona “because” sasiziiMarshalls. 
Sipho:  (Okay) and “then” nina nahamba naye emveni nimbambile, ‘ba nizithathile eza 
nto “and then” yena wahambe w’othenga? 
P3: Waphinda yena wahamba waya kuthenga (Mhmm), yha. Qho ke izinto zakhe 
besinama sizithatha sizenze loo nto, sizilahla phantsi, sizinyathele yonke loo nto, 
sizichithe, yonke loo nto.  Wafumanisi ukuba akeva, wasifaka amapolisa, wab’eyenza 
“still” le nto le. “No” sadisayida into yokuba ke ngoku isigqibo sinye bekuth(i)we umntu 
xa eyenza loo nto leyo echasene nenkqubo yethu uyatshiswa.  
Sipho: Okay. Uthi kum xa ndikubuza bra, ndifun’undicacisele nje kakuhle; uziva njani 
ngale “case” yakhe, uthi kwakubuhlungu. ”No!” xa uthi kum xa ndikubuza into 
eyayirongo ngale “case” yakhe eyayi“unfair” yinto yokuba wena wenziswa i“statement” 
esingesiso.  
P3: Yha 
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Sipho: Kuba ubethiwe, uphind’uthi kwakubuhlungu kodwa kwakungekho ndlela 
singenza ngayo kuba umntu wayesilwela inkululeko yakhe.   
P3: (Mhhh) 
Sipho:  Ndifun’ ingathi uyandicacisela kanye apho xa uthi ayikho indlela esinokwenza 
ngayo, sasilwel’ inkululeko. 
P3:  (mhhh) 
Sipho: Ibengath’uyayiphuhlisa, ingathi uyayityebisa tata.   
P3: “No”, ndithi kaloku into yayisenzeka ngelaa xesha eliya urhulumente we-Apartheid, 
wengcinezelo. So sasifun’abantu bakuthi bamanyane senze intw’eyi“one”, kungabikho 
mntu owenze into ngapha bebona into yokuba lo rhulumente usicinezele, … yabo.  So 
sidisayide intokuba, “no” into eyenzekayo indaw’ethile akunakuthengwa kuyo, (Mhhhh) 
uyabona, (Mhhhh), kuthengwe endaweni (Mhhh) ethile, and “then” ke ngoku into 
eyayisenzeka kwezi ndawo kuthengwa kuzo,… into eyasisenzeka kwakune“discount” 
eyayisenzeka (okay) “and” ezi shopu zibenemali ethile eziyinika (okay) umbutho, 
uyabona (okay), ezi sithi makuthengwe kuzo (Mhhhh) . 
Sipho:Okay 
P3: ”Because” into njeba si..  makungathengwa kwezo “shop” ezo (Mhhhh), 
sasisenz’into yokuba nabo bayive la maBhulu into yokuba atsala nzima (Mhhh) azokwazi 
nawo uba “against” urhulumente (Mhhh).    So kwakunjalo, “because” indawo ezininzi 
“let’s say” kweziny’iindawo bekusebenza mos amaQheya kakhulu (Mhhhh), so ke ngoku 
ababaqashi abantu abamnyama. Saqonda okay ababafun’abantu abamnyama so ke le 
  264
ndawo asuzuthenga kuyo. Sakuvala, sakutheng’endaweni ethile.   So kwakuthengwa 
“only” kuDe Wits (mhhh) nakuKhayalethu (Mhhh), indawo ekwakuthengwa kuzo.  
Sipho: Ngoku wona amapolisa, ngoku eli xesha la mapolisa ubuwabiza pha ngamagama 
ngeli xesha akubethayo athini?  Sekuthotsharisha ke ngoku.  
P3: Athi mandichaz’inyani so ndibachezele ayikho eny’inyani endinayo ngaphandle 
kwale nto ndibachezela yona ekundithotsharisheni kwabo, ndibendisithi kwaye 
andinguye lo mntu nithi ndinguye bath… bafun’ u-Askes, ndithi andingo-Askes mna 
igama lam ndingubani.  
Sipho: Okay  
P3:  So baye bandiphuncula kwi“game” yokuqala, ndaye ndaphuncuka so ndabuyela, 
baphinda bandi“hunter” ,bendifuna bondithotsharisha, ndikhululeka “weer” bandikhulula 
so okokugqibela ke ngoku yile mini ze bondilanda ekuseni ndilele ke ngoku. Bathi 
bandifumana bondenza eza nto zabo njengoba bendichaza. Babesithi mandiyibeke ngolo 
hlobo (okay) “because” aba bantu siva ngabo bayasilahlekisa nton- ntoni (okay), Ndathi 
“no” asivi ngamntu. babesithi (mhh)  (Mhh) OoPinkjan ntoni- ntoni, so siva ngoPinkjan. 
So ke andamelana nayo indaba yothotsharishwa (mhhh), yabona z’andamelana nayo, so 
ndaphetha ke ngoku bandithatha bandenza i“state witness” sabo (mhh).  
Sipho: Mhh,  
P3: Yha  
Sipho: Mhh. Bath’obaas benu banilahlekisa,  
P3: Yha  
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Sipho: Nani, zange nina khe… nanicula ngalaa mini yenzakayo laa “way” nanicula. 
P3: Sasicula amagwijo,  
Sipho: Awukhumbuli nanicula awaphi?  
P3: Athini? “eSanlam, (okay) safika eSanlam kuzele ngamaBhulu, negazi labazali 
bethu”, ukuba ndisakhumbula kahle. “Igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni”. 
(okay) Yha (okay) sasibetha ke nethebula (okay), Yha 
Sipho: Safik’eSanlam  
P3: Mhhh 
Sipho: Phi? 
P3: ESanlam? (Mhhh) safika le Sanlam kuzele amaBhulu, xa’thi masikroba safika 
kuphalala igazi lomntu omnyama, yayisitsho loo“freedom song” 
Sipho: Ithi safika eSanlam  
P3: Ewe, ithi safike, safike le Sanlam kuzele amaBhulu xa’thi masikroba safika kuphalala 
igazi lomntu omnyama 
Sipho: Kuzele? 
P3: Kugcwele ngamaBhulu  
Sipho: Sathi ? 
P3: Masikroba  
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Sipho: Sa….? 
P3: Safika kuphalala igazi lomntu omnyama  
Sipho: Kuphalala ig….azi  lo mntu o…..mnyama, okay…. iphelela apha?  
P3: Iphelele 
Sipho: Okay, eli lithi igazi labazali bethu limpompoza, iphelele apho?  
P3: Yha, igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni (E-e-we) thabath’ u-AKHA gerila.  
Sipho: Okay  
P3: Sihambe sigoduke  
Sipho: E-e-e-we, thabathu u-AKHA, sihambe sigoduke. Ziculwa nga..., ziculwa ngeli 
xesha lo SISI atshiswayo. 
P3: Zicula (okay), sayicula engaveli yena, engakafiki “because” sasimlindile “because” 
sasiyazi uhamba ngalaa ndlela (okay), uza “moet” ehambe (okay) 
Sipho: Ngo’ senimbambile zange ni... kwakungaculwa?  
P3:  Hayi ngo’ sesimbabile kwakungasekho kucula ke ngoku “because” sasesi... (okay).  
Sipho: Zithini? Safika eSanlam kuzele amaBhulu sathi masikroba safika kuphalala igazi 
lomntu omnyama. Okay, ithi igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni, okay.  
Akakafiki ngeli xesha, useza.  
P3: Akafiki yena, akakafiki. 
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Sipho: Ngale mini, emveni ‘ba egqity’ ukutshiswa tata, na...na… naya phi? Xa kuth’wa 
nanga amapolisa, uthi kwath’wa amapolisa ayeza.  
P3: Sabaleka seza ngapha eDrayini (mhh). Senyuka apha ngedrayini s’oqabela entabeni 
(mhhh) apha ngasemangcwabeni, (Mhh), so sabuyela ngaph’emaBongweni ke ngoku, 
ntoni-ntoni.  (Mhh), yha 
Sipho: Nihambe nonke? 
P3:  Sabe ke ngoku sekugcwele. Wabe esiza umntu,... wab,...e kusiza wonke umntu xa 
sesibeth’ethebula ke ngoku, kuphuma ilokishi yonke ke ngoku, yajoyina ithebula ke 
ngoku (okay), sabe sezibethi ithebula ke ngoku (okay) 
Sipho: Najikela, naqal’itoyi toyi.  
P3: Yhee eBongweni, so sabeth’ ethebula sesisihla, (Mhhh), sabe ke ngoku siqonda nathi 
siyozilwela kula maBhulu. (mhh)  
Sipho: ”And then” kwathini ke ta? 
P3: So sahamba sa... sasilee ezantsi, kanti nyani ke amaBhulu sengenile (mhhh),  abe ke 
ngoku sesidubula ngepeleti nee“rubber bullet” (mhhhh),  sabe ke thina siwagibisela 
ngezi “lenger veer”, (mhh), uyayibona intshuntshe.  Sasingcucalaza singalal’ emakhaya 
“because” bayasifuna, so into eyenzekayo ke ngoku sihamba silala kwezi zakhiwo 
zecawa, ... apha ezicaweni nakwizindlu esiyaziyo loo ndlu ayinamntu (mhh). Sokungena 
ngobusuku, singabonwa mntu, singafuni ukuba sibonwe ngabantu xa singena apho, 
(okay) .Nophuma ke besiphuma eli (mhh), yha.  
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Sipho: H-h-ha, okay.  So wena ngoku aba bantu basiwa e”court” nawe ukhona aph’e” 
court” ,wena ulingqina lika rhulumente?  
P3 : Yha 
Sipho: Okay, bathini kuwe ngoku amapolisa wena xa sowungqina?  
P3: Akhonto bayithetha “because” bavuya nje ngoku xa seku... benikwa isigwebo, le 
genge, xa ndiyongqina phaya (okay), bandithatha bandibuyisa (okay) back eColesberg.   
Sipho: Okay, wena waziva njani?  
P3: No, ndandingonwabanga (Mhh), ndandingonwabanga (mhh), “so that is why” ke 
ndakwazi ukuphinda ndinikezele ubungqina kuRoshani (mhh), yha.  
Sipho: Emveni kobungqina bukaRoshani uthi wab’uyakhululwa.  
P3: Yha  
Sipho: Wena uphi ke ngoku?  
P3: Mna ndilaph’eColesberg. URoshani wayesuke lee eDurban wazothatha ke ngoku eso 
“statement” (mhh) si –esithathela eCentral Hotel (mhh), so ndabe ndiyamnika obu 
bungqina esithi oba bungqina ndimnika bona buzakwazi ukumkhulula entambeni (Mhh) 
uyabona, engakaxhonywa (okay), uTefo. 
Sipho: Wena waziva njani ke ngoku emveni kwaloo nto? Babuya bazokuxelela futhi lo 
mntu uxhonyiwe okanye akaqhonywanga?  
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P3: Yha babu ..babuya ezondichazela wathi isebenzile “because" u… akazubheka 
ntanjeni (Mhh) ngoku, so ufumene nje iminyaka (okay), so ndabe ndixolile “because” 
ekubeni ba usindile entanjeni yabo ba… (okay)  
Sipho: So wena zang’ugwetywe ke ngoku, … zange kwenzek…..? 
P3: Zange ndigwetywe mna.  
Sipho: Okay, okay. Eny’into tata ofun’ukundichazela yona endingayibuzi? 
P3: Ayikho.  
Sipho: (Okay) Okwangoku bhuti mandith’enkosi. 
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: E-e-eh. Ndiza kubuyela kuwe wena ezi zinto ndiza kuzikhuphela.  
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: (Uku)ba ndinemibuzo, mhlawumbi.  
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: Sowumkile ndizakufowunela.  
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: Ndinayo ifowuni yakho.  
P3: Okay.  
Sipho: Ndizakuthi enkosi okwangoku.  
  270
P3: Okay. 
Sipho: Ndiyabulela. 
P3: Sharp. 
Sipho: Ndiyabulela.  
P3: Hayi uza kundifumana.  
Sipho: Okay. 
 
 
